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ABSTRACT 
Adapting the question at the end of Keats's 'Ode to a Nightingale', 
this thesis argues that reading poetic texts involves a form of 
suspension between waking and sleeping. Poems are not the product of an 
empirical dreamer, but psychoanalytic understandings of dream-work help 
to provide an account of certain poetic effects. Poetic texts resemble 
dreams in that both induce identificatory desires within, while 
simultaneously estranging, the reading process. In establishing a 
theoretical connection between poetic texts and drearit-work, the 
discussion raises issues concerning death, memory and the body. 
The introduction relates Freudian and post-Freudian articulations 
of dream-work to the language of poetry, and addresses the problem of 
attributing desire "in" a literary text. Interweaving the work of Borch- 
Jacobsen, Derrida and Blanchot, the discussion proposes a different 
space of poetry. By reconfiguring the subject-of-desire and the 
structure of poetic address, the thesis argues that poetic "dreams" 
characterize points in texts which radically question the identity and 
position of the reader. 
Several main chapters focus on texts - poems by Frost and Keats, 
and Freud's reading of literary dreams - in which distinctions between 
waking and sleeping, familiarity and strangeness, order and confusion 
are profoundly disturbed. The latter part of the thesis concentrates on 
a textual "unconscious" that insists undecidably between the cultural 
and the individual. Poems by Eliot, Tennyson, Arnold and Walcott are 
shown to figure strange dreams and enact displacements that blur the 
categories of public and private. Throughout, the study confronts the 
recurrent interpretive problem of reading "inside" and "outside" textual 
dreams. 
This thesis offers an original perspective on reading poetry in 
conjunction with psychoanalysis, in that it challenges traditional 
assumptions about phantasy and poetry dependent upon a subject 
constituted in advance of a poetic event or scene of phantasy. It brings 
poetry into systematic relation with Freud's work on dreams and 
consistently identifies conceptual and performative links between 
psychoanalysis and literature in later modernity. 
CO]IFTENTS 
Acknowledgements 
Abbreviations 
1. Poetry and Dreams: an ln(tro)duction 
Literature and Psychoanalysis 
Reading Dreams -a brief history 
Poetry and the Unconscious 
The Desire of a Text 
The Dreaming Space of Poetry 
2. Just Sone Human Sleep 
Adequate Satisfaction 
The two-pointed ladder 
The Form that Dreaming Takes 
Honest Duplicity: Metaphor and Ambiguity 
Troubled Sleep 
Speculations on Frost: the Dream of an Afterlife 
Apples in the Fall 
A Sleep of Death 
3. Play Time: creative daydreaming in 'Ode to a Nightingale' 
"Do I wake or sleep? " 
Imaginative Licence 
Passing time 
Textual Machinations 
Body Matters 
Interleavings 
4. Delusions and Drea in Freud's Gradiva 
The remains of a text 
Familiar Faces 
Dreams never dreamt at all 
Authorizing Science 
Psychoanalysis as Archaeology 
Psychoanalysis as narrative, 
Living in History 
Science as a Xistress 
or the Tail of the Lizard 
5. Eliot, the Uncanny and Cultural Phantom. - 
The Unconscious and the Individual Talent 
'Gerontion' 
The First Voice of Poetry 
Secret histories 
Im-memorial Ways of Life 
The Uncanny 
The Omnipotence of Thought 
Memory and Desire 
1 
2 
6 
13 
32 
46 
61 
62 
67 
70 
74 
82 
88 
95 
103 
114 
114 
119 
122 
129 
134 
137 
143 
143 
145 
149 
153 
166 
171 
174 
182 
192 
192 
194 
203 
210 
217 
222 
224 
227 
/ 
The Hyacinth Garden 232 
Automatism and sexuality 241 
6. That Oceanic Feeling: Reflections on the Sea 
'254 
The Oceanic Feeling 255 
"The unplumbld, salt, estranging sea" 258 
A Moving Tide 260 
The Sea of Faith 267 
Superimpositions 277 
The "swaying words of the sea" 283 
Conclusion: Crossings 292 
Bibliography 297 
ACKIFOVLEDGEAMS 
This thesis is the result of five years of study and teaching, and there 
are many people to whom I am grateful for intellectual stimulation, 
helpful suggestions, support and friendship. At Stirling, I am indebted 
to Nicholas Royle, Tina Webberley and various members of 'Foreign Body'. 
Colleagues at University of Central Lancashire, particularly John 
Joughin, Megan Stern and Richard Walker in the Department of Cultural 
Studies, contributed to a vibrant research culture. Special gratitude 
goes to my supervisor, Professor David Punter, for his advice and 
unfailing confidence in my work. I would also like to thank Lucie Armitt 
for her support and encouragement over the final months leading up to 
submission. I wish to acknowledge the Department of Education for 
Northern Ireland for its award of a two-year Major State Studentship. I 
would also like to thank the Sutherland Page Trust for their assistance, 
in the form of a grant awarded in 1992. My greatest debt of gratitude is 
owed to my parents, James and Susan, for their unwavering support, 
loyalty and generosity. This work is dedicated to them. 
ABBREVIATIONS 
The following abbreviations are used in the main text: 
P. F. L - Sigmund Freud, The Penguin (and Pelican) Freud Librarjy, eds. 
Angela Richards and Albert Dickson. Particular volumes are 
identified below: 
AL - Art and Literature G. F. L. 14) 
CRS - Civilization, Society and Religion (P. F. L. 12) 
ILP - Tntrnductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (P. F. L. 1) 
OX - On Metap5ychology: the Theory of Esychoanalysis G. F. L. 11) 
TID - The Interpretation of Dreams (P. F. L. 4) 
SE - Sigmund Freud, Standa ition of the Co=lete Psychoanalytic 
Works, trans. James Strachey. 24 vols, 1953-74 
E- Jacques Lacan, Ecrits: A Selection 
FFC - Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis 
ECP - T. S. Eliot, CollectPH Poems 1909-1962 
/ 
I 
POETRY AND DREANS: AN IN(TRO)DUCTION 
Keats's 'Ode to a Nightingale' closes by asking itself an 
unanswerable question: "Do I wake or sleep? " The "waking dream of 
poetry" has long been a beguiling notif for writers and readers who 
readily translate dream as pleasurable escapist fantasy. Both writer and 
reader can treat the text as safe play, a space in which to stage 
"other" worlds. Yet in Keats's poem the border between waking and 
sleeping, familiarity and strangeness, order and confusion is profoundly 
disturbed. Its undecidable question implicates the reader, who is 
neither securely inside or outside the textual "dream". This thesis 
considers how we might compare poems and dreams, and to whom we might 
attribute "desire" in poetry. It asks who or what : might "fall asleep" in 
a poetic text, a question that has implications for the reading process, 
the subject of poetry and the subject of desire. It examines poems that 
explicitly refer to acts of dreaming and also those that manifest a 
similar disturbance between waking and sleeping to that in 'Ode to a 
Nightingale'. In the attempt to establish who or what might be 
"dreaming" in the work of poetry, the discussion engages with a number 
of related issues to do with desire, death, history and the body. This 
opening chapter re-ýiews the ways in which the relationship between 
poetry and dreams has been read by literary criticism, psychoanalysis 
and cultural theory, and closes by offering a different conception of 
the space and subject of poetry. 
1 
The title of this thesis denotes a certain "coming-after" Freud, an 
act of commenoration and a concern with the effects and legacies of his 
departure. This coming-after could be read as an act that wavers between 
violent interpretive intentt reverent procession and recognition of the 
uncanny resonances that Freud bequeaths to us. This study will read 
Freud's work alongside poetic texts, tracing the strange genealogies, 
hauntings and repetitions that link literature and psychoanalysis in 
reading dreams in the wake of Freud. 
Literature and Psychoanalysis 
Freud claimed that writers discovered the unconscious long before 
psychoanalysis, self-effacingly stressing the secondary and derivative 
status of many of his ideas. It is not necessary to accept or reject 
Freud's false modesty or his tracing of the history of ideas to discern 
a link between Freud's speculative, conceptualising endeavour and 
"imaginative" or "creative" activity in art. Texts are not embodiments 
but figurations of "interior" and flexterior" reality. For 
psychoanalysis, the unconscious is already conceived as a fictional 
construct, a "matter" of imagination, anecdote and intuition before it 
becomes clinical fact. This in no way denies the value or purchase of 
Freud's explorations of psychic disorders, f ixations, symptomatic 
I 
behaviour and phantasy structures, but stresses how deeply 
psychoanalysis is indebted to and invested by the fictive nature of 
reading and writing. The relation between literature and psychoanalysis 
is not a decidable question of priority or superiority: neither 
discourse definitively "discovers" the unconscious or the constitution 
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of the mind; both produce or f igure versions of that hidden economy, 
field of desires or web of traces that characterizes the unconscious. 
Dreams, the royal road to the unconscious, offer a privileged, fictional 
scene in which to encounter (both in terms of observation and affect) 
the workings of the insistent, elusive effects of desire. 
In the historical shifts in understanding of dreams and the 
unconscious, it is implicit that dreams are always figured, recorded and 
theorized in writing. The "history" of the unconscious is presented by 
Freud as a textual history. The Interpretation of Dreams opens with a 
summary of other dream- Ii terature; he deploys mythical and literary 
parallels throughout his work; and he displays a recurrent fascination 
with aesthetic creativity (dealt with at length in Chapter Four). In 
Freud's theoretical writing, this textual or linguistic history 
consistently brackets the impulse to name and scrutinize the structures 
of the mind f or science. From the dream-books and keys to dream- 
interpretation produced in ancient cultures, to the institution of 
psychoanalysis as a theoretical or scientific discourse, dreams have 
been a matter of inscription. Voice may have been privileged in the 
recounting of dreams, particularly in the analytic situation (Lacanian 
psychoanalysis is still described as the talking cure), but in 
literature and psychoanalytic theory dreams are always marked by the 
effects of writing. This is more than an historical alignment: 
attempting to understand dreams through or in writing is inextricably 
bound up with conceptualizing dreams as a form of writing. Bunyan' s 111p, 
Pilgrim's Progress "graphically" illustrates the inextricable relation 
of dreams and writing in its opening paragraph: 
As I walked through the wilderness of this world, I lighted 
on a certain place where was a den, and laid me down in 
3 
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that place to sleep; and as I slept, I dreamed a dream, 
I dreamed, and behold, I saw a man clothed with rags 
standing in a certain place, with his face from his own 
house, a book in his hand, and a great burden upon his 
back, I looked, and saw him open the book, and read 
therein,, '" 
As Jon Stratton points out, dreams become the site of Bunyan's text; 
whereas Freud treats dreams as a provisional and limited representation 
of truth that is concealed from the "world", in The Pilgrim's Progress 
"the dream provides a site of a truth which is already in the world, 
already known". ": ' Yet as this example demonstrates, any truth in a 
textual dream is necessarily mediated through reading and writing in a 
series of ways. Firstly, this textual dream places the book as a central 
image and f igures an act of reading; secondly, this dream is already 
inscribed within a literary text; thirdly, both of these inscriptions 
are part of a process of reading and interpretation. The ragged man and 
the dreamer are not the only readers implicated here, and the "certain 
place" of this dream is thus rendered considerably less certain. 
Freud's theory of dreams posits a scientific framework in which the 
dream-process could be marked and analysed. At its outset, however, 
psychoanalysis is not a science of observable data, barely a science at 
all, in fact. It proceeds by risk-taking, imagination, speculation and 
thinking limits. It foregrounds its interpretive and creative qualities 
in an explicit fashion, qualities that empirical science tends not to 
acknowledge as part of its methodology or conceptual framework. The 
interrelation of science and art has a direct bearing upon 
psychoanalytic dream-theory. On the one hand, psychoanalysis turns 
dreanr-interpretation into a body of knowledge: dreams are decisively 
mapped and brought to the light of objective scrutiny. On the other 
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hand, Freud acknowledges the provisional status of dream-analysis, 
enphasisi-ng how dreams retain their nystery and resist the colonizing 
tendencies of conventional science. Dreams remain at the fringes of 
discursive practice. Just like drearn7work, dreami-analysis is a form of 
thought, creative and speculative. This hovering between the scientific 
and aesthetic is not merely a symptom of the inadequacy of 
psychoanalysis: it is an ineluctable part of its theoretical venture to 
contaminate boundaries between "official" and "unofficial" knowledge. To 
"comprehend" the unconscious requires both deductive and speculative, 
"scientific" and "artistic" thought. Literary criticism and 
psychoanalysis are related, but in no way identical enterprises. Since 
Freud, the consonances between literature, criticism and psychoanalysis 
as discourses have become clearer. They are situated in a structure of 
mutual contamination, since there is no clear way that any of these 
discourses can be said to remain definitively outside the others. 
Shoshana Felman seeks to unseat the domination of one f ield of 
enquiry over the other: 
While literature is considered as a body of language - 
to be interpeted - psychoanalysis is considered as a body 
of knowledge whose competence is called upon to interpret, 
Psychoanalysis, in other words, occupies the place of a 
subject, literature that of an object; the relation of 
interpretation is structured as a relation of master to 
slave,,, (3) 
Felman argues that neither literature nor psychoanalysis can claim the 
position of privifeged or metalinguistic discourse and that each 
discourse represents an integral part, even the unconscious, of the 
other. Literature can be read as psychoanalysis and psychoanalysis can 
be read as literature: neither has autonomy or inherent authority: 
Literature is therefore not simply outside psycho- 
analysis, since it motivates and inhabits the very 
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names of its concepts, since it is the inherent 
reference by which psychoanalysis names its findings, "' 
In Freud's essay on Jensen's Gradiva., a sliding between these "poles" 
occurs; psychoanalysis operates at times like literature, and Freud is 
attracted to a literary text that operates like psychoanalysis. In his 
act of speculation, he writes about another creative work. The master- 
slave relation is never displaced, however; despite Freud's deference 
and collaborative claims, psychoanalysis reads the text from a position 
of authority. Literature and psychoanalysis perform double movements, 
each defending their specificity as discourses while reading and being 
read in terms of the other. Thus there exists a power relation between 
the two, whereby each discourse is drawn to assume the place of the 
other; this appropriative, identificatory desire is not to be understood 
as appropriative in the sense of obtaining an object of desire, but as 
an act of taking the place of an other. 
Reading Drea -a brief history 
Since Freud states that creative writers and artists discovered the 
unconscious before psychoanalysis, it is perhaps instructive to consider 
the ways in which dreams are represented in literature before Freud's 
psychoanalytic investigations begin. Fron the earliest cultures, right 
through to the Romantic and Victorian periods, dreams have assumed a 
I 
prominent role in literature. As Manfred Weidhorn points out, dreams 
often constitute both the manner and matter of a text: 
The dream has been commonly used as a literary device 
because it offers the poet a ready way to rearrange 
reality, to present things that cannot take place in 
actuality, or to account for strange actions by a sort 
of "as if" statement, The function of the dream thus 
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approaches the function of metaphor, "' 
Here the textual "dream! ' is regarded as a conscious and convenient 
formal device, part of an explicit and delimitable textual strategy. Its 
10strangeness" explains away lacunae and contradictions in the text; the 
flotherness" and ambiguity of the literary text depends upon the textual 
dream. By employing the mysteriousness and seeming impenetrability of 
dreams, the writer also gains access to the forbidden and "unspeakable" 
areas of public and private existence. This use of dream, apart from its 
formal convenience, provides a pretext for the writer to explore 
"deeper" levels of experience and meaning. Yet Weidhorn's comment 
exemplifies a traditional notion both of dream-poetry and the figuration 
of the unconscious in literature. His reading of dream as a literary 
device assumes the conscious control and authority (in a strict sense) 
of the writer. Thus the poet is held to have priority over the text, 
anticipating, authenticating and delimiting the process of writing and 
reading. In this way the poet can "rearrange reality", a rearrangement 
presupposing that reality is "in" the text, and that the poet is outside 
this reality, strategically employing it for aesthetic effect. Here 
reality is something easily manipulated, something a writer and a text 
is "beyond"; you can take or leave reality, move in and out of it when 
you choose. This view also implies that writer and reader remain 
distanced and uninvolved in the work of a text, noving unproblematically 
inside and outside its "world". The "strange actions" of the text, which 
take place under the description of and are excused as a "drean! ', are 
taken to be a direct result of the poet's deliberate intent. 
The issues raised by Weidhorn's rationale for literary dreams will 
be a recurrent concern in this study. Do poetic dreams, in their 
7 
/ 
figuration and theorisation, offer private, pleasurable escape or do 
they constitute a problematic engagement with the "world", with radical 
implications for questions of identity and representation? To raise the 
question of literary texts and dreams is to confront the work of desire 
in reading and writing, work radically unmanageable and intangible in 
comparison to conventional notions of literary metaphor. Desire is that 
which disrupts, transforms, exceeds the control of any conscious writing 
or reading endeavour. It is a non-presence that functions as a 
generative absence and a necessary supplement of writing. 
A survey of dream-theories across different historical periods is 
necessarily somewhat sweeping, but several main features can be 
established. Dreanr--theories, up to and including Freud, engage with 
similar and recurrent questions: are dreams a matter of body or mind, 
private or social, and are they meaningful or meaningless? Ancient 
dreairr-theories concentrate on the heuristic and mantic nature of dreams. 
Dreams, whether emanating from the individual subject or bestowed by 
divine intervention, prophesy future events, relive the distant past and 
grant moral or religious insights. In The E12ic of Gilgamesh, Enkidu's 
oneiric descent into the underworld produces radical social and 
political reversals and transgressions: 
I entered the house of dust and I saw the kings of the 
earth, their crowns put away for ever; rulers and princes, 
all those who once wore kingly crowns and ruled the world 
in the days of old, They who had stood in the place of the 
gods, like Anu -and Enlil, stood now like servants to fetch 
baked meats in the house of dust to carry cooked seat and 
cold water from the water-skin, 161 
A. rtemidorus of Daldis, one of the earliest and most notable dream- 
interpreters, stresses that dreanr-analyses depend upon the rank of the 
dreamer. ': 7-1 This hierarchical structure situates not only the act of 
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interpretation but also the process of dreaming in the realm of the 
social and the representational. As Freud acknowledges in an extensive 
footnote in The Interpretation of Dreams, Artemidorus was keenly 
attentive to punning and verbal play in dreams: Freud cites in 
particular Artemidorus's translation of Alexander's "satyr" dream (TID 
173n). Callimachus treats the dream as private phenomenon, but still 
links it with representation, explicitly identifying the dream-state 
with the artistic experience and equating the mystery of artistic 
creativity with the mystery of dreaming. "' 
In the medieval per i od, dreams are subj ect to elaborate 
classification, and the medieval dream7-poem becomes a convention. (9ý' In 
medieval thought, sleep liberates irrational thought-processes but also 
co-operates with rational day-thought. A. C. Spearing emphasises that 
drean, r-poems are not direct expressions of the unconscious but do employ 
the "methods" of dreams. Langland's Piers Plowman, for example, presents 
a world of dreams that is "a wilderness at times, a world in which 
everything is slippery and problematic, nothing is what it seems, and 
rational analysis is defeated". In Langland's text, allegorical figures 
are interchangeable, and concepts can become places and people. "': ' 
Kathryn Lynch comments that the liminal status of medieval dream--visions 
raise "ontological" questions about the interpenetration of flesh and 
spirit and the margins of social organisation. Importantly, also, the 
function of the dream-poem is to demand a complex process of 
interpretation. The dream-poem does not derive its "ambiguous power" 
from subjective fancy or purely conscious intent: 
Even when divinely inspired, the imagination was a kind 
of prerational realm of consciousness, and as such, its 
vision was suggestive rather than conclusive, chaotic 
9 
rather than controlled, "" 
In the early modern period, the debate on the source and nature of 
dreams is more clearly structured around dreams as idle, escapist 
fantasy and serious intent. For Ben Jonson, dream provides intellectual 
and emotional release from daily anxieties and rationality: 
Phant'sie is the healthy imagination -a product of 
'bloud, and naught of flame' - unchecked by reason and 
best known to us in dreams, during which it frees us from 
the preoccupations of the day, (12) 
Conversely, Cowley employs a dream dialogue to bring political theories 
into conflict in A discourse by way of vision. concerning the Government 
of Oliver Cromwell. ("31' Here dream embodies not an escape from but a 
thoroughgoing engagement with issues in the "real" day-world. Jonson 
sees dreams as a necessary and pleasurable escape from daytime 
foreality"; Cowley uses dream as a literary device to frame a political 
discussion without acknowledging the fundamental difference of dream- 
thought to waking thought. These conceptions of dream as a psychic 
phenomenon and a literary device appear totally distinct: dreams either 
retreat from or confront the day-world. Yet Jonson's notion of dream as 
wish-fulfillment and Cowley' s implication that dream can be an 
ideological battleground need not be mutually exclusive nor over- 
simplistic. Dream-material consists of unconscious wishes, day-residues 
and structures of thought that are necessarily ideological. Weidhorn 
suggests that Bunyan's The Pilgrim's Progress, with its various 
narrative perspectives, unfixed subject positions and multiplicity of 
abstract and composite figures may resemble most closely the modern 
understanding of dream-work. 1: 14) 
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Romantic engagements with dream tend to reinforce ideas of poetry 
as day-dreaming (in which, of course, the unconscious still manifests 
itself) and an occasion for fantasy. Keats terms poetry "a vast region 
to wander in", a medium for day-dream (Chapter TbLree conducts a more 
extensive consideration of this phrase). Dreams are a source of 
fascination and "creative" potential for Romantic literature, a 
fascination that had been growing throughout the previous century. "" 
The poetic dream represents a vehicle for "unleashing" the imagination, 
a recourse to "deeper" psychic levels. Dreams function ambivalently in 
Romantic poetry, provoking both terror and pleasure. (De Quincy's 
('nnf es-, -, ions of an English Opium-Eater' 16 -1 is a notable exanple. ) The 
Romantic poetic dream tends towards subjective fancy and escape while 
searching for a vatic, trance-like state that invokes an unbidden source 
of inspiration and meaning. This implies two different conceptions of 
phantasy in poetry, a tension between the poetic dream as a product of 
conscious design and unconscious determination. Towards the end of his 
short career, Keats cones to question his early conception of the poet 
as day-dreamer. Though the poet enters a dream-world to confront Moneta 
in The Fall of Hyperion, the text concludes: "The poet and the dreamer 
are distinct, / Diverse, sbeer opposite, antipodes". (1-7'. ) 
Charles Lamb also articulates this tension between the poetic dream 
as pleasurable but conscious phantasy, and as the site of overdetermined 
drives and structures of desire that constitute psychoanalytic 
definitions of phantasy: 
,,, the 
true poet dreams being awake, He is not possessed by 
his subject but has dominion over it ... where he seems most to 
recede from humanity, he will be found the truest to it, "81 
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Lamb perceives the poet as having "dominion" over her/his dream 
"subject", and the dream appears to be a literary device. Nonetheless, 
it is the phrase "where he seems nost to recede from humanity" which 
suggests that perhaps Lamb regards the dream of which he speaks as more 
than a formal device. A psychic area furthest from "humanity" or 
conscious experience is precisely where the unconscious operates; the 
unconscious remains radically distinct from consciousness, and 
"possesses" the day-world in strange and disruptive ways. The aesthetic 
recession from humanity means that the poet cannot exercise total 
control over a "waking dream". The Victorian period manifests this 
uncertain relationship between dream as a literary device and as an 
autonomous psychic act. Much of the poetry remains dream-heavy, 
indolent, yet the strategic textual "deployment" of the unconscious 
produces unsettling and ambiguous effects within poetic discourse. 
Bernard Richards remarks that Tennyson's work is a prime example of "the 
mysterious and even anti-social origins of poetry in madness, dream and 
reverie".,: 19: 1 It is as if Victorian poetry longs to "sleep", yet fears a 
loss of "control". 
Freud's study of dream7work at the turn of the century, and 
subsequent revisions of his theories of the unconscious, bring the 
processes of dreaming and poetry into more systematic relation. During 
this period psychoanalysis heavily influences conceptualisations of 
reading and writing.: indeed, Freud stresses the "poetic" character of 
psychoanalytic theory and interpretation, Robert Young outlines how 
Jacques Lacan's revisionist return to Freud continues this poeticisation 
of psychoanalysis, shifting it "from a seemingly self -referential body 
of technical knowledge into a metaphorics of language". `10) This study 
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concentrates mainly on poetic texts post-1850, implying a certain 
historical conjuncture between poetry and psychoanalysis, but in the 
wake of Freud it is possible to read before and after Freud. 
Psychoanalysis, after all, necessitates different readings of history. 
One famous Romantic text, Keats's 'Ode to a Nightingale', is examined 
since it anticipates the problematic of the thesis: how to think about 
dreams in poetry, and how to think the unconscious in terms of language, 
history, the subject and the body. The thesis follows through the two 
"poles" marked out in the brief history of dream-theories and 
literature, concentrating on the textual "drean! ' both as intrasubjective 
and intersubjective, a distinction that is seen to be contaninated and 
dissolved in the work of poetry. First it is necessary to examine more 
closely the relationship between dreams and language, particularly 
poetry. 
Poetry and the Unconscious 
Several "commonsense" points can be made i7n diately about the 
differences between dreams and poetry. A recounted dream represented in 
speech or writing has undergone various stages of transformation and 
revision, subject to the demands of different modes of articulation. 
There is no dreamer "behind" the poem - either writer or reader - whose 
total mental existence can be adduced to freely associate, filling in 
the gaps and assisting the analysis of the text. Even if a poem appears 
to identify the sources of dream material as part of its own "making" 
(such as Robert Frost's 'After Apple-Picking' in Chapter Two), the work 
of that poetic text is irreducibly different. Equally, how can a textual 
13 
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"dream" be attributed to an author, character or reader? No poetic text 
functions as a result of "individual" desire. Yet such objections do not 
resolve several important issues, namely those of interpretation and 
communication. Firstly, does literary interpretation read a text more 
"finally" and completely than psychoanalysis reads a dream?. Literary 
analysis might be said to be strictly interminable: there are always 
other readings, and like a dream, a poem remains "excessive to its 
translatability into language". 1: 21 -1 Secondly, is it possible to argue 
convincingly that dreams do not communicate and poems do? Dreams and 
poems are not identical but share similar (dis)figurative poetics that 
draw to the point of fragmentation and breakdown. Like a dream, a poem 
simultaneously articulates and deforms meaning, remaining ineluctably 
other to itself. 
At one stage Freud is tempted to identify language not only as the 
primary interpretive medium for dreams but also as constituting the 
materiality and structuring force of dreans: "Language, in its 
unrivalled wisdom, long ago decided the question of the essential nature 
of dreams.. " (AL 136). He f ocusses on the dream7--work, which "speaks" the 
language of desire. Dream-work represents the forms taken by desire; the 
mechanisms of dream-work operate through a "multiplicity of conceptual 
relations" (SE VIII 172) and verbal devices. John Forrester points out 
that Freud does not distinguish between linguistic and thought 
mechanisms, and that his discussion of "trains of thought" always 
I 
suggest verbal chains possessing a gramnar and certain linguistic 
properties like ambiguity: 
The processes he conceived of as specific to the dream- 
work - condensation, displacement - have close affinities 
with strictly linguistic devices (metaphor, metonymy, 
14 
/ 
tropes etc), 
(22) 
Such affinities lead Lacan to state that "the unconscious is structured 
like a language" (FFC 20). The emphasis must be placed on "like" in 
Lacan's assertion; the unconscious can only be read as discourse in 
terms of affinities and analogies, since there remain differences 
between the discourse of the unconscious and other "day-world" 
discourses, as will be seen later. Yet the insistence of desire in all 
registers of discourse means that the dream7work bears important 
implications for the interpretation and analysis of poetry. Lacan 
stresses that from its opening reference to the dream as a rebus, lba 
Interpretation nf Dreams is a thoroughly linguistic project, "the 
proportion of analysis of language increasing to the extent that the 
unconscious is directly concerned" (E 159). The dream has the structure 
of a form of writing, and, for Lacan, the elaboration of the dream can 
be read in terms of various categories of rhetoric. "': ' 
Condensation, displacement, indirect representation and secondary 
revision are the chief mechanisms of dream--work identified by Freud in 
The Interpretation of Dreams. Condensation, the first achievement of 
dreanr-work, involves the creation of composite structures and f igures 
within the manifest dream, which "has a smaller content than the latent 
one, and is thus an abbreviation of it" (ILP 205). It is brought about 
either by the total omission of latent elements, by fragments of the 
latent dream being allowed to pass into the manifest dream, or by linked 
latent elements "being combined and fused into a single unity in the 
manifest dream" (ILP 205). Condensation provides a means of connecting 
disparate dream-thoughts, ensuring that as little as possible of the 
latent dream is omitted. This involves " overdeterminat ion", a method for 
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"representing in a single piece of content thoughts and wishes which are 
often widely divergent in their nature 
It (TID 470). Condensation is 
characterized by the multiple use of similar material, verbal puns and 
focus on similar sounds, a process equated with rhyming and poetry by 
Freud (SE V 650). The dream-work seeks out an ambiguous word to condense 
two different thoughts: 
The most convenient way of bringing together two dream- 
thoughts which, to start with, have nothing in common, 
is to alter the verbal form of one of them, and thus bring 
it half-way to meet the other, which may be similarly 
clothed in a new form of words, (SE V 6SO) 
The process of condensation also disrupts the distinction between word- 
as-symbol and word as actual sound. Vords are treated and combined as 
though they were things in the manifest dream. The work of condensation 
depends upon ambiguity and multiple meanings, which assist dreams in 
remaining inaccessible and uninterpreted. This renders it impossible to 
interpret a dream completely: 
Even if the solution seems satisfactory and without gaps, 
the possibility always remains that the dream may have yet 
another meaning, Strictly speaking, then, it is impossible 
to determine the amount of condensation, (TID 383) 
The process of displacement forms an "essential portion" (TID 417) 
of the dream-work and, in Freud's words, "might equally be described (in 
Nietzsche's phrase) as a 'transvaluation of psychical values'" (SE V 
655). A dream has to evade censorship in order to satisfy the dream- 
wish, hence the "displacement of psychical intensities to the point of a 
transvaluation of , all psychical values" (TID 650). In dream 
displacement, a psychical force strips elements of high psychical value 
of their intensity and creates new values from elements of lower 
psychical value. The most intense elements of psychical value are 
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prevented from entering the dream-content by dreanr--censorship. The 
intensity of a thought or idea passes to another idea, with little 
apparent relation to the original psychical element: 
... in the course of the dream-work the psychical 
intensity 
passes over from the thoughts and ideas to which it 
properly belongs on to others which in our judgement have 
no claim to any such emphasis, (SE V 654) 
Displacement achieves the necessary distortion to permit the latent, 
unmodified dreamr-thoughts tO pass over into the manifest dream. As a 
result of this displacement t, ýVdream "appears differently centred and 
strange" (ILP 208) and "the difference between the text of the dream- 
content and that of the dreairt--thoughts comes about" (TID 417). The 
manifest dream thus gives only a distorted version of the dream-wish 
which exists in the unconscious. Dream-displacement sets itself free 
from this restriction: 
,,, the dream-censorship only gains its end if it succeeds 
in making it impossible to find the path back from the 
allusion to the genuine thing, (ILP 209) 
Considerations of Representability, or the transformation of 
thoughts into visual images, is described by Freud as "psychologically 
the most interesting" achievement of the dream-work (ILP 209). This 
process "results in a colourless and abstract expression in the dream- 
thoughts being exchanged for a pictorial and concrete one" (TID 455). 
The unconscious "speaks" through thing-presentation, employing a mode of 
iconic expression. Freud conceives the transformation of thoughts into 
visual images as resembling a shift from alphabetic writing to picture- 
writing: "the dream-work reduces the content of the dream-thoughts to 
its raw material of objects and activities" (ILP 211). This process of 
representation observes no logical or syntactical relations: contraries 
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are treated as conformities. Such displacement assists the work of 
condensation, increasing the ambiguity and multiplicity of words which 
convey the dream-thoughts, a process equated with "the whole domain of 
verbal wit" (TID 456). Representations also employ symbols derived from 
a variety of cultural sources. These symbols in dreams can facilitate 
and obscure interpretation, and their ambiguity again links with 
overdeternination. Most symbols are conventional and recurrent, but are 
not nerely subject to decoding by a given, rigid interpretive key: "as 
with Chinese script, the correct interpretation should be arrived at on 
each occasion from the context" (TID 470). C.: Z4> 
Secondary Revision, the final distorting activity of the dream- 
work, acts as both censor and editor of the dream. Secondary revision 
can operate in the course of the dream itself, the censorship working 
"in a conducive and selective sense upon the mass of material present in 
the dream-thoughts" (TID 641). Equally, the revision process operates 
when the drean is presented in a verbal or written account. The revision 
is responsible for interpolations and additions to the dream-work and is 
not simply a censoring agency which limits and omits portions of the 
dream-work. Secondary revision makes something coherent and intelligible 
from the dream-work; under its operation, the dream loses its appearance 
of absurdity and disconnectedness, approximating "to the model of an 
intelligible experience" (TID 630). This ordering of irrational dream- 
material by the conscious mind actually contributes to the work of the 
three other distorting iaechanisias. Intepretation is thus another 
disordering transformation. 
Freud stresses the importance and interrelatedness of the 
mechanisms of condensation and displacement: 
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Dream-displacement and dream-condensation are the two 
governing factors to whose activity we may in essence 
ascribe the form assumed in dreams, (TID 417) 
Following Jakobson's. identification of similarity and contiguity as the 
fundamental poles of language, Lacan relates metaphor and metonymy to 
condensation and displacement. Freud makes no distinction between 
associative links dependent on similarity (or likeness) and those 
dependent on proximity (or contiguity). Lacan reworks Freud's 
description in order to confine condensation to "metaphoric shifts of 
association (based on similarity) and displacement to metonymic ones 
(based on contiguity". 1: 2-5" Condensation, in particular, is the mechanism 
"connatural with poetry" (E 160). (See Chapter Two for a more extensive 
discussion of metaphor in relation to poetry and dream. ) Malcolm Bowie 
comm nts that literature, in offering a plenitude of meaning, betrays 
its debt to the unconscious: 
Its ambiguities, its nodal points and knotted structures, 
are no more than local instances of what language at 
large inveterately supplies; and condensation, disguise 
and displacement go on relentlessly within the unconscious 
mind, irrespective of the cues and inducements that 
language may offer, 1261 
Poetry in particular "offers the psychoanalyst a working model of the 
unconscious considered as an unstoppable and self-pluralizing signifying 
chain". (-'7-1 Lacan argues that unconscious discourse, like poetry, is 
polyphonous, in contradistinction to Saussurean models of linearity in 
the chain of discourse (E 154). 
The other aspe9ts of dream7-work raise further questions about the 
relation of dreams and poetry. Considerations of representability bring 
in issues of social and historical influences on the unconscious, while 
secondary revision relates directly to questions of reading. Freud 
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emphasises that the unconscious employs a "particular symbolism" in 
dreams: 
,,, this symbolism partly varies from individual to individual; 
but partly it is laid down in a typical form and seems to 
coincide with the symbolism which, as we suspect, underlies 
our myths and fairy tales, (SE XI 36) 
A dream can be individual and intersubjective; it has a particular 
meaning for the dreamer but it is also conveyed through a shared system 
of representation, a vocabulary of symbols. Dreaný-symbolism derives from 
a wide range of cultural sources: "There can be no doubt that the 
connections between our typical dreams and fairy tales and the material 
of other kinds of creative writing are neither few nor accidental" (TID 
345). Therefore, considerations of representation in the dream-work mean 
that the dream is only ever relatively "private". Terry Eagleton 
compares secondary revision with literary criticism which orders, makes 
coherent and explains the text under examination, briskly resolving 
ambiguities, questions and irregularities so that the text may be 
consumed by readers. 112131 In a sense, secondary revision disorders and 
renders incoherent, and Elizabeth Wright emphasises its distorting and 
foreclosing capabilities whether this mechanism is encountered in the 
work of dreams or literary texts: 
Secondary revision shows that it is a danger for all 
systematic thinking to ignore elements that do not fit 
into a desired pattern, Reading shares this danger with 
the reporting of a dream, "" 
Considerations of representation and secondary revision are elements of 
the dream-work closer to the wish-fulfilling functions of phantasies and 
day-dreams. These portions of the dream-work are closer to conventional 
notions of aesthetic production, yet it is the primary mechanisms of the 
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dreanr-work - condensation and displacement - that are more thoroughly 
poetic. 
In linking dream-work to poetry, the emphasis is an analogy rather 
than homology, similarity rather than identicality. Freud attempts to 
establish a direct link between dreaming and literature in 'Creative 
Writers and Daydreaming' . The artist resembles the child at play: "He 
(sic) creates a world of phantasy which he takes very seriously - that 
is, which he invests with large amounts of emotion - while separating it 
sharply from reality". (AL 132) This childhood play (spiel) transforms 
into adult phantasy but the playful activity remains, since the yield of 
pleasure gained from play is never renounced, merely replaced by a 
substitute or surrogate form of pleasure. Thus the adult "builds castles 
in the air and creates what are called day-dreams" (AL 133). Freud 
charts a clear continuity between night and day-dreams: both are 
phantasies whose motive forces are unsatisfied wishes ("wish" can be 
translated here as desire). Day-dreams are wishfulfilments like night- 
dreams, the only separating factor being dreanr-distortion (AL 136). As 
Lacan comments, the "efficacy of the unconscious does not cease in the 
waking state" (E 163). Unconscious desire takes different forms in, but 
is common to night-dreams, daydreams and art, its voice "loW' but 
"indestructible" (FFC 255). Thus Freud is justified in claiming that the 
imaginative writer is comparable to "the 'dreamer in broad daylight'" 
(AL 137). The artist makes the egoistic phantasies of day-dreams more 
socially acceptable, ' and overcomes the "feeling of repulsion" in others, 
by a process of dilution and transformation: 
The writer softens the character of his egoistic 
day-dreams by altering and disguising it, and he bribes 
us by the purely formal - that is, aesthetic - yield of 
pleasure which he offers us in his phantasies, We give 
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the name incentive bonus or fol-e-pleasure to a yield of 
pleasure such as this, which is offered to us so as to 
make possible the release of still greater pleasure 
arising from deeper psychical sources, (AL 141) 
The writer offers initial pleasure in the play of language, and greater 
pleasure derives from the work's content. Freud thus addresses the 
question of the pleasure of the text, but his reductive schema proposes 
the normative view of poetry as liberating and escapist "idle fancy" 
criticized earlier. 
Lacan deploys structural linguistics to conceptualise unconscious 
discourse in a imore rigorous strategy aimed at bringing the unconscious 
and the field of representation into stricter relation. Yet in his 
critique of Lacan' s use of Jakobson, Jean-Francois Lyotard argues that 
metaphor and metonymy in regard to dream-work must themselves be 
understood "metaphorically"; equally, Lacan's theory of metaphor is "a 
theory of the metaphor of the subject". (3'0-1 The "work" of desire cannot 
be assimilated to the constraints of discourse: each of the operations 
of dream-work elaborated by Freud "is conducted according to rules which 
are in direct opposition to those governing discourse" (3). Thus, for 
Lyotard, Lacan's attempt to read dream-work according to strict 
linguistic models is flawed: the "I language' of the dream seems to be 
nothing more nor less than the language of art" (22). Lacan's 
theorisation of the language of desire remains "poetic". 
Conversely, Antony Easthope uses discourse as the means of 
distinguishing dreams and poems. He points out that phantasy, as it 
I 
moves from unconscious discourse to poetic discourse, loses its 
relatively "narcissistic" quality and necessarily takes on "a social 
feature denied to it in dreamsll., ý-31 > In poetry, phantasy becomes 
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publicly available, intersubjective. Subject to the obligations of oral 
and textual discourse, "phantasy in poetry Is always already socialised 
compared to the relatively private phantasies experienced in 
dreams". Elsewhere Easthope contends thatt unlike dreams, poems are 
"necessarily committed to significance in a temporal dimension and so to 
syntagmatic relations". Several points can be taken up here. There 
are discursive dissimi lari ties between dreams and poetry: dreams are 
subject to greater distortion and illegibility, while day-dreams partake 
of inner discourse. I Desire in dream-work does not conform to the 
laws of "day-world" discourse, and Lacan's "oneiric discourse" might be 
better understood in figurative terms. Yet Just because dream7work 
cannot be accommodated within the rules of discourse, it does not follow 
that desire does not "work" in poetry in a similar manner to that in 
which it works in dreams. To contend that the unconscious is not 
actually a language does not mean that its effects, however faint or 
strange, cannot be discerned in discourse. Desire simultaneously 
recognizes and transgresses the law of the signifier, and does not obey 
the "obligations" of the order of representation. The unconscious 
"speaks" in the sense that its imprint and performativity may be 
understood as an absent presence that insists in discourse, eluding 
"final" analysis. Desire works on dream-texts and poetic texts in a 
violently disfigurative manner, as Lyotard articulates: 
Desire does not manipulate an intelligible text in order 
to disguise it; it does not let the text get in, forestalls 
it, inhabits it-, and we never have anything but a worked- 
over text,, (35) 
Easthope's careful qualification that phantasy in dreams is only 
Ilrelatively" private invokes the contentious debate surrounding the 
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sociality of dreams and the unconscious that is dealt with below. It is 
the nature of poetry's "obligations", coherence and its "temporal 
dimension" that are at issue. Any projected homology between dreams and 
poems must confront questions of "coirmunication" and socialisation. 
Freud stresses constantly the irreducible difference between unconscious 
and conscious thought: 
The dream-work is not simply more careless, more 
irrational, more forgetful and more incomplete than 
waking thought; it is completely different from it 
qualitatively and for that reason not immediately 
comparable with it, It does not think, calculate or 
judge in any way at all; it restricts itself to giving 
things a new form, (TID 650) 
Dreams are not intended for communication to or interpretation by 
another agency: "A dream does not want to say anything to anyone. It is 
not a vehicle for communication; on the contrary, it is meant to remain 
ununderstood (sic)" (ILP 270). Freud also casts light on the "social" 
aspect of dreams in his comparison of dreams and jokes. Although 
identifying similarities - condensation, displacement and indirect 
representation - between the mechanisms of dreams and jokes, Freud draws 
a major distinction between the two activities. A Joke 
is the most social of all the mental functions that aim 
at a yield of pleasure, It often calls for three persons 
and its completion requires the participation of someone 
else in the mental process it starts, (SE VIII p, 179) 
Jokes also "retain the precondition of intelligibility" (ILP p. 208). On 
the other hand, a dream has no need to communicate itself or to prove 
intelligible: "it is a completely asocial mental product.. it must 
I 
actually avoid being understood, for otherwise it would be destroyed; it 
can only exist in masquerade" (SE VIII 179). 
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Freud nakes explicit the shared, social aspect of jokes, in that 
they depend upon a network of social relations for their operation. For 
example, a tendentious joke requires three people for its functioning: a 
teller, an object of "hostile or sexual aggressiveness" (SE VIII 100) 
and a third person (analogous to a reader or an audience) in whom 
pleasure is produced. Each joke needs a "a public of its own" (SE VIII 
151) in order to release inhibitions and gain pleasure. Tendentious 
jokes "exhibit the main characteristic of the joke-work - that of 
liberating pleasure by getting rid of inhibitions" (SE VIII p. 134). 
These inhibitions, although taking a particular forin in the individual 
subject, derive from social sanction and censorship, but tendentious 
jokes relieve repression by lifting inhibition temporarily, subverting 
society's repressive activity. A tendentious joke's intention is both 
public and private, "psychic" and "ideological", acting at once as a 
safety valve to relieve the demands of the unconscious and as a 
potential challenge to group unity, undermining or rejecting social 
restraints. Unlike a dream, a joke bears the traces of unconscious 
processes and generates social meanings. 
Employing puns and allusions, ambiguities and shifts of context, 
Joke-work operates at the level of textual play; jokes "insist on 
maintaining play with words or with nonsense unaltered" (SE VIII 172). 
Jerry Aline Flieger argues that this "double-dealing" aspect (SE VIII 
155) links the poet and the joker; both profit "from a double vision in 
order to play creative games with double talk, deploying the layers of 
meaning that resonate both in pun and in metaphor. ": -16 " As Samuel Weber 
observes, however, the "developed play" (SE VIII 179) of joke-work is 
not in the service of "pure" pleasure. Weber demonstrates how Freud' s 
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work on Jokes comes to acknowledge that there is no wholly "free" play 
in the unconscious. Freud initially contends that the essential 
structure of the joke lies in its verbal or conceptual form. Adult jokes 
are an attempt to retain the childish pleasure of pure play, 
"intrinsically independent of the constraints of meaning and its 
JOSJCII. (37: 3 Yet he goes on to argue that a good Joke depends upon an 
impure form or play and pleasure: a joke must consist of playfulness and 
an appeal to reason. In Sakes and Their ]Relation to the Unconscious, 
Freud's description of play - involving a conception of economy or 
saving (Ersparung), a reduction of psychic energy - contradicts the 
conception of pleasure outlined in Ihe InterpretatiQn of Dreams: here 
pleasure, the Lustpr-Inzip, "is conflictual in nature. a relation of 
forces, a state of tension". ':: 301' This might equally characterise the 
Of impure" f orm and the conflictual forces of the dream--work. 
Extrapolating this onto literature, it is clear that such a notion of 
pleasure would not support the idea of the pleasure of text as deriving 
from a play of genuinely "pure" textuality or from the ideal 
metaphoricity of writing. 
Freud emphasises that dreams are not impervious to culture or 
society; indeed, they come into conflict with social constraints and 
inhibitions. In this way, dreanr-work resembles joke-work. Moreover, in 
comparing secondary revision to political censorship, Freud foregrounds 
the problematic issue of ideology and the unconscious. Francesco Orlando 
links ideology, poetry and the unconscious in contending that 
"literature or poetry is the seat of a socially institutionalized return 
of the repressed". "I He argues that the predominance of the letter or 
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signifier characterizes the operation of the unconscious, dreams, jokes 
and poetic language: 
... who could fail to notice that the predominance of the letter, the dominance of the verbal signifier, though 
now controlled by the conscious ego, equally decisively 
characterizes poetic language? (6-7) 
Orlando problematically assumes that the conscious ego controls the work 
of the signifier, an assumptionthat as will be seen below, underpins 
ego-psychological approaches to literature. Orlando argues that 
literature postulates an addressee and thus poetry, even lyric poetry, 
possesses a "minimum of self-sufficiency lacked by the semiotic 
manifestations of the unconscious" (130). For Orlando, the communicative 
capacity of poetry separates it from the "language" of the unconscious: 
to rehearse the earlier debate, poetry is discourse, dream-work is not. 
In Writing Degrgg- 7prn, Roland Barthes rejects the 
conceptualisation of modern poetry as social or functional 
communication. Barthes draws a distinction between "classical" poetry, 
which makes a "gesture of intellection, that is, of comminication", and 
modern poetry, which "destroys the spontaneously functional nature of 
language, and leaves standing only its lexical basis". 1`4cll' Fixed 
connections between words are abolished, and the consumer of poetry 
faces a poetic word that is "an act without immediate past, without 
environment": "The Word is no longer guided In advance by the general 
intention of a socialized discourse" (58). Modern poetry has 
destroyed relationships in language and reduced discourse 
to words as sta. tic things,, modern poetry is a poetry of the 
object, In it, Nature becomes a fragmented space, made of 
objects solitary and terrible, because the links between 
them are only potential, (59) 
In this fragmentary space a strange, unassuagable hunger roams, making 
poetic speech "terrible and inhuman": 
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It initiates a discourse full of gaps and full of lights, 
filled with absences and overnourishing signs, without 
foresight or stability of intention, opposed to the social 
function of language, M) 
This desocialization of poetic language renders it "hardly possible to 
speak of poetic writing, for this is a language in which a violent drive 
toward autonomy destroys any ethical scope". Barthes stresses that 
"there is no humanism of modern poetry" and, beyond the spiritual and 
social, modern poetry thus approaches "the splendour and freshness of 
dream language" (60). For Barthes, modern poetry foregrounds the 
materiality of language, of words-as-things, which recalls the form of 
picture-writing deployed in the dream-work. Treating words as objects, 
foregrounding its language as a play of absence and presence and 
refusing the social, the textuality of modern poetry is "truest" to the 
language of dreams. 
Although this characterisation of an hermetic "poetry of the 
object" does not resolve the social/ psyche impasse, the idea of the 
psyche as a writing-machine haunts Freud, as Jacques Derrida points 
The "terrible and inhuman" voice of poetry raises the spectre 
of a textual machine that returns throughout this thesis, a machine that 
moves to efface the forms of history, social life and the "natural" body 
that modern poetry, in Barthes' s account, can sidestep. By comparing the 
work of poetry with dream language, however, Barthes necessarily raises 
the question of desire, which involves a conflictual relation between 
body, psyche and the "external" world. There appears to be no place for 
a desiring subject in this poetic language that resembles dreams; yet, 
as Robert Young stresses, if desire "is the desire of the Other, this 
means that desire is a social phenomenon". 
( 4: 2 ý, Nonetheless, in 
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interrogating the definition Of poetry as functional "communication" or 
socialised discourse through analysis of its textuality, Barthes's work 
is highly significant in this discussion. Poetic language offers 
plenitude and lack (the structure of desire), and its meaning is not 
constituted or decidable in advance: it is "without foresight or 
stability of intention". In the light of Derridal s conception of the 
. -lopoematic", it might rather be proposed that poetry (and dream-work) 
figures a strange telepathic foresight, bringing the. "reader" into 
being. The "poematic" also offers a way in which disruptive textual 
effects of poetry can be brought into relation with the social. 
Orlando presumes an uninterrupted chain of communication in the 
poetic event, with two material subjects - speaker/ listener, author (or 
text)/reader, poet/audience constituted before the act of 
communication takes place. Yet the nature of poetry's addressee and its 
mode of communication must be questioned in terms of Derrida's 
reconf iguring of the structure of address. In his work on telepathy, 
Derrida posits an addressee who does not exist in advance of a text. The 
risk of the postal system is that letters (and poems) may go astray or 
never reach their destination. In 'Che Cos'6 la poesia, Derrida's 
notion of the poematic refutes Orlando's empiricist designation of 
poetic communication. The "poematic experience" disrupts experience and 
subjectivity, constituting and deconstructing the subject in its "call" 
to an anonymous, unspecified addressee. Derrida avoids terms like author 
and poet, instead concentrating on "yoo, "I" and "other". As Timothy 
Clark points out, 11(t3he movement of poetic comiminication, or rather 
experience, cannot be mapped onto a familiar tripartite division of 
sender, a relay and a receiver"; the poem brings "what it relates into 
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being by force of its own event". 11-4: 3ý Derrida conceives of the poetic as 
a singular apostrophe: 
,, someone writes you, to you, of you, on you, 
No, rather 
a mark addressed to you, left and confided with you, is 
accompanied by an injunction, in truth it is instituted 
in this very order, which, in its turn, constitutes you, 
assigning your origin or giving rise to yOU'. 1441 
In the poetic structure of address, the authority, destination and 
desire of a text is ineluctably bound up with the indeterminacy of its 
addressee. The poetic event is a two-way process, constituting and being 
constituted by its addressee: 
The poetic is the chance of an event of interruption whose 
arrival constitutes its receiver, even as it simultaneously 
institutes itself and is contaminated, risking effacement, 
by the force of this reception, "s' 
The poetic is an address "singularly to you"'46-1, a vocative "you" that 
may even be self -communing. I" I This "inward turn" is not an asocial or 
ahistorical gesture, however; the poem is "obliged to address itself to 
someone" ,a subj ect intimate and anonymous, publ ic and private .1 
18 1 Thus 
the poem is entrusted, in complex fashion, to the thoroughfares of 
language. (See Chapter Three for a more extensive consideration of the 
poematic. ) 
This reflects on Freud's assertion that a dream "does not want to 
say anything to anyone. It is not a vehicle for communication". By 
"communication" Freud appears to be denoting an exchange between two 
empirical subjects-, dreams do not make constative statements, do not 
intend to say anything directly and do not establish a recipient in 
I 
advance. Yet Freud is impelled to read dreams, an attraction or 
injunction that he points out is common throughout the recorded history 
of oneiro-criticism. If Derrida's notion of the poenatic is applied, 
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neither dreams nor poems are securely or decidably destined to anyone. A 
dream is a psychic event, a form of enunciation that is not purely 
private or abstract, and which, in a sense, calls "you" into being, 
whether "you" may be the dream- interpreter or the subject who dreams. A 
dream comes from the other, the "other" place of the dream-work that 
figures the "other" of desire. For Derrida, the poetic also comes from 
the other, yet this other is near and distant, singular and nultiple, an 
other that is irreducibly part of the "I" and "you" that make up the 
poetic event. Desire is elsewhere in the work of a dream or a poem, but 
comes into complex relation to "you", "I" and "other" in either 
instance: it implicates "dreamer" and "interpreter", "author" and 
"reader". The dream, like the poem, makes an appeal to the "I", 11youll 
and "other" that categorize the subjects of desire, an appeal that 
simultaneously disturbs precisely such distinctions or categories. 
The structure of address, and its inextricable connection with 
alterity, challenges the distinctions between public and private and 
brings poetry and the unconscious into a different relation to the 
social. Despite Freud's insistence on their asociability and 
impenetrability, dreams take place in historical time in a network of 
social relations. Elizabeth Wright sees psychoanalysis as exploring 
"what happens when primordial desire gets directed into social goals, 
when bodily needs become subject to the mould of culture". For 
Wright, dreams exemplify this clash of social and individual, "natural" 
and cultural: 
Dreams, par excellence, reveal themselves to be boundary 
phenomena, in that they occur where intentions are in 
opposition, where bodily desires have to come to terms 
with society, '50' 
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The question of the unconscious in reading and writing is a matter of 
relations: social, familial and sexual relations, and the relationship 
between public and private bodies. The distinctions between public and 
private, collective and individual, desire and repression, body and 
culture remain relative and provisional, shifting points of difference. 
The next section returns to the question of the subject of desire, 
considering whose desire or unconscious can be said to "insist" in a 
poetic text. 
The Desire of a Text 
Does a text fulfil a wish and whose desire is at stake in the 
reading of poetry: the desire of an author, a reader or a culture? One 
could say, paradoxically, all and none of these. Thinking the 
unconscious is problematic precisely because analysis encounters the 
unconscious as a concept that is unfixed, resists clear demarcation, 
eludes easy description . and might be strictly characterised as 
unthinkable. According to Freud, "a dream is a (disguised) fulfillment 
of a (suppressed or repressed) wish" (TID 244) and he foregrounds wish- 
fulfillment in his general aesthetic speculations. In his most notorious 
statement, he relates the artist to a neurotic who satisfies an 
infantile wish in a work of art, 
an activity intended to allay ungratified wishes - in 
the first place in the creative artist himself and 
subsequently in, his audience or spectators, (SE XIII 187) 
This presupposes a direct link between an artist's life and her/his 
aesthetic products. The writer fulfils a wish in textual form, rather as 
dreams fulfil unconscious wishes. Underneath the manifest level of the 
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text a latent, true meaning can be recovered. The "neurotic" author and 
the wish-fulfilling text thus become subjects for analysis. As Lacan 
points out, Freud's analysis of dreams reveals that the "laws" of the 
unconscious are equally applicable to the "normal" and the "neurotic" 
subject (E 153). In spite of this, Freud's work on aesthetics displays a 
tendency either to privilege or pathologise the artist. Hence 
symptomatic and intentionalist readings predominate in traditional 
psychoanalytic readings of literary texts and dreams. 
Ego-psychology proposes a theory of creativity that shifts the 
emphasis from the notion that art expresses a neurotic infantile wish 
seeking to find expression to the nanner in which the ego's preconscious 
operations modify that unconscious wish. Simon Lesser exemplifies this 
approach: art, although an intricate interplay between "spontaneous" 
creativity and "cool critical reflection", remains a matter of 
selection and control in the service of the waking ego. Artists try to 
"tap" into the "surging energies responsible for the formation of 
dreams", but this is a one-way process since dreams are "autistic" while 
"the artist is governed by the desire to communicate". : -II ) While 
Lesser's work is predominantly focused on fiction, Ernst Kris engages 
with the relation of dream and poetry: 
The language of the dream, which is in force when we are 
asleep, becomes a tool of the creator, The trance or 
reverie in which it emerges has the capability of most 
efficient communication, What in the dream impresses us 
as Noverdetermination" becomes the potential of the art- 
work, (S2) 
I 
Aesthetic ambiguity is equated with overdetermination in the drearo-work, 
an ambiguity particularly relevant to poetry. Kris suggests that a 
multiplicity of association acquires acute significance in modern 
poetry: 
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... here complexity of words tends to be maximised, 
multiple meanings abound, and uncertainty of inter- 
pretation teqds to prevail, There can be little doubt 
that in thKT4"mv'eodern poet is more than accidentally 
akin to the dreamer, (483) 
For example, Kris notes the "spread of associations" in T. S. Eliot's 
poetry. This argument grants pre-eminence to the ego, and privileges the 
artist's conscious control over his/her artwork. Once more the stress is 
on poetry's capacity for determinable and delimitable communication. 
Unconscious strategies and the energies of primary process are tamed 
and shaped by the poem's formal design. Selecting, ordering, making 
comprehensible, the artist conforms to certain conventions in order to 
produce an intelligible, acceptable text for public consumption, an 
undertaking similar to that of secondary revision. 
For Kris, the "multiple neaning" of poetry "constitutes richness", 
and " the dichotomy between appropriate ambiguity and hidden 
precision-becomes an important criterion in the study of poetic 
language (483). This advances an instrumentalist conception of language, 
and places the artist unquestionably in control of the work, 
interpretive orthodoxies that underpin ego-psychological approaches to 
art. Such a concept of ambiguity fails to take account of unconscious 
strategies and operations, which remain dynamically opposed to conscious 
thought. The latent ambiguities of dreams and poems can be dismissed or 
foreclosed by the ego only by ignoring the disruptive and transgressive 
tendencies of the unconscious. If dream-work is taken to be a 
I 
representative (dis) articulation of the primary process, it is inimical 
to conscious direction, coherence and logic. Both/and alternatives co- 
exist without contradiction in the dreairý-work, and syntactical 
discontinuities and fragmentation are accommodated. The idea of 
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11appropriate" ambiguity is revealing; in order to diminish the 
disruptive potential of desire, the scope and intensity of the text's 
anbiguity necessarily must be linited. Kris proposes a safe, acceptable 
version of ambiguity which is regarded as a plenitude of meanings 
constituted by associations within defined cultural limits. For the 
reader, the poem depends upon "standards of correspondence", "standards 
of intent" and "standards of coherence" - all conventional ideas of 
reader- c onpe te nce. 1: 53 -1 The reader must not construct the "wrong" poem. 
Kris posits the ego as managing the subversive unbound energies of 
primary process towards coherence and publically shareable significance; 
yet textual form and ineaning cannot be limited or foreclosed by the 
to egoll. 
The dynamic between formal intention and unconscious influences has 
remained a complex, central concern for traditional literary 
criticism. '-5411 Lionel Trilling takes his cue from Freud, who argues that 
dream-thoughts are represented symbolically rather than prosaically, "by 
means of similes and metaphors, in inages resembling those of poetic 
speech" (SE V 659). Trilling asserts: 
The Freudian psychology is the one which makes poetry 
indigenous to the very constitution of the mind, Indeed, 
the mind, as Freud sees it, is in the greater part of its 
tendency exactly a poetry-making organ, (55) 
Psychoanalysis, especially in its examination of dream-work, is for 
Trilling a "science of tropes, of netaphor and its variants, synedoche 
and metonymy" (61). Nonetheless, poetry is not equivalent to the working 
of the unconscious mind and the analogy between dream and poetry must 
remain limited: "between the unconscious inind and the finished poem 
there supervene the social intention and the formal control of the 
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OR" refe, r. to t he conscious mind" (f3 0). Presumably "Social intE-IltiL 
artist's strategies and designs to make the text comim nicable and 
publicly acceptable. Trilling echoes Kris by privileging the artist's 
formal, conscious command of his/her material, drawing a precise 
distinction between art and neurosis, formal control and unconscious 
impulsion: "The poet is in command of his fantasy, while it is exactly 
the mark of the neurotic that he is possessed by his fantasy" (53). 
Graham Hough follows Trilling's conventional approach to a large 
extent. Like dream, poetry operates through clusters of associations, 
compression, multivalence: the "shifting boundaries of the symbol" 
represent the major effect of the modernist poetic project. The poet 
operates on a level close to that of the dreamer: "The poet is working 
as the mind of man works at its deeper levels". ýrz7,1-1 Hough hints at the 
distinction between conscious design and unconscious determination 
present in the "deeper levels" of the psyche: 
The poet's dominion is more over his craft than his 
conception or his material; it reveals itself in the 
linguistic embodiment, in the work of expression and 
revision, in all that makes a poem, because it is a 
verbal construct, something different from an unwritten 
dream, It is true that a poem is not simply the record of 
eavesdropping on the unconscious ... But the element of the 
dictated, the unmodifiable, the given (given perhaps by 
the individual consciousness, but perhaps by the unrecog- 
nised pressure of a culture or a genre) is always present, 
And of this the poet is not in command, "" 
This acknowledges, albeit in vague and untheorised terms, that both poet 
and day-dreamer find some points in their separate modes of discourse 
I 
which resist conscious alteration or direction, touching on the work of 
desire and ideology. Nonetheless, in contrast to the symptomatic 
approach of classic psychoanalysis, the primacy of the artist and the 
text remains intact. 
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Classic psychoanalysis adopts a "nosographic" approach, treating 
texts as symptoms or secondary manifestations of the writer's neurosis. 
The text's effect is dependent upon an uncontrolled return of the 
repressed that overspills the author's "conscious" control. The 
nosographic approach either explores the author's psyche, or treats a 
literary character as a subject to be psychoanalysed. This "classic" 
approach commits two major errors: the psychobiographic method presumes 
an unmediated link between writer and text, and does not begin to 
consider the role of the reader, while the characterological approach 
treats a character as a "real" patient manifesting "real" symptoms. No 
text is an unmediated or transparent expression of a writer's 
personality, -nor is it a psychic notebook or confession. Like dream- 
interpretation, which as Freud enphasises cannot offer a "final" reading 
of the dream, literary analysis cannot ever recover an "essential" 
meaning from a text. A character in a text cannot be subjected to real 
analysis; the first person singular "I" occupies a constructed subject 
position within a poetic text, an effect of language rather than the 
embodiment of presence. As has been shown above, the " I" cannot be 
reduced to a single, empirical subject. So, both psychobiographical and 
characterological critical methods are conceptually flawed, and a 
textual "drean" cannot be attributed in a conventional sense to a writer 
or af igure in a text. 
The symptomatic psychoanalytic reading reduces the text to a 
I 
reservoir of clues revealing latent material and primal wishes. 
Christian Metz points out that such a reading pays no attention to the 
influence of social effects or the ideological "imprint" upon a 
text. In addressing questions of history and ideology, materialist 
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critiques have consistently drawn on psychoanalytic models or 
terminology, but can be equally schematic in reducing a text to the 
status of symptom. In both of these cases, the author or text or becomes 
a patient to be analysed with potentially therapeutic results. The 
emphasis shifts the perspective from the individual subject to the 
social, a move from the "I ad' - to the "It is" that has increasingly 
characterized a variety of critical and theoretical approaches to the 
reading of literature. This shift mirrors theoretical developments 
in psychoanalysis, particularly Lacan's return to Freud. According to 
Terry Eagleton, Freud offers "nothing less than a materialist theory of 
the making of the hunan subject". "'-` -' This is a useful corrective to the 
tendencies of cultural theories like Marxism to elide the fact that 
psychoanalysis is a theoretical "articulation of the subject with the 
soc ia1 11 . 
("-ý2 " 
Yet several years earlier, in Eagleton's Criticism and Ideology- 
psychoanalysis dematerialises into a convenient metaphor for reading 
power and social relations. He posits the dream as a process of 
production and the site of conflict between society and desire: "The 
dream, as distorted and mutilated text, is a conflict and compromise 
between unconscious material seeking expression, and the intervention of 
an ideological censor". `*-'-' Here the drean is reduced to the meeting- 
point between an unspecified and unattributed wish and a prohibitive 
"ideological censorit. This conception of "dream! ' effaces several 
I 
elements central to dream-work for psychoanalysis: the body, the subject 
and the unbound energies of desire. Robert Young dismisses this 
deployment of the literary dream-text as "the oldest trick in the 
psychoanalytical critical book", -still indebted after Lukacs to a theory 
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of reflection and provoking "a seemingly endless hunt for 'gaps' in 
literary texts which could be arbitrarily proclaimed their unconscious 
moment of ideological conflict". "" Materialist "treatments" of the 
symptomatic text betray a therapeutic interpretive urge similar to that 
of classic psychoanalysis. The text is perceived as a patient, revealing 
an ideological condition in need of critical diagnosis and cure, a 
remedial impulse rejected by Frederic Jameson. Young illustrates the 
problems of substituting a model of the psyche for that of the state: 
.. it is an untheorised transference: the psychoanalytic 
model is precisely about the incommensurability of the 
psyche's relation to the social, and therefore it makes 
no sense to apply that model to the social as such, "" 
Conversely, however, psychoanalysis has tended to colonise the social, 
taking up Freud's challenge at the end of Civilization and its 
Discontents to "embark upon a pathology of cultural conni nities" (CRS 
339). Andre Green notes how psychoanalysis is ineluctably drawn to 
individual and social, "interior" and "exterior" conditions: 
The task of psychoanalysis is paradoxical; in psycho- 
analytical practice it strives to examine as closely as 
possible the singularity of a single analysand; on the 
other hand the result of its research and the ensuing 
theory seem valid only if they define the most general, 
even the most universal, traits of the human condition, "" 
Similar to the "master/slave" dialectic between literature and 
psychoanalysis outlined by Felman, there is a contest between cultural 
theory and psychoanalysis to synthesise conceptualisations of the public 
and private, bodily and cultural subject. 
I 
Antony Easthope negotiates between historical materialism and 
psychoanalysis via a concept of social pýbantasy that regards the 
insistence of phantasy in poetic texts as an imbrication of ideological 
and unconscious meanings. Poetry produces unconscious and ideological 
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meanings differently but simultaneously, and the attempt "to discuss a 
poetic text only with attention to one side is reductive and 
inadequate". I'll Easthope reviews unsuccessful theoretical attempts to 
establish a theoretically coherent synthesis between historical 
materialism and psychoanalysis. He contends that we have no right to 
expect such a synthesis, not least because at any given historical 
moment, the "time" of the unconscious and ideology may be relatively 
autonomous and distinct: 
,, there is no need to suppose that the time of the 
unconscious coheres with the time of ideology; each must 
be recognised as acting transformatively in their own 
specific effectivity according to their own autonomy, (32) 
Easthope adapts Saussure's metaphor describing the connection of 
signifier and signified as a model of the imbrication of ideological and 
unconscious phantasy: 
(a) what is analysable as ideology and as phantasy follow 
their own autonomy; 
(b) they are necessarily by nature distinct and 
incommensurate; 
(c) but in history they are always produced together 
and in simultaneity; 
(d) a change in one is simultaneous with and corresponds 
to a change in the other, (42) 
Social phantasy affords a means of reading the unconscious in poetry as 
enmeshed in discourses and relations of power, and neither historical 
materialism nor psychoanalysis need efface each other as discourses. 
Yet, as has been seen, Easthope draws fairly clear distinctions between 
dreams and poems, , and his analyses of phantasy are dependent on 
pathological categories, offering an insufficient articulation of the 
subject of phantasy or the subject of poetry. 
The reductive searching for latent content that lies "behind" the 
surface of the work of art has dogged psychoanalytic investigations of 
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aesthetics. Lacan notes that in The Interpretation of Dreams Freud is 
not engaged in tracking down repressed infantile wishes. Freud stresses 
that dreans are constituted as superimposed layers of meaning (TID 312), 
ambiguous, multiply-determined - and suggestive of many readings. The 
wishes that dreams fulfil are conplex and ultimately irrecoverable in an 
analytic sense, thus defeating the quest for pristine latent meaning or 
truth in the dream. Instead Freud is concerned primarily with dream- 
work, the forns employed by the "language" of desire. When analysing 
dreams, his main interest lies in their construction and processes of 
figuration, and he shows little inclination to uncover a prinal wish or 
an essential meaning in the dream-text. Words are "predestined to 
ambiguity" and dreams are yet more elusive and distorted: ". we must not 
be surprised or at a loss if it turns out that a number of ambiguities 
and obscurities in dreams remain undecided" (ILP 270). Freud admonishes 
some of bis followers for overlooking the distinction between latent 
dream-thoughts and the dream7work: 
At bottom, dreams are nothing other than a particular fOrAy 
of thinking, made possible by the conditions of the state 
of sleep, It is the dream-work which creates that form, 
and it alone is the essence of dreaming,, (TID 650) 
Dreams are processes, acts of representation or def ornation. As Jean- 
Francois Lyotard observes: "it is not the dream-content that fulfils 
desire, but the act of dreaming". ý'6*-) Cynthia Chase notes that Freud's 
interpretive strategy negotiates between hermeneutics and poetics. Freud 
initially sees the task of dreanr-interpretation as one which requires 
the reader to "plunge into the minutest details" of the patient's life. 
Yet Freud's theories of dream-work and transference emphasise the vital 
inportance of exploring unconscious processes of production. As Chase 
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stresses, to "plunge" into the search for hidden meanings in a text 
risks obscuring its modes of expression and conditions of knowledge: 
The transference 'peremptorily demanded' by the &*Ppýeneulic 
enterprise of interpretation, conflicts with the poLzlicsof 
the enterprise of textual analysis, which would have to 
trace, by means of displacements or transferences, not the 
meaning but the devices of meaning, the transferential 
process, of the teXt, (70) 
By shifting the emphasis onto form rather than content, 
psychoanalysis thus moves away f rom its preoccupation with locating a 
primal wish. Jeffrey Mehlman contends that searching for a repressed 
wish can itself become repressive. He argues that the hunt for latent 
semantic content in the dream overlooks the syntactical nature of the 
unconscious, "reducing the process of dream-work to a single moment in 
the overall series of transforimations". ': -71" Mehlman adduces Freud's 
observation that dream-content seems like "a transcript of the dream- 
thoughts into another mode of expression" (TID 381), but this is a 
transcript that is also a translation. Rather than reducing dreams to a 
semantic core, interpretation must concentrate on the transformative 
processes involved in dream-work: 
,, dream analysis is concerned 
less with discovering 'the 
original' than with charting the transformation performed 
between 'original' and 'translation', less in search of a 
latent content beneath the manifest than a latent 
organization of the manifest, 
(72) 
This has clear implications for reading poetry: instead of tracking down 
a essential meaning located in the psychology of an author or character, 
I 
criticism should read psychoanalytically by tracing "latent" forms of 
organization in the text. Such an approach entails concentrating on ways 
in which poetic texts prevent readers "seeing", how they disturb and 
scramble attempts at critical translation. By focusing on 
42 
ýA 
transformations, analysis can avoid schematic predictions about what it 
will discover. This offers a connection with Steve Connor's articulation 
of a deconstructive approach to poetry, an act of reading 
characterized not by processes and effects that may be 
reliably predicted in advance, but rather what may ensue 
from a reading that does not in principle suspend itself 
at the point where coherence of meaning seems to have been 
1731 achieved,, 
Dream-analysis and literary criticism must resist the temptation to 
operate like secondary revision in the dream-work, omitting what does 
not fit and rendering incoherent and ambiguous naterial more 
comfortingly intelligible. For Freud, poems and dreams require similar 
modes of interpretation: Just as dreams 
are capable of being 'over-interpreted',, so all genuinely 
creative writings are the product of more than a single 
impulse in the poet's mind, and are open to more than a 
single interpretation, (TID 368) 
Analysis of a dream-text is partial, provisional, inexhaustible and 
strictly interminable, a "finely-spun web of linguistic 
interconnections". 1: 7,4ý The whole of the dreamer's mental existence is 
potentially relevant to the interpretation. Yet at certain moments 
analysis is halted, brought up against what Freud terms "nodal points", 
upon which a "great number* of the dream-thoughts converge and which 
have "several meanings in connection with the interPretation of the 
dread' (TID 388). For Freud, these nodal points ultinately prove 
unplunbable. Lacan renames these 
I 
analytic moments points de capiton or 
anchoring points, "by which the signifier stops the otherwise endless 
movement (glissement) of the signification" (E 303). These anchoring 
points weigh and button down the " <7S. ) upholstery of speech" ' and form the 
point at which need is represented in psychical life. Lacan conceives 
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the chains of the signifier and signified as being distinct orders 
connected only by slender dotted vertical lines, fine streaks of 
correspondence. The point de capiton forms a knot which closes 
signification, anchoring the two registers (S/s) to each other: it is a 
punctuation by the real. This represents the "mythical" point at which 
discourse hooks itself onto signification, and it is only here that the 
analyst might see the fish that s/he hooks (E 303). Nodal points in 
dreams and poetic texts are passing places or temporary resting points, 
moments that every reading posits but they are not the moments where 
signifier and signified finally unite. Dream-analysis cannot trace an 
originary desire or reveal the subject as "itself"; dream-analysis can 
no more exhaust the "meaning" of a dream7text than literary criticism 
can provide an ultimate interpretation of a text. 
Thus the problem of attributing "desire" or an "unconscious" in a 
text remains, leaving its ambiguities as "undecided" as those which face 
Freud in the dream-work. Peter Brooks asserts that criticism 
involves a willingness, a desire, to enter into the 
delusional systems of texts, to espouse their hallucinated 
vision, in an attempt to master (sic), and be mastered 
by their power of conviction, 
(76) 
For all Brooks's problematic investement in critical "mastery", his 
comment foregrounds that fact that literary interpretation is not a 
matter of dispassionate and objective reading, but that the reading 
process draws readers "into" the text. This returns us to Freud's 
I 
statement about the artist as neurotic allaying "ungratified wishes" in 
a work of art. Although Freud maintains the primacy of the artist, he 
also attributes the need for gratification to the audience. Texts 
involve strategies of persuasion and revelation, influencing and 
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coercing readers. They work on, and are worked on by texts, a "complex 
double dialectic of two bodies inscribed in language". In this two- 
way process, readers' desires are at stake too. This bears some relation 
to the concept of transference, where the analytic situation brings into 
play the unconscious of both the analysand and the analyst. The 
psychoanalytic encounter becomes an exchange between two subjects who 
must "open up" the resistance involved in the transferential process. 
Analogously, the reading subject is drawn to read the other while the 
other reads the reader. Transference is not deployed here in order to 
reinstate the text as a patient, and the notion of transfer is not to be 
taken as suggesting the commi nication or imparting of meaning that 
exists in advance of the text. Transference marks, in a dynamic of 
interpretation and subjectivity, a certain similarity between 
psychoanalysis and literature. 
Meredith-Anne Skura directly connects the limits of dream- 
interpretation with the endeavour of literary criticism: 
What Freud's work established was not the existence of a 
simple battle between wish and censor but the fact that 
the dream is multiply determined and lends itself to 
multiple, contradictory readings, This conflict is less 
like the tug-of-war implied by the dream formula than 
like the perceptual conflict caused by ambiguous duck- 
rabbit drawings or the intellectual conflict in a debate 
or a sequence of textual interpretations, "" 
Any textual reading or dreair-analysis is a point of departure and cannot 
claim to be total or foreclosing: it is rather "a polemical field of 
I 
interpretive forces". '171-ý This interpretive field involves questions of 
the constitution of the subject "in" dreams and poems, the personal and 
social, the body and language, history and the "timeless" unconscious. 
As Lacan suggests, desire Is interpretation. ': "" The closing section 
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brings together the work of poetry and questions of interpretation, 
advancing a way of reading differently, or rather, of trying to read the 
difference and otherness that is ineluctably bound up with poetry and 
dreams. 
The Dreaming Space of Poetry 
Thus far the discussion has centred on several associated theoretical 
difficulties in relation to dreams and poetry: the issue of 
"communication", the complexity of ascribing a place or identity to the 
subject of poetry, and the problem of attributing or interpreting desire 
in a poem or drewir-text. The question of comnunication might be 
rephrased: how might dreams and poems be said to "pass" thought, and who 
is the addressee of a dream-text or a poetic text? Are there 
similarities in the ways that dreams and poems induce subjects to see, 
think and know in "hallucinatory" form? 
In 'Dreams and Occultism' Freud discusses the phenomenon of 
thought -transference in which mental processes "can be transferred to 
another person through empty space without employing the familiar 
methods of communication by means of words and signs" (PFL 2 69). Here, 
11empty space" might equally be taken to refer to words and signs, their 
lack of "inherent" reference and the hollowness at the heart of 
representation. Teldpathy can occur both in dreams and a waking state, 
but "the state of sleep seens particularly suited for receiving 
telepathic messages" (PFL 2 66). Freud emphasises that "what seemed to 
teach us something about telepathy was not the dream but the 
interpretation of the dream, its psychoanalytic working-over" - Telepathy 
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is thus understood to be an effect of interpretation; nothing in the 
dream-texts under discussion are in tbemselves telepathic. The dream- 
texts possess no content as such. Telepathy is a process that is "hard 
to demonstrate" (PFL 2 86), traceable only in its effects. Yet those 
dream7-texts force Freud to encounter strange transmissions and see 
things: telepathy works as an effect between reader and text, 
interpreter and interpreted. Reading is both an active and passive 
process, the "transfer" of meaning taking place across "empty" space, a 
transfer that occurs in the here and now, without a preexisting message 
waiting to be delivered, subject to delay, misdirection and non-arrival. 
This has clear implication for the production of meaning in 
literary texts, particularly in view of Derrida's articulation of the 
poematic. The act of poetry comes from "elsewhere", but this other place 
or site is not embodied in an omniscient other - an author or a dream- 
subject - nor is it located in a reader or interpreter. It is always 
both elsewhere and in beguiling proximity, both inside and outside the 
subject, a threshold that Lacan terms "extimacy". The poematic involves 
all of the figures implicated in the structure of address. It brings a 
poetic "subject" into being, a subject that makes and is made by the 
poetic event and that cannot be reduced to conventional categories like 
poet, protagonist or reader. Thus it follows that the critic, reader or 
interpreter is never securely "beyond" the text. The one who reads 
becomes the one who is read; there is no position "outside" the text 
which interpretation can safely assume. Nicholas Royle proposes that the 
literary text operates telepathically, as "reading-machine, as reading 
effect, that is as always in advance including, foreseeing, its 
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addressee". 1191 1 Royle links psychoanalysis and literature through this 
telepathic structure: 
Whether it is a matter of the relationship between the 
psychoanalyst and his/her subject or between a literary 
critic and a literary text, the following also applies: 
the analyst or critic is being read, being determined by 
the text, (82) 
It may be possible to conceive of dream-texts as operating under similar 
conditions of possibility to those of literary texts. In a highly 
provisional sense, then, dreans can be said to bring a "subject" into 
being: a dream-subject neither empirical nor self-identical, and an 
interpretive subject (the two are not clearly separable) constituted 
through the dreams s/he interprets. 
What is the place of dreams, whose place is it, and what bearing 
might such a place have on desire and representation? In the course of 
his meditations on the space of literature, Maurice Blanchot draws a 
distinction between the place of sleep and the place of dream. In sleep, 
the "sovereignty of the 'P dominates this absence which it grants 
itself". The absent presence of the sleeping state assures the 
subject of its world, an "intimacy with the centre": 
My person is there, prevented from erring, no longer 
unstable, scattered and distracted, but concentrated in 
the narrowness of this place where the world recollects 
itself, which I affirm and which affirms me, Here the place 
is present in me and I absent in it through an essentially 
ecstatic union, My person is not simply situated where I 
sleep; it is this very site, and my sleeping is the fact 
that now my abo, de is my being, (266) 
In this paradoxical "ecstatic union" between presence and absence, the 
place of sleep institutes and is instituted by the subject. For 
Blanchot, this site starkly contrasts with the act of dreaming, which 
"is the reawakening of the interminable": 
It is an allusion at least, and something like a dangerous 
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call - through the persistence of what cannot finish - to 
the neutrality that presses up behind the beginning, (267) 
In the dream, the "emptiness and vagueness of the anterior" surfaces. In 
psychoanalytic terms, this anterior suggests the fleeting intangibility 
of primordial desire, the mythically original sources and objects of 
satisfaction, simultaneously accessed and obliterated by the elusive 
mobility of desire and its representations. Dream is a realm of 
substitution and repetition, of simulacrum, where the subject f ades 
into imitation: the dreamer "is not another, some other person, but the 
premonition of the other, of that which cannot say 'I' any more, which 
recognizes itself neither in itself or others". (6141 Turned reflexively 
on itself, the form of the dream is its sole content. With no assigned 
subject, voided of substance, the dream cannot really "be": 
The dream touche5 the region where pure resemblance reigns, 
Everything there is similar; each figure is another one, is 
similar to another and to yet another, and this last to 
still another, One seeks the original model, wanting to be 
referred to a point of departure, an initial revelation, 
but there is none, The dream is the likeness that refers 
eternally to likeness, (es) 
Ineluctably other and dispersed, both one and none, in the dream the 
subject cannot be synonymous with itself: it is present only in 
supplement and repetition, like desire "known" in its absence only 
through its representations. 
In Studies on Hysteria Freud remarks that we are all "insane" in 
our dreams (PFL 3 64). If this is so, Freud proposes the dream as a 
place of hallucination, otherness and dispersal, where identity is both 
staged and effaced, a mise-en-sc6ne of desire that is strangely intimate 
yet thoroughly misrecognised. Yet Freud's subsequent delineation of the 
dreanr-wish, and the designation of a dream-subject for whom desire is 
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staged, conflicts with the logical conclusions of his comments on the 
madness of dreams. In The Freudian Subject, Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen 
thoroughly reconfigures Freud's understanding of the dream-subject and 
the nature of the dream-wish. Borch-Jacobsen contends that 
wishfulfilment in dreams takes the form of, and the subject of the dream 
is constituted by, a rivalrous, even murderous identification with the 
other. The dream wish is mimetic, nanifesting a desire not to have or 
obtain the object, but to be it, possess and assume its place: 
"Desire. does not aim essentially at acquiring, possessing, or enjoying 
an object; it aims (if it aims at anything at all) at a subjective 
identity". In its ambivalent identification with the other, desire 
is altruicidal. 
Borch-Jacobsen points out that dream-representation shows an 
"enigmatic preference for resemblance", and there is a consonance 
between the "gramnar" of phantasy and dreams in terms of simulation, 
the same amb i guous lea. -vis in whi ch the 'I' speak s( and 
desires, and enjoys) in the name and in the place of another, 
without our knowing for certain whether that 'P has ever 
been located anywhere except in resemblance, where it plays 
all the roles and simulates all identities, (22) 
This mimetic grammar, where identity is always somethinE and somewbere 
else, recalls Blanchot's "semblance" of dreams. Borch-Jacobsen 
delineates a "blind spot" of phantasy, the point of otherness from where 
the subject "sees", and yet which remains invisible to the subject. 
(This "blind spot" will be brought into sharper focus in Chapter Three. ) 
The "subject's place in phantasy is always the place of another" 
and the point of otherness, where the "I" is the "other", opens up a 
"space of adversity" (40). Wishfulfilment takes place on a displaced 
stage, and unconscious phantasy is not mounted for the benefit of a 
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subj ect of f stage. The subject is no longer ascribed a position of 
exteriority in the mise-en-sc6ne of desire. The subject of the wish has 
neither property nor identity prior to phantasy (23), and the desiring 
subject is brought into being by the act of identification: 
The so-called subject of desire has no identity of its own 
prior to the identification that brings it, blindly, to 
occupy the point of otherness, the place of the other (who 
is thus not an other): an original alienation (which is 
thus not an alienation); and an original lure (which is 
thus not a lure, either), (87) 
Borch-Jacobsen's work profoundly revises Freud's statement that 
dreams are "completely egoistic" (TID 370). By now, to question the 
place and identity of the subject of dream or phantasy is also to raise 
questions about the subject of poetry. Assimlilating the other in an act 
of appropriation, the dream-wish observes precisely the motivation that 
Freud assigns to the writers and readers of popular novels in 'Creative 
Writers and Day-dreaming' . These works encourage identification with 
heroes and heroines, whereby the " I" stands in or assumes the place of 
the other: the real hero of these stories is "His Kajesty the Ego" (AL 
138). Appropriating the place of the other in order to constitute the 
"self" is a form of being "elsewhere", a move that institutes absence at 
its outset. Since "one" is not "one" in advance of the act of 
identification, there is no other whose place "one" assumes. The other 
institutes the "I"; as in Derrida's poematic, the distinctions between 
to if$ 41youl, and "other" are traversed. Altruicidal desire is 
I 
paradoxically suicidal. Thus desire's megalomaniac "will-to-be-a- 
subject"') is doomed to failure. In short, you cannot have one without 
the other. 
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Borch-Jacobsen shifts the emphasis away from the object-orientation 
of desire; a different model, that of identification, triggers desire. 
He stresses that there exists no essential bond between desire and its 
object: rather, "the desire for an object is a desire-effect", induced 
via a mediating other (26). This hypothesis invites a comparison with 
the reading-effect of poetry proposed above. To reconfigure the object 
of desire necessarily realigns the subject of desire. For the purposes 
of our discussion, however, it is possible to retain the notion of an 
object even if, as Borch-Jacobsen notes, it is "fundamentally lost, 
irremediably absent, lacking, missing in representation" (27-8). Here 
Borch-Jacobsen implicitly acknowledges that the object-as-trace haunts 
representation. The object of representation can be regarded not as 
thing or "originary" source of pleasure to be obtained or reclaimed, but 
in terins of identification, as possession of the object as an other('s) 
place. Object-orientation in dreams and poems articulates the desire to 
acquire a subject-position or the guise of identity. 
Poetry, like the place of phantasy, is an "other" place. Writing 
about Vallace Stevens, Nancy Blake outlines a version of the "space" of 
poetry: 
The 'subject' of poetry is not the ego, for the ego is 
fictional; it is not the self which is speaking through 
poetry, Nor is language as a pure reflection the subject of 
poetics, For Stevens (and others like him)$ poetry 
elaborates a sparc the place of being, '69' 
Blake's ascription of poetry's space implies a metaphysics that must 
necessarily undergo radical revision in the light of the versions of 
poetic and dream-subjectivity that have been elaborated. Adducing Borch- 
Jacobsen, poetry might be understood as the place of a desire-to-be-the- 
other, even if it simulates the desire to be "oneself". However it 
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yearns for the impossible fusion of signifier and signified, poetry is 
not the place or event in which "being" is unveiled or affirmed in its 
fullness; rather, it places under erasure a punctual, unified self. 
Poetry is an event that interrupts or surprises experience: the poetic 
event suspends neither the iterability of language nor the sometimes 
violent, sometimes silent but always-elusive displacements of desire. 
Meanings and phantasies offer an illusion of substance, yet 
representation cannot institute satisfaction or desire "itself", since 
that would be to link desire to its "original" object. Similarly, in 
language, a "poetry of the object" aims at an impossible union between 
word and thing. Dreams, like the language of poetry, dramatize a failure 
in representation. Textual space implies potential and lack, the 
condition of possibility for the play of presence and absence. As Ellie 
Ragland observes, 
figures cannot say, nor can signifiers reveal, that the 
true limits of discourse are those of missed encounters, 
desiring encounters that flee even as they occur, showing 
the slip of mortality, the void, the hole in the field of 
knowing and being,, 1901 
For Lacan, language and desire are positioned around "originary" 
loss, a positioning which fundamentally connects representation and the 
death drive. The "real" object is lacking, unavailable, unpresentable in 
pure form: as Ragland remarks, "it is a permanent ab-sens unattainable 
in any final resolution or permanent satisfaction" (84). In the dream, 
the objet a stands in for the real, unable to eradicate its difference: 
a representative of desire, it is not the tbing itself. Like the object, 
the subject simultaneously appears and disappears in the chain of 
signification, "a missing link that is spoken or re-presented in its own 
blackout" (94). This representational iteration and obliteration of the 
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subject, netted and dispersed in an incessant semblance, links dream- 
work and the work of poetry. For Ragland, "ItIhe dream becomes 
paradigmatic of the human subject disseminated in images and words that 
fade into enigma and anxiety" (101). 
As Freud claims, psychoanalysis "seeks to prove to the ego that it 
is not even naster in its own house" (ILP 326), an eviction continued by 
Lacanian psychoanalysis. This decentring tendency has its corollary in 
the theorization and practice of literature in later modernity. As 
Michel Foucault argues: 
In writing, the point is not to manifest or exalt the act 
of writing, nor is it to pin a subject within language; it 
is, rather, a question of creating a space into which the 
writing subject disappears, "') 
As Borch-Jacobsen and Blanchot illustrate in different ways, the 
semblance of dreams displaces, even effaces the subject, just as desire 
"kills" the object. These altruicidal gestures have their equivalent in 
the space of writing, particularly in a "poetry of the object", where 
the word enacts the "murder" of the thing. Language is that which 
instals and absents the subject, and it is a comnon feature of the poems 
under discussion that they figure moments of strangeness or absence of 
self, whether in dreams, hallucination, trance, madness or phantasy. In 
'Ode to a Nightingale' , the desire to dissolve the boundary between 
subject and object produces a radical estrangement, the loss or erasure 
of a "sole self" even as the text acknowledges the impossibility of 
I 
subjective transcendence. Drifting between sleeping and waking, dreams 
and "reality", conscious and unconscious determination, the Poetic IP 
comes into intimate relation to alterity. The poetic subject proves as 
spectral and dispersed in its otherness as the dream-subject. 
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Textual "dreams" night thus be understood as the nodal points at 
which poems nost strikingly and insistently question the category of 
"identity" and the position of the reader in relation to the text. The 
11poematic experience" is one of suspension or interruption, disrupting 
clear demarcations between those figures implicated in the poetic event. 
Poems and dreams have already been tentatively compared as reading- 
machines, but they can also be seen to function as desiring-machines. 
Dreams lure the interpreter to read the unreadable and radically 
displace the subject-who-dreams. Poetic texts produce the reader's 
desires, inducing us to identify (impossibly) with the space of 
literature, to lose ourselves in its estranging networks. Poetic 
"dreams" characterise those spaces or moments where texts usher the 
subject towards a form of sleep, both suspending and making possible 
ways of "seeing" - 
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II 
JUST SOME HUXAN SLEEP 
When I reached manhood, I saw rising and growing upon 
the wall shared between life and death, a ladder barer 
all the time, invested with an unique power of evulsion: 
this was the dream,, '. " 
,, creative writers are valuable allies and their evidence 
is to be prized highly, for they are apt to know a whole 
host of things between heaven and earth of which our 
philosophy has not yet let us dream, 
(Delusions and Dream$ in Jansen's 6, r,? di , AL 34) 
This chapter offers an analysis of a poetic text, Robert Frost's 
'After Apple Picking' , which explicitly "stages" a dream. Three main 
issues are considered: how a poem can be read as a "dream"; how desire 
is understood as being "figured" in a text, and to whom it might be 
attributed; and how Frost's poem appears to link up with Freud's essay 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle, published seven years after 'After Apple 
Picking' was written. Central to these issues is the question of whose 
desire is at stake in a psychoanalytic approach to literary criticism, a 
question that opens out to include the issue of identification in the 
reading process. There is also an analysis of the poem's entropic 
trajectory, its falling "asleep", which is mediated through Derrida's 
discussion of Freud's speculations on the so-called "death drive" in 
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A 
Adequate Satisfaction 
After Apple Picking 
My long two-pointed ladder's sticking through a tree 
Toward heaven still, 
And there's a barrel that I didn't fill 
Beside it, and there may be two or three 
Apples I didn't pick upon some bough, 
But I am done with apple-picking now, 
Essence of winter sleep is on the night, 
The scent of apples: I am drowsing off, 
I cannot rub the strangeness from my sight 
I got from looking through a pane of glass 
I skimmed this morning from the drinking trough 
And held against the world of hoary grass, 
It melted, and I let it fall and break, 
But I was well 
Upon my way to sleep before it fell, 
And I could tell 
What form my dreaming was about to take, 
Magnified apples appear and disappear, 
Stem end and blossom end, 
And every fleck of russet showing clear, 
My instep arch not only keeps the ache, 
It keeps the pressure of a ladder-round, 
I feel the ladder sway as the boughs bend, 
And I keep hearing from the cellar bin 
The rumbling sound 
Of load on load of apples coming in, 
For I have had too much 
Of apple-picking: I am overtired 
Of the great harvest I myself desired, 
There were ten thousand thousand fruit to touch, 
Cherish in hand, lift down, and not let fall, 
For all 
That struck the earth, 
No matter if not bruised or spiked with stubble, 
Went surely to the cider-apple heap 
As of no worth, 
One can see what will trouble 
This sleep of mine, whatever sleep it is, 
Were he not gone, 
The woodchuck could say whether it's like his 
Long sleep, as -I describe its coming on, 
Or just some human sleep, 
(2) 
Read as part of a plain-speaking, con nsense poetic tradition, 
'After Apple-Picking' presents an idyllic view of New England, a world 
of rural simplicity and homespun, earthy wisdom. The tradition of rural 
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toil and humble faith looks back to Piers Plowman, who is granted a 
dream vision after his exhausting work induces deep slumber. 
Unpretentious, without apparent linguistic complexity, the subject- 
matter of Frost's poem seems -straightforward and unproblematic. The 
apple-harvest forms part of a lower-intensity Keatsian autumn, with a 
concentration on fruition, abundance, russet tones. New England autumn 
provides subtle contrasts in colour and temperature, mingling early 
frost and lingering warmth. Steady-paced, even-toned, emotionally- 
temperate, the poem depicts a cherished, domestic and familiar 
landscape. Reviewing the day's repetitive activity, registering the ache 
of physical fatigue, the speaker records a comnonplace unanbiguous 
aspect of human experience. The feeling of winter sleep and hibernation 
pervades the natural world. Not every apple can be picked, a recognition 
suggesting the countryman's patient awareness of the seasons and the 
transience of existence: in a real harvest, some fruit inevitably falls 
and spoils. Exhausted by the day's labours, it is perhaps inevitable 
that the speaker is preoccupied with thoughts of apple-picking. 
Philip Gerber's remarks exemplify this conventional and normative 
reading of the poem: 
So accurately and economically does Frost capture the 
essence of apple harvest that one cannot be faulted for 
finding adequate satisfaction within his portrayal of the 
apple-picking itself, needing no more, The sights and 
sounds are all there, Every sensation is recorded 
vigorously, No one who has used a ladder or laboured long 
hours driven by. desire, or nodded in the heavy drowsiness 
of Indian summer, is likely to forget soon the 
achievement of this verse, As rural idyll, it gratifies, "' 
Yet the poem remains far from straightforward in its structure or 
meaning, as these comments tacitly suggest. Gerber emphasises the 
familiarity of the scene depicted in the text, yet any sense of 
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comforting familiarity is vitiated by "No one-is likely to forget 
soon. " If the poem "achieves" an easily recognisable and comforting 
evocation of rural simplicity, should its forgetting be likely at all? 
Richard Poirier comments that Frost's poem is so familiar that it is 
difficult to recognise its strangeness, a comment that combines memory 
and f orgetting. 1: 4 -' The familiar, the known and commonplace masks the 
strange and unfamiliar. Since Freud's work on das unhelmlicb, the 
familiar, known and homely often becomes the most unsettling site of 
otherness. 
The extent to which the familiar scene represented in Frost's poem 
is satisfying for the reader is rendered problematic. The references to 
pleasure and fulfillment, attributable both to text and reader, are 
striking and insistent: "adequate satisfaction", "needing no more", 
"driven by desire", "it [the text, the actual activity, the effect upon 
readers and critics? ] gratifies". Gerber affirms the satisfying elements 
of the poem in decidedly negative terms: "one cannot be faulted", ý"no 
more"# "no one". Absence and ghostly traces haunt Gerber's critique, 
just as Frost's poem is haunted. His reading becomes implicated in a 
network of desire, though the location or structure of that desire 
remains unspecified, Just as desire remains elsewhere, traceable only in 
its passing in the poetic text he reads. Rather than maintaining an 
objective distance, his critical response, like the text itself, is an 
invested, situated reading. Ils: l Whose desire is referred to here by 
Gerber? Can a dream, or a poem, be reducible to a core phantasy? Freud's 
dream-analyses can be construed as interpretations of a text, rather 
than offering definitive understandings of particular dreams. Equally, 
the reading of a poem cannot be "concrete". Reading subjects are defined 
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in a web of relations that are both public and private, indvidual and 
collective. Reading Frost's text is not a case of tracking down an 
elusive wish or desire that can be identified with any particular 
author, character or reader. Rather, this reading attempts to indicate 
precisely how difficult (but inescapable) it is to attempt to locate or 
attribute "desire" in the act of reading. 
Gerber's commentary does recognise that the text revolves around 
insistent memories of satisfaction. Desire and phantasy are also bound 
up with memory, the mental recreation of a past event. Leo Bersani 
highlights Baudelaire's mnemonic concept of desire, which suggests that 
desiring memories are essentially phantasies. ': -: 1 The very act of 
remembering activates desire. In Frost's poem, the harvested apples take 
on the representation of desire, but the nature of that desire 
necessarily remains ambiguous and elusive. The memory of picking apples 
is one version of desire rather than its concrete objectification. The 
endless mobility of desire strives to recover an original source of 
(known, remembered or phantasised) pleasure. Incomplete, inadequate but 
irreducible, desire never finds concrete satisfaction, and must instead 
seek out derivatives or substitutions to appease the demand. An activity 
within a lack, desire seeks to recreate lost pleasure, partially 
satisfying need while anticipating real satisfaction. Thus desire is 
based on a fictional recreation of original pleasure, what Bersani terms 
an "appetite of the imagination": 
The activity of desiring is inseparable from the activity 
of fantasizing, There is no scene of desire which is not 
an elaboration, a kind of visual interpretation, of other 
scenes, (7) 
Reformulating and revising other desires, the operation of desire in 
phantasy or dreams is also interpretive: 
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If sexual desire is inseparable from fantasy, then it is 
always already an interpretative movement, and any 
originally exciting object or event gets lost in the very 
excitement which it produces, The work of fantasy in 
desire makes impossible the historical tracing of presumed 
sources of desire, "' 
Critical inquiry can only speculate on the location or nature of an 
original source of pleasure: it cannot trace a primal wish that 
underlies the text. Interpretation can be argued to constitute another 
itinerary of desire. Phantasy is already an interpretation of that 
initial wish or desire and analysis, a further stage of interpretation, 
needs to concentrate on tracing the various forms that desire takes. It 
can be argued that objects of desire are less objects than "creative 
processes" (42). Critical attention should focus as much on the form as 
on the meaninE of desire in a text or phantasy. If apples are taken as 
symbols of desire, part of a reproducible system, then a typology of 
"fantasy" could be used to immobilize author and readers into a scheme 
of fixed desires and sexual scenarios. For Bersani, this reductive 
classification highlights the failings of traditional Freudian 
criticism. He offers an alternative approach: 
A psychoanalytic theory of fantasy can be most profitably 
brought into analyses of literary texts not in terms of 
specific sexual content, but rather in terms of the 
mobility of fantasy, of its potential for explosive 
displacements, (6) 
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The twc)-pDinted ladder 
'After Apple Picking' , references to dreaming are explicit. The 
poem considers the relationship between dream and writing, often in a 
highly self-conscious manner. The ladder pointing "toward heaven" in the 
opening lines unmistakeably alludes to Jacob's ladder in Genesis 28: 11- 
15, where Jacob dreams of angels ascending and descending a ladder to 
heaven. By referring to a dream figuratively represented in another 
text, the poem draws attention to the significance of its own textual 
dream. People do not climb literal ladders to reach to heaven. In the 
introduction it was indicated that throughout literary history dreams 
have been used both as a convenient formal device and as a way of 
investing texts with figurative or symbolic meaning. In 'After Apple- 
Picking' the dream represents both a formal figuring device and a 
potential means of interpreting the text itself. For Richard Poirier, 
the poem is a "dream vision"': ': ', thus aligning it with some of the 
earliest literary texts. 
To Freud, dreams recorded in ancient sources prove the ahistorical 
value and truth of psychoanalytic dream interpretation: "The respect 
paid to dreams in antiquity is... based upon correct psychological 
insight and is the homage paid to the uncontrolled and indestructible 
forces in the human mind. .. " (TID 775). Classical dream- interpretat ion 
seems to confirm for Freud the timeless and universal "language" of 
I 
dreams, and the passage from Genesis appears readily susceptible to a 
"typical" Freudian interpretation: 
And he dreamed, and behold a ladder set up on the earth, 
and the top of it reached to heaven: and behold the angels 
of 6od ascending and descending on it, 
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And, behold, the Lord stood above it, (6enesis 28: 12-13) 
Staircases and ladders "are representations of the sexual act" (TID 472) 
while "a supremely phallic, flying father" presides over and transcends 
this phantasy of sexual intercourse. Thus the dream appears to 
provide clear evidence of the eternal and universal validity of 
psychoanalytic concepts and interpretation, yet this conclusion assumes 
that subjectivity is a constant, beyond history or at least coterminous 
with the history of the human species. In addition, the dream is part of 
a written text, a text rewritten many times: its textual status, 
cultural significance and meanings have changed throughout its 
historical transmission. It needs to be read in its "own" moment of 
production (and that itself is highly problenatic for any classical 
source) and also to be reinterpreted in the present moment. Freud 
appears to elide a network of differential relations that crosses time 
and texts, but the "confirnation" that "original" sources offer Freud 
are in fact reworkings and reconfigurations of older scenes of writing 
by the new "science" of psychoanalysis. 
The "confirmation" from antiquity of Freud's dream-theories is 
quite clearly a problematic rewriting, deriving from a complex interplay 
of influences and strategic reappropriations. It is more than a case of 
Freud's entrapment in universalising or totalizing discourse, or his 
logocentric presuppositions. Freud continually demurs to the 
authenticity and priority of ancient writings on dreams; his 
I 
observations, footnotes, disclaimers and introductory passages imply 
that antiquity has anticipated or foreseen psychoanalysis, waiting for 
Freud to confirm findings and discoveries already established but long 
ignored or concealed. These "early" thinkers privileged and insisted 
68 
/ 
\ 
upon the force and value of oneiric prophesy and foreseeing, precisely 
the sort of superstition or naive belief about dreams that Freud both 
rejects and acknowledges. In the name of scientific positivism, Freud 
sought a theoretical schema for the study and comprehension of dreams 
during the early development of psychoanalysis, yet his apparently 
rationalist endeavours were regarded in many fields of established, 
conventional knowledge as invalid, irresponsible or vulgarly 
speculative. Despite its early reception, psychoanalysis strove for 
authority and institutional ity, which necessitated significant reversals 
and elisions, a strategy to li3nit or marginalise those areas so 
inportant to Freud's early thought: hypnosis, telepathy and the occult. 
Yet much of Freud's work tests the limits of science and reason, its 
logical conclusions moving into precisely these superstitious areas 
excluded from or dismissed by conventional science and philosphical 
thought, with its positivist or empiricist tendencies. The non-linear 
temporality of dreams, the interweaving of past, present and future is 
transposed onto a "history of ideas", a transposition disrupting, if not 
wholly overturning, the concept of progress and chronology. 
Nevertheless, Jacob's dream reveals one psychoanalytic "truth" that 
may be loosely termed "universal" or "timeless" and which offers a 
valuable point of contact with Frost's text. The allusion to Jacob's 
ladder not only indicates the poem's subject matter, it enacts a pattern 
- the endless mobility, deferral and repetition of desire - that 
structures the whole text. The angels continually ascend and descend the 
ladder, suggesting the constant movement and transformation that defines 
dreanr-work. The ladder "still" sticks toward heaven, suggesting that it 
is to be climbed continually. The opposite ends of the ladder represent 
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heaven and earth, but such dualities become transformed or erased. 
Travelling along the ladder, the angels engage in a ceaseless 
interchange between poles that are never absolute distinctions but 
moving points of difference, precisely the boundaries that become 
blurred in dreams: mental and physical, conscious and unconscious, 
mortal and immortal, rational and irrational, social and individual, 
material and ethereal, literal and figurative, day-world and night- 
world. Are the angels the ghosts of desire, the traces of the body in 
the text, the only way in which dreams can be read or desire encountered 
in texts? 
The Form that Dreaning Takes 
Since it seems such a revealing, unveiling text "on" dreams, can 
'After Apple Picking' be examined like a dream? Is it possible to map 
the contours, trace the direction and follow the shifts and 
transformations of the dream-work by exanining a literary representation 
of a dream? The text seems to identify all the formative elements, the 
ingredients that constitute the raw material of dream-work, offering a 
description of dream-formation not unlike that outlined by Freud, who 
identifies several sources of dream-material. The first source is found 
in recent and indifferent material, or day-residues: ".. in every dream 
it is possible to find a point of contact with the experiences of the 
previous day" (TID 249). Memory-traces are derived from the previous 
day's events and actions, or may emanate from a more extensive period of 
the recent past. These remnants of experience need not appear important; 
in fact, the triviality of the remembered experiences may result from 
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the distorting activity of the dream-work, which displaces psychic 
significance or energy from one event to another. The dream-work 
connects psychically significant impressions and indifferent experiences 
by setting up ideas between them. Day-residues - memories of picking 
apples - occupy a central role in the poem, filling the speaker's mind: 
Magnified apples appear and dis appear, 
Stem end and blossom end, 
And every fleck of russet showing clear, 
A second source of dreams lies in somatic stimuli or "excitations 
of the sense organs" (TID 314). These excitations consist of chance 
stimuli during sleep and strong sensory impressions "such as cannot fail 
to impinge even upon a sleeping mind" (TID 314). Freud indicates that 
"the dream-work is under the necessity of combining into a unity all 
instigations to dreaming which are active simultaneously" (TID 323). As 
has been seen, the dream-work combines day-residues by means of certain 
connecting ideas. As another "instigation" to dreaming, somatic stimuli 
are added to the currently active psychical material in the sleeping 
mind. This need not always take place - there are other ways of reacting 
to a somatic stimulus in sleep - but this combination occurs when 
ideational material is found to represent both sources of the dream. 
This description of dream-formation seems to offer some explanation of 
the textual dream. The various associations that surround apple-picking 
can be seen to combine with insistent physical excitations aroused by 
previous activities - there are many references to snell, touch and 
sound in the poem -, into some sort of determining chain of ideas and 
impressions. It can be read in terms of the hypnagogic state (a term 
that will be encountered in a more radical sense shortly), where a 
person hallucinates while falling asleep or feeling great fatigue; in 
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such a "dream", someone who has just fallen asleep reworks their most 
recent thoughts and perceptions. Yet, for all the representations of 
physical experience, who (or what) might be construed as possessing a 
"sleeping mind" in 'After Apple Picking"? Is it possible to refer to a 
"speaker", or should we refer to the memory and body of the text? The 
body of the speaker - or should it be the text - bears the marks of 
repetition: 
My instep arch not only keeps the ache, 
It keeps the pressure of a ladder-round, 
I feel the ladder sway as the boughs bend, 
And I keep hearing from the cellar bin 
The rumbling sound 
Of load on load of apples coming in, 
Read experientially, the speaker's physical condition shows the effects 
of the day's labour. Undoubtedly, the body makes its mark and is marked 
in the text, but is it possible to locate this marking solely in the 
corporeal presence of a character? Where does that leave the reader, the 
movement of language, even the author? 
The third source of dreams identified by Freud is infantile 
material, which consists of childhood memories and impressions of 
distant events. Dreams permit a privileged regression to the origins of 
childhood memory, resurrecting buried memories. Often an infantile wish 
deriving from a childhood event underlies other meanings in a dream: 
... a succession of meanings or wish-fulfillments may 
be 
superimposed on one another, the bottom one being the 
fulfillment of a wish dating from earliest childhood, (TID 312) 
The insistence on an infantile wish underpins Freud's speculations on 
I 
art; it is at once the most alluring and most problematic facet of 
aesthetic production. There are a convenient stock of "typical symbols" 
in Frost's poem to assist a symptomatic reading. Freud points out 
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various symbols that commonly appear in dreams. There are obvious 
phallic images - tree trunks and branches (pulling off a branch is 
identified with masturbation or "tossing off") and picking or biting can 
be interpeted as a variation on rape. "II Steps and ladders, ascending 
or descending them, represent the sexual act (TID 472). The allusion to 
Jacob's ladder underlines this sexual connotation. Yet again, the apples 
attract multiple associations, insisting pervasively in the text: one of 
the merits of this approach is its close attention to figures of 
repetition. The apples nay correspond either to male genitals or female 
breasts (ILP 190). Equally, they could be an analogue of defecation, as 
they fall into the cellar bin (thus representing the repressed drive 
since defecation may be an early source of pleasure). The lulling warmth 
and drowsiness, the maternal, nurturing environment may suggest a memory 
of the womb, a desire to return there which finds expression in the 
preoccupation with death that haunts the poem. Attempting to trace 
infantile material in a literary text is fraught with difficulty and 
raises highly contentious issues (as well as critical hackles). If no 
due regard is paid to the context of "typical symbols", the practice 
proves naively intentionalist and reductive. More fundamentally, the 
question once more arises of where to attribute desire or locate an 
unconscious in a text. Instead of tracing an individual history, it is 
more productive and valuable to consider a textual memory or history, 
one that involves readers, other texts, voices and bodies. In this 
history, what remains and what returns is a different form of haunting. 
Thus, although the text suggests a recognition of the formative elements 
and processes of dreaims, it is clear that any tentative homology between 
Freud's work on dream--formation and a poetic figuring of a dream-state 
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will hit major stumbling blocks. The next approach will consider the 
poem/drean's signifying capacity. 
Honest Duplicity: Netaphor and Ambiguity 
'After Apple Picking' appears to manifest that "honest duplicity" 
of which Frost himself speaks: it is "all hint". ': '-` The motif of the 
ladder provides a tempting but traditional depth metaphor for the 
processes of literary criticism and dream analysis, a metaphor that is 
alluring and pervasive. 1: 131 Within this lexicon, criticism is regarded 
as looking "beneath" the manifest surface of the text, tracing its 
latent meanings; attention is also paid to the interrelation of these 
levels. Similarly, psychoanalytic dream-analysis moves "down" from the 
rational light of day to the shadowy depths of the unconscious. Such a 
process tests the knowable limits of the psyche, sounding the 
"unplumbable" depths of dreams, an interpretive project that travels as 
close as possible to Lacan' s mythical point, where discourse hooks 
itself onto signification (E 303). Interpretation represents itself as 
being conducted from a privileged position above, outside, 
uncontaminated by the text, gesturing towards a final profundity, a 
stable resting point for the reader. Yet, although it attempts to plumb 
the unplumbable, reading has always already fallen from its position of 
mythical unity, objectivity and authority. The spatial metaphor of 
reading seeks to uncover another dimension of meaning behind the text or 
under its surface, an approach exemplified by Meredith-Anne Skura: 
There is a connection between dreams and certain kinds 
of literature that insist, like the dream, on a gap 
between what the text seems to mean and the deeper 
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meaning it seems to imply, 
(14) 
According to this schema, both dreams and poems say one thing while 
suggesting sonething else: meaning resides in another place, deeper than 
the surface of the text. A traditionally instrumentalist approach to 
poetry would see metaphor as forming part of a conscious textual 
strategy, satisfying formal obligations. Reading the text as netaphor 
simultaneously recognises and effaces its materiality, and privileges 
content over form. Skura refers to the gap between apparent and implicit 
meaning in the text, yet fails to acknowledge that the act of 
interpretation thus depends upon reading absence, and that 
interpretation must attend to the gaps that the text makes visible. 
As David Murray stresses, the operation of metaphor suppresses 
difference, privileging elements that can be connected and brought into 
unified patterns. Metaphor enacts the "ruthless subordination of 
difference in the name of a single unified focus". "'-': ' The univocal, 
totalising tendency of metaphor effaces the work of metonymy, although 
the effects of both of these figures are at work in language and the 
unconscious, as has been shown in the opening chapter. In conventional 
terms, a metaphorical reading of 'After Apple Picking' would interpret 
the apples as substituted for another layer of meaning, offering a 
symbolic or figurative equivalence. The apples also signify 
metonymically, however; they are a form taken by desire, a provisional 
link in the chain of desire. Again, the concentration rests as much on 
how the poem works as what it means. Significantly, the ladder is 
described as "two-pointed", an image suggesting separate lines of 
meaning running parallel to, not above or beneath, each other. The 
spatial figure is thus lateral, a matter of contiguity as well as 
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similarity. Interruptions to the rhythmical pattern and syntactical 
inconsistencies attest to the displacements of desire that transform the 
surface of the poem. This conception is faithful to the original sense 
of metaphor as transfer, a bearing-across or constant movement. (This is 
not to argue the case for the imetaphoricity of all writing, or the 
endless deferral of meaning. ) Instead of reading metaphorically in terms 
of depth or univocality, the ladder can be seen to represent a form of 
the royal road to the unconscious, a "transcribing" of the unconscious, 
with transformations - of meaning and desire - taking place across the 
surface of the text. 
As has been discussed earlier, in the textual "dream" apple-picking 
is not merely an aspect of the coherent, orderly day-world: it is 
invested with figurative significance, an investment that is both intra- 
and intertextual. Just as the orderliness of the day-world is disrupted 
and put in question by the processes of the unconscious, so the 
transformative movements of desire in language undermine commonsense 
readings and unground any reading position that claims to be securely 
outside the text that is being read. Apple-picking is a memory in the 
poem, albeit recent, aching and pervasive: it is a representation, in 
the dual sense of displaying and replaying. Just as that menory alters 
in the poem, so a memory becomes changed in a dream. In dreams any 
memory changes in terms of status and significance. It Joins other raw 
material in the dream7work, where anxieties, desires, other ideas and 
I 
recollections can combine, interact with or radically alter that 
original memory. Indeed, it may be impossible to write of an "original 
memory" in a dream or a text. In a dream, a memory is a transformed 
mental product, something other than itself. It may have assumed greater 
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or lesser significance, perhaps even altered almost beyond recognition. 
The question of textual memory imbricates the individual and the 
collective, with implications for the ownership and authenticity of 
memory. 
Foregrounded as the central, overbearing image of the textual 
dream, apple-picking denotes more than picking fruit from a tree; it is 
the focus of numerous ideas and associations in the poem. In an actual 
dream, this image would be understood as an overdetermined element, 
possessing "multiple connections with other elements in the latent 
dream-thoughts". "c-) This definition of an overdetermined element is 
analogous to poetic metaphor, "a single word with multiple resonances, 
the meeting point at which overdetermination, surfaces". 
C17) The polysemy 
of any word is central to both linguistics and dream interpretation: 
11 words, since they are the nodal points of numerous ideas, may be 
regarded as predestined to ambiguity" (TID 456). Conceived of as 
provisional, open to the play of difference, the figure of metaphor 
provides an inportant theoretical link between dreams and poetry. The 
networks of meaning in poems and dreams are potentially endless and 
always deferred, but nodal points allow a space for determinate, 
provisional readings of dreams or texts, whatever the distinctions 
between those two activities. This "poetic" point, the impossible moment 
of hooking desire or knotting down strands of meaning, may be the only 
site of reading dreams and texts, though this is not a case of arguing 
I 
for "creative" or relativistic interpretations. 
As Christian Metz acknowledges, poetic language bears a relation to 
the primary process, but the language of poetry differs radically from 
the "language" of desire. This difference is illustrated by the 
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successive distinct stages between the primary process, dream-work and 
conscious thought. The primary process plays a major part in the 
formation of both dreams and literary products, but in itself this 
common factor cannot bridge the gap between the dream-state and poetry. 
These two discourses operate at different levels, and the effects of the 
primary process differ accordingly in each discourse. The primary 
process represents that activity of unconscious desire which seeks to 
repeat achieved satisfaction by locating the perception that accompanied 
it. Dreams arise when an unconscious impulse seeks to fulfil a desire 
not satisfied in waking life. The force of repression cannot allow this 
impulse to find representation in its original form. The unconscious 
material is instead transformed into a series of images in the dream. 
The initial impulse manages simultaneously to obey and escape censorship 
by assuming a form that is not immediately recognisable, a guise that is 
"other" than itself. In this fashion, the dream makes a compromise 
between the desire and the strictures of the repressive force. 
Unconscious material is subject to the flow of the primary process, 
which makes irrational and absurd connections between ideas and images. 
The first two mechanisms of dream-work, condensation and displacement, 
distort and deform these images, which are then further subject to 
secondary revision. This revision makes something intelligible and 
coherent from the dream-work, although it too is understood as a 
distorting process. Rational day-time reality (when a dream is 
I 
recounted, for example) reinforces this censorship by imposing sense and 
coherence on the "absurd" dream. Dreaut-work and conscious thought 
includes secondary revision, which is absent in the primary process. 
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Freud initially considers condensation and displacement as aspects 
of dreanr-work, serving the censoring force. Yet, since these mechanisms 
perform a distorting activity, they are subsequently regarded as 
manifestations of the primary process (TID 753-6). Condensation and 
displacement serve both prinary and secondary processes, adopting roles 
which are subversive and defensive, disruptive and controlling. Hence 
Freud's division of primary and secondary processes becomes problematic. 
In equating condensation and displacement with metaphor and metonymy, 
Lacan seeks to untangle this problem. Language is seen to be more 
radically subject to the influences and workings of the unconscious: 
"every single utterance, spoken or written, is invaded by the 
unconscious". ': Lacan's equation seems to offer an homology between 
the primary process, dream-work and poetic language. This 
conceptual ization is far from straightforward, however. The dream-work 
does not think: it is anti-thought, attempting to make its elements 
unrecognizable, giving them a new form. Its mechanisms can only distort, 
deform, bring pressure to bear. Condensation and displacement are 
illogical operations of a non-discursive nature; their relation to 
conscious language (relatively secondary, rational, ordered) is only 
approximate. 1: 19 -' These two mechanisms are distinguished from oral and 
textual discourse by the third stage of dream-work, considerations of 
representability. Lacan likens the dream's operations to a dumb-show, an 
evolutionary stage of writing. Speech is only one element of 
representation in a dream (E 161). 
Nonetheless, Lacan crucially highlights the continuity through each 
level of discourse. Only a provisional distinction exists between free 
and bound energy, unconscious and conscious meanings in dreams, speech 
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and written language (something taken up more radically by Derrida). 
There is an ongoing exchange and negotiation between the primary and 
secondary processes. The primary process represents a psychical 
substructure apparent only in its effects, an itinerary of always absent 
presence. 120: 1 It constantly informs, pressurizes, subverts, acts on 
conscious material. The primary process is active day and night, whereas 
dreairr-work assumes the economic conditions of sleep, Derivatives of the 
repressed drive still appear in language, although greatly distorted in 
order to overcome censorship. These derivatives function in altered 
form, as something "other", and it is this alteration that resembles 
poetic metaphor: 
This persistence and insistence of a repressed chain 
is precisely what gives poetry the quality of saying 
what it says as much by what is not there as by what is, "" 
Metz argues that meanings or valencies which surround any particular 
element in dreams or language are not all equally prominent or apparent. 
In the dreaw-work, some associations may not be easily accessible to 
consciousness; in language some acceptations are theoretically 
eliminated by context, but nevertheless remain present. It is this 
multivalence that suggests poetry's proximity to unconscious processes: 
... 
the eliminated acceptations (which are actually 
never eliminated: a definition of over-determination) 
inhabit a zone closer to the unconscious in the case 
of dreaming, closer to the preconscious for ordinary 
polysemies, and somewhere between the two for poetic 
resonances ... 
(22) 
Metaphor represents the interaction of similar and dissimilar elements; 
it is the reader or interpreter who enacts the transition from "literal 
incongruence to metaphorical congruence". "2ý'I' The split reference is 
still retained and this semantic clash attests to the subversive 
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activity of metaphor, disrupting the logical discourse of the rational 
mind. Secondary revision can be seen as analogous to reading, but both 
activities carry traces of primary process., they are not acts of pure 
rationalization or conscious reordering. The activity of reading is part 
of the transformation of meanings that takes place in a text. 
For both literary criticism and psychoanalytical. dream- 
interpretation, not only the manifest appearance of a text, but what 
remains unspoken and how that text is figured, proves of vital 
importance. Clearly the oppositions of primary and secondary, irrational 
and rational, unconscious and conscious can be only provisional, 
relative. The difference between dream and waking experience is seen to 
be relative and contingent. The meaning of a poem can be characterized 
by what it leaves tacit, discontinuous, occluded - that which 
constitutes the unconscious of the text. Poetic discourse operates 
through compression, elision and multiple associations, transforming its 
elements into something "other". At a different level, the dream--work 
functions in similar fashion. Thus the framing of 'After Apple-Picking' 
within some sort of textual "dream" invites, even necessitates, a 
reading of its otherness, to acknowledge the ways in which it resists 
any unifying "metaphorical" decipherment. Frost's poem "is an occasion 
when the precondition of metaphor itself seems to be that the normal 
distinction between dreaming and waking be suspended". 11: 24: 1 This 
suspension throws the poem's status radically into question, and unseats 
any comfortable notion of a fully conscious, controlling reading 
process. Poetry acts as an interruption rather than a replication of 
experience, constituting as well as being constituted by the subject who 
reads . 
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Troubled Sleep 
The text represents varying and often confused states of 
consciousness, modulating from conscious, waking thought to day-drean, 
"troubled sleep" and night dreans. The distinction between "conscious" 
and "unconscious" thought is indeterminate. For example, it is uncertain 
whether the transformative norning vision through the pane of ice is 
located in a waking or sleeping state. Even the connotations of sleep 
become ambiguous and unfixed: an undecidable "it", sleep comes to stand 
variously for physical rest, day-dream, night dream, winter and death. 
Richard Poirier comments: "By the end of the poem it is impossible to 
tell memories of waking fact and sleepy distortions apart". "s-1 In the 
poem, Just as the waking and sleeping states interchange and become 
barely distinguishable, so the meanings and the status of the text 
become blurred. In part, this confusion, distortion and transformation 
of thought resembles the operation of dream-work which, according to 
Freud, "does not think, calculate or Judge in any way at all; it 
restricts itself to giving things a new form" <TID 650). It is left to 
secondary revision to edit the dream-work and make the dream into 
something intelligible, but this confusion and transformation traverses 
both the work of secondary revision and the work of dreaia-analysis. 
Similarly, although traditional theories of literature night attribute 
the work of secondary revision variously to the author or the critic, 
those acts of "conscious" reworking are equally marked, traversed by 
otherness, an unconscious not decidably attributable to an individual 
psyche. 
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How can the reader securely decide when to read the text "as" a 
dream'? How might the text induce the reader to sleep? Who or what is 
asleep, or slipping in and out of various states of consciousness, 
within the text? Poirier's renark about "waking fact and sleepy 
distortions" situates the reading process in a sleepy state, as if the 
poem itself causes the reader to "drowse off". This would be to argue 
the case for a poetics of reading which suspends any conventional or 
privileged textual logic. '126-1 The "other" side of the text, its "honest 
duplicity", is not derivable fron the intention, self-conscious artifice 
or even the "unconscious" of the author. The textual dream in 'After 
Apple Picking' is not simply a strategic device that lures the reader 
into its spell, a device satisfying the obligations of poetic disourse 
or a strategy arising from a contractual agreement between writer and 
reader to suspend "reality" and enter a safe site of "play". To borrow 
T. S. Eliot's phrase, this poetic drean "is a concentration which does 
not happen consciously or of deliberation". ':: 21) To read a "dream" in 
poetry brings about a more extreme form of disruption, what Nicholas 
Royle characterises as "Itlhe notion of a hypnagogics or hypnopoetics, a 
radical disturbance of sleeping and waking, reading and dreaming". "I" 
This radical disturbance enacts a suspended state or state of suspense, 
a hovering or wavering at the borders of sense, a tottering bef ore the 
text falls (asleep) into an "other" side of thought or writing. 
There are repeated instances of "falling asleep" or slipping into 
different states of. consciousness within the text, indicated both by 
formal shifts in rhyme, syntax and rhythm, and by rhetorical shifts of 
emphasis. An initial sense of weariness is evoked: 
.1 am 
done with apple-picking now, 
Essence of winter sleep is on the night, 
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The scent of apples: I am drowsing off, 
Soft "s" sounds and lulling rhythms enact this drowsiness, blurring the 
distinction between waking and sleeping. The force of "done with" 
signals a shift in register, and the drift into sleep is either 
interrupted or succeeded by (there is a confused sequence of "events") a 
discomforting vision: 
I cannot rub the strangeness from my sight 
I got from looking through a pane of glass 
I skimmed this morning from the drinking trough 
And held against the world of hoary grass, 
The sibilance and hard-edged diction contrasts sharply with the previous 
lines. The pane of ice becomes a hard, precise window on the world; this 
perspective is startling, at once magical and disconcerting. The ice is 
"held against" the world, both as an aid to vision and as a protective 
barrier, although it is a barrier already breached. What the text 
"shows" is unclear, since the vision is a mixture of clarity and 
vagueness, yet such "strangeness" is a vision of alterity, the otherness 
of perception, the realm of phantasy. 
The icy vision abruptly shatters: "It melted, and I let it fall and 
break. " This fall leads to a strange prophetic sight of the future, as 
if familiar and recurrent, an anticipation of "What form my dreaming was 
about to take". The repetition and insistence of the chiming rhymes 
"well", "fell" and "tell" suggest the immanent force of this dream, as 
if the text cannot help itself, cannot avoid "drowsing off". The rhymes 
sound a knell similar to the " toll" at the end of Keats's Nightingale 
Ode. 
I 
Here, however, there is no return to a" sole self": it will be seen 
that the "self" in the text is rendered ineluctably other to itself in 
the strange vision through the ice. The text performs a hesitant or 
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oscillating movement, wavering on the edge of trance, of IoEing control, 
The text has slipped into past tense, implying that the dream took place 
immediately after the morning vision. This confusion - whether the 
passage records the original morning experience or is a later reworking 
of the "vision" - has troubled critics, inviting some interpretive 
gymnastics. Poirier suggests that the change in tense helps to suspend 
the distinction between waking and sleeping: 
It is as if he woke before work into a kind of 
reality that had all the strangeness of dream, and 
he looks to sleep after work almost in the hope 
of dispelling the dream, "" 
The moves of desire are traceable in terms of new relations and forms, 
and the dream of apple-picking may be regarded as a new f orm of desire, 
another mental representation or arrangement of images that supports 
that original desire. It is highly significant that the text anticipates 
the f orm of the dreaming rather than the content, as though the dream 
rehearses a familiar scenario but the meaning is not readily accessible. 
Even if the apples are an analogue of an original wish or desire, the 
location of that desire need not (cannot) be sought, for the dream or 
phantasy of apple-picking is already an interpretation, a recreation of 
pleasure, adhering to no strict chronology or original wish. 
Let us (as ever) return to Freud's terms for a moment: "recent 
material" - picking apples - combines with existing elements to give 
this dream its particular vivid and immediate form. The phantasmagoric 
swirl of "magnified apples" presents a scene nore mobile but as graphic 
I 
and strange as that observed through the pane of ice. The play of 
distortion, shifting intensities, displaced energies, repetition and mix 
of sharp detail and imprecision is characteristic of dream-work. The 
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11pressure" of the ladder-round and the insistent rhythms of the 
accumulating apples as they slide into the cellar bin are more than 
sensory impressions; they are mental recreations, part of a disturbed 
sleep. Once again there is an abrupt syntactical shift: "For I have had 
too much/ Of apple-picking" seems to be the response to a question or 
proposition, as if the text is constructing an argument. The rhetoric 
echoes "done with" earlier in the poem; "too much" could refer equally 
to the dream or the day' s exhausting activity. This dismissal is 
countered immediately by the enamoured way in which the text considers 
the unpicked fruit. Apple-picking is anything but forgotten: "There were 
ten thousand thousand fruit to touch, Cherish in hand, lift down, and 
not let fall". 
The nostalgic pleasure in the wake of this fall is fractured by 
another sudden syntactical disruption, suggested by the broken lines, 
Jagged diction and intimations of violence and oblivion: 
For all 
That struck the earth, 
No matter if not bruised or spiked with stubble, 
Went surely to the cider-apple heap 
As of no worth, 
This Jars against the previous moment of reflection, a disjunction 
underlined by the pessimism and vehemence of "As of no worth". The 
gentle caress of "Cherish in hand" is replaced by the rough edges of 
"struck" and "spiked with stubble". With crushing finality, "As of no 
worth" brings this trope or chain of memory to a halt. The text hovers 
on the threshold of, revelation, not disclosing "what will trouble/ This 
sleep of mine, whatever sleep it is". The self -referential manner in 
which the text anticipates the onset of "sleep" - "As I describe its 
coming on" - implies that the text will finally disclose what it really 
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means by "sleep", but the question of what is "coming on" (rest, winter 
or death) remains unresolved. The traditional reinstatement of rational 
control in dream poetry - the textual phantasy disavowed as only a dream 
or "Just some human sleep", the impersonal and self-conscious use of 
"One" - does not enact an i=ediate or secure return to reason or 
losenself. Human sleep brings dreams, the realm of desire. Sleep and 
dreams do not necessarily provide pleasurable escape and rest. As in the 
closing lines of Keats's 'Ode to a Nightingale' , the poem renains in a 
state of suspension, between sleeping and waking, leaving unresolved 
what "sleep" really means. Whatever sleep it is, the closing lines 
perform an even more radical falling asleep, a more extreme lapsing, 
than the "drowsing off" in the early part of the poem. The next step 
"beyond" is to consider further the "it" that constitutes the text's 
troubled sleep. 
Hillis Miller describes Wordsworth's 'Dream of the Arab' in Ib& 
Prelude in terms that are reminiscent of 'After Apple-Picking': 
,, the relation between dream and waking 
is so immediate and 
is made so explicit that the dream may almost be called a 
daydream, or at any rate a so-called 'hypnagogic' dream, that 
sort of dream which provides an immediate reworking by a man 
who has just fallen asleep of what he has been perceiving 
and thinking, rather than the rising up within deep sleep 
of buried images and memories, "" 
Royle notes several sideways substitutions in Miller's renarks, arguing 
that the notion of the hypnagogic dream is "immeasurably complicated" in 
several ways. One complication concerns Niller's experiental reading 
I 
identity 'of the dreamer' which does not confront "the question of the 
and what happens to this identity through the dream! '. 131 1 The 
represented thoughts in the text do not correspond to the operations of 
an actual sleeping mind: as has been shown earlier, the dream-subject 
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and the subject of writing are both problematic categories. A second 
complication noted by Royle relates directly to Wordsworth's poem but 
can be extended persuasively to 'After Apple Picking'. This complication 
arises through 
the way in which the text of the 'dream itself' - if it 
were ever really possible to say such a thing - is embedded 
and encrypted in a context of other texts and dreams, books 
and readings: it is cryptaesthic; it buries itself, 
uncannily performing what it describes, (32) 
Frost's poem does not so much describe as "perforn" a peculiar type of 
dreaming that is to do with prophesy, intertextuality and death. It is a 
feature of this thesis that certain texts will be seen to I'dream" of 
each other, and Frost's poem echoes other texts, including Keats's 'Ode 
to a Nightingale' and Freud's essay Beyond the Pleasure Principle. A 
poetic dream embeds itself, falls asleep in the networks of literature, 
losing itself in the crypt of reading. Yet the poem is not just a matter 
of the buried traces of texts; it involves a thanatographic movement, a 
writing or ciphering of one's death by burying one's own name, 
entrusting it in cryptic form to posterity. Since, in its iterability, 
the name carries death, death writes through the text, an unnamed " it" 
that is never presentable but never truly absent. Frost's thanatography 
will be considered through Freud's speculations on the death drive and 
the notion of the entropic pull. 
Speculations on Frost: the Dream of an Afterlife 
Derrida's re-reading of Freud's Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 
which discerns a connection between a certain strategy or perforimativity 
of writing and the "death drive", offers an intriguing link with Frost's 
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poem. Freud's and Frost's texts derive from a particular historical 
moment and in different ways are concerned with encrypting or encoding 
the kernel of a name (that carries death) and entrusting it to the 
future. John C. Kemp dates the writing of ' After Apple Picking' between 
May and July 1913. (: 3: 3: 1 Freud began work on a first draft of Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle in March 1919 and completed it in 1920. However, as 
Angela Richards notes in her editorial conments, the essay derives imuch 
of its material from earlier work on metapsychology, namely 'The Two 
Principles of Mental Functioning' (1911), 'Narcissism' (1914) and 
' Instincts and their Vicissitudes' (1915) (OM 272). For a work of 
speculation so concerned with genealogy, Freud's essay itself has a long 
history, a complex (re)birth. This reading is not a case of speculating 
on Frost's familiarity with Freud's work; it is rather an attempt to 
trace the faltering movements and speculative ventures of 'After Apple 
Picking'. 
Although the title of the essay broaches the possibility of 
crossing thresholds and boundaries, of making advances (not least on the 
reader), Derrida argues that Beyond the Pleasure Principle is a 
particularly halting, risky endeavour for Freud. Lacking secure footing, 
it occupies an uncertain space between scientific objectivity and 
abstract theorising. Hesitant and uncertain in its movements and 
tentative conclusions, the essay proceeds a-thetically, tending "to 
bring out what makes it elude the appeal of a 'last instance'". 
<34 :) For 
Derrida, speculatioii "is not only a mode of research named by Freud, not 
only the object of his discourse, but also the operation of his 
writing". Frost's poem too tests limits, positing and depositing, an 
oscillation that is actually a stasis. There is a similar sense of 
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restance or drifting (to sleep), and the text is never sure of its 
definitions: definitions are used here in the dual sense of findings or 
deductions and textual limits. 
Derrida considers what is at stake in Freud's theoretical 
speculations about what (if anything) lies beyond the pleasure 
principle. In doing so, Derrida advances a reconception of autobiography 
which tests the limits of the categories "life" and "work". There is a 
well-documented biographical supplement to the writing of Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle: the death of Freud's daughter Sophie, Freud's long 
struggle with cancer, and his deep pessimism in the "wake" of the First 
World War. These deathly "shadows" are assumed to inform the gloomy 
reflections throughout Freud's later work. Yet there are also issues of 
contest and priority at stake, both "personal" - an ambivalence towards 
Sophie's husband - and "professional" - an anxiety over the future 
direction and disposition of psychoanalysis. The nodal point of Freud's 
essay, the description of the fort/da game that Ernst plays with the 
wooden reel, meshes together the "theoretical" and "autobiographical" 
trajectories of the discussion. Indeed, this witnessed scene, "a 
legendary argument that is neither story nor history nor myth nor 
f iction"':: " 1, traverses the distinctions between personal and 
professional. Ernst's game functions not only as a theoretical proposal 
but also as an autobiography of Freud; Derrida thinks of autobiography 
here not so much as testamentary writing as a "more or less living 
I 
description of his writing" (119). 
In the fort1da (gone. . there) episode, where Freud's grandson Ernst 
repeatedly winds and unwinds a reel or bobbin as a form of exercising 
mastery over his absent nother, Freud looks on as an "interested 
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witness". His interest, argues Derrida, is the result of nore than 
personal or intellectual curiosity. He is a" busy" witness, 
"busy. producing the institution of his desire, making it the start of 
his own genealogy" (116). Freud reconstructs this domestic event in such 
a way as to secure his heritage: 
,, the speculating grandfather ... produces his text, 
making a contract with himself so as to be left holding 
all the strings of his line, descendants and ascendants, 
in an incontestable ascendancy, (134) 
Christopher Norris comments on the calculated risk of Freud's 
provocative thesis: 
Like little Ernst, he wants to venture on to dangerous 
ground, experience the provisional loss of mastery, so long 
as he can pull on the string, so to speak, and recover his 
powers of theoretical command, (37) 
Yet, what Ernst's game "reveals" is the death drive, the beyond which 
overruns the pleasure principle. A pervasive, unnameable otherness 
invades the household, the site of heritage and authority, and 
challenges the law of the olkos. So, too, an invisible, silent other 
invades the "familiar" rural setting of 'After Apple Picking'. 
The dream of Jacob's ladder in Genesis performs a projective 
movement that perhaps confirms the "incontestable ascendancy" that Freud 
envisages for his name as psychoanalysis. This ancient dream-sequence 
invents or invests in a future, wondering at a beyond, an afterlife. 
Like a dreanr-text, it weaves between past, present and future. As a 
represented dream inside a literary text, Jacob's dream is doubly 
displaced from conventional notions of causality and linear time. In the 
dream, God declares that Jacob's descendants will multiply and prosper: 
"and in thee and in thy seed shall all the families of the earth be 
blessed" (Gen 28: 14). God confirms Jacob's patriarchal sovereignty and 
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also assures his earthly "immortality", in that Jacob will live on 
through his line of descent. God's promise ensures that Jacob can 
transmit his name, marked already by repetition and death, through his 
descendants. The emphasis on patrilineal descent, an assured masculine 
legacy, f inds an echo in the "great harvest" of ' After Apple Picking' , 
an abundance that is measured in Biblical proportions: "There were ten 
thousand thousand fruit to touch". In the poem, apple-picking can be 
seen to operate as an analogue of prosperity, a means of displacing the 
finality of the cellar bin, as if anxious to ensure that the work will 
not be fruitless, of no worth. Frost's writing is saturated with 
Christian echoes of a futuristic or projective character. In 'Education 
by Poetry' he claims: "Belief in God is a relationship you enter into 
with Him to bring about the future". "311 
These two strangely linked examples of speculation - one from the 
Old Testament and the other from the new testament of psychoanalysis - 
form a tentative yet suggestive intertextual framework for Frost's poem, 
which performs another speculative venture. Poirier says that in his 
poetry "Frost is mostly an older version of himself looking at a 
younger". "0': ' Wallace Nartin outlines Frost's thanatographic strategy, 
the writing of one's own death: 
The poem, in Frost's view, is for its maker always a double 
reading (of past experience, and of other texts) and hence 
always a double repetition, The poet is thanatographer, 
perpetually rediscovering a dead self and finding that it 
provided for a future - the "now" of its verbal memorial, "') 
In this way Frost i-ronises the humanist "self", but this thanatography 
remains self-conscious artifice, a rhetorical strategy. The vision 
through the sheet of ice in 'After Apple Picking' opens onto a more 
radical thanatopoetics, beyond any traditional notions of conscious 
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authorial intention. The "strangeness" of sight cannot be erased after 
looking through "a pane of glass". If the glass is a window on "a world 
of hoary grass" it depicts an icy morning, but "frost" is the one 
obvious descriptive word missing from this wintry perspective. This is 
not simply an oversight, or poetic licence, in a poem turned towards a 
beyond, that speculates, transmits to the future. "Hoary" stands in for 
frost and, not incidentally, also connotes great age and ancient 
lineage, a genealogical association that echoes the "promise" of Jacob's 
dream. Faithful to the traditions of dreams in "classical antiquity", 
the vision is prophetic: as the glass falls, "I could see what form my 
dreaming was about to take. " This monent of dreaning acts as an encoding 
and bequeathing, a projective nessage or a signature to the future that 
detaches itself from the singular moment and intention of its 
production. (415 Writing acts as the carrier of death but in its 
iterability also enables the endurance of a name, even one that is 
buried, secret or cryptic. Such a reading is not proposing a more 
sophisticated psychobiographical approach, but attempting to adhere to a 
different "topography" of autobiography suggested by Derrida, who argues 
that Beyond the Pleasure FrincipJa writes the auto-biographical 
differently: 
A "domain" opens up in which the "inscription" of a subject 
in his (sic) text is also the necessary condition for the 
pertinence and performance of a text, for its "worth" beyond 
what is called empirical subjectivity,,, (42) 
This complex inscription of the subject is ineluctably caught up by, and 
I 
in, the performativity of a text, an inscription of readers and writers. 
Yet the specular morning scene records the dispersals of writing, 
name and identity. If the "glass" is a kind of mirror or frame for 
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identity, then it refracts the gaze, dividing the "I" that looks from 
the " I" that is reflected. Lacan emphasises that the imaginary 
structuration. of the mirror stage is "fundamentally alienating" and tied 
in with death. 14: 3ý As the pane of glass shatters, it offers not a 
reflection but a fracturing of identity (not that the mirror-image of a 
double would be any less disconcerting). The subject cannot render 
itself in terms of faithful representation: the glass does not reflect 
how s/he "truly is". Instead, the subject is forced to render up its 
self-image, being made strange, other to itself, precisely how the 
dreaiir-subject (and the subject of writing) is defined. The "world of 
hoary grass" is other, producing a reciprocal estrangement in the one 
who speculates through the pane of glass. Just as the poem's scenes 
(imaginary, remembered, dreamt? ) shift and transform, always strange to 
sight, so the subject, like the nagnified apples, appears and disappears 
from the field of vision. 
This disappearance and return performs a similar movement to that 
witnessed by Freud, a reeling-in like the bobbin or spool that little 
Ernst repeatedly winds in and throws away. In its way, the various 
discarded interpretations of the game resemble the inconclusive 
speculations and reflections on the nature of "sleep" in the poem. The 
visual connotations of speculation and reflection are particularly 
apposite when the chain of references to seeing and looking in the text 
is considered. This poetic version of -for-t1da induces a different sort 
of "reeling", however; in its heady projective vision, between waking 
and sleeping, the text spins and swirls uncertainly as it posits the 
future of a name, steps around the limits, the beyond of the subject, In 
doing so, it is traversed by the beyond of writing, which can be 
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categorised variously as the real, the body or death. The text's 
speculations do not unleash the work of the "death drive" , since that 
work (if it can be termed work) is always already taking place in the 
space of a text. Rather, to unravel further the string notif, the text 
permits a certain weaving or rhythm to be traced. Might this suggest, in 
the manner of much of Frost's poetry, that death "is the rhythm of 
ife" 14 :' The visionary moment of the breaking glass intensifies (it 
cannot be said that it produces, since difference is already lodged in 
the text) a difference or strangeness that inhabits the text. Lacan 
stresses that aggressivity corresponds to a splitting of the subject 
against itself; the text can be read as opening onto a difference or 
foreignness leading to a dream of self-annihilation that flits through 
the drifting, entropic rhythms of the closing lines. The next section 
will consider another type of fall that will lead directly onto 
questions of sleep and death. 
Apples in the Fall 
'After Apple-Picking' nay be termed a "dream vision" with some 
justification; like a traditional "dream vision", it appears as if the 
poem is building up to some revelation or spiritual truth. Apples evoke 
Eden, temptation and the Fall. This Christian, sacralizing reading is 
advocated assertively and unequivocally by Poirier: "To speak of apples 
is to speak of the Fall". "-r-I Reading the text is thus a case of 
interpreting and knowlnE the meaning of the images that begin to 
unground or suspend the distinction between waking thought and dreaming. 
Yet the text simultaneously frustrates understanding, rendering the act 
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of elucidation uncertain and speculative. The Fall from Grace functions 
as a necessary reminder of the sinful state which any Christian aspires 
to leave, but it is also a reminder of the transgressive potential of 
desire and sexuality. This duality marks the intent contemplation of the 
unpicked apples, and the lingering ache of remembered satisfaction 
suggested by "Cherish" looks back to the temptation in Eden: 
And when the woman saw that the tree was good for 
food, and that it was pleasant to the eyes, and a 
tree to be desired to make one wise, she took of 
the fruit thereof, and did eat, and gave also unto 
her husband with her; and he did eat, 
And the eyes of them both were opened, and they 
knew that they were naked ... (Genesis 3: 6-7) 
Looking, desiring, knowing: these are the crucial determinants of 
original sin. Adam and Eve aspire to absolute, transcendent knowledge, 
but in that very aspiration human insufficiency has already been 
recognised. The desire to know the other, in order to know what the self 
desires, underlies all quests for knowledge. (461 God has created Eden to 
satisfy every human need: the activation of desire, the supposition of 
demand, is a transgressive force, disrupting the stability of this 
perfect and endlessly pleasurable existence. Knowledge, a guarantee of 
existence for the subject, also institutes difference, a falling away 
from origins. The desire for the Logos and the imaginary plenitude of 
presence can never be fulfilled, an irretrievable and haunting 
loss. C47> 
Eating the apple expresses a desire to know what more is to be 
desired than can be satisfied by the "perfection" of Eden. In the Garden 
it is not the physical act of sex, but the mental awareness of sexuality 
and incompletion, that D. H. Lawrence polemically terms "sinful": 
Why were we driven out of Paradise? Why did we fall 
into this unappeasable dissatisfaction? Not because 
we sinned, Ah, no, All the animals in Paradise enjoyed 
the sensual passion of coition, Not because we sinned, 
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but because we got our sex into our head, "" 
Lawrence argues from within a narrow conceptual framework that is 
heterosexual and phallocentric. 14': -" He contends that the will to "know" 
sex is a prohibitive endeavour, repressing all that is Joyful and 
intuitive. Lawrence's commitment to the heterosexual genital act leads 
him to conclude that "coition is the essential clue to sex". He 
views the unconscious as "by its very nature, unanalysable, undefinable, 
inconceivable". (511 Illuminatingly in the context of the remarks on 
Eden, Elizabeth Vright comments that Lawrence "sees the Freudian 
enterprise as a second Fall; the will to know the unknowable becomes a 
mission of doom". Despite Lawrence's misreading of Freud, his attack 
on psychoanalysis raises important questions: can the unconscious be 
"known" and is it possible to know or recognise desire? To ask what 
desire "is" presupposes a metaphysics and yet the place of desire is 
both empty and constitutive. Desire can be mapped or traced only in 
its absence or its passing, through the transformations and 
displacements it enacts. Furthermore, for all the limitations of 
Lawrence's argument, flunappeasable dissatisfaction" acknowledges an 
irruptive, conflictual itinerary of desire that can be traced in Frost's 
poem. 
This flunappeasable dissatisfaction", the insufficiency and 
irresistibility of desire is a fundamental part of the human organisim, 
the seed of the forbidden fruit of knowledge. All fruit, however 
cherished, must f all. Every stimulus of desire, however unwillingly 
relinquished, remains ultimately unsatisfying, incomplete, an 
inadequation of pleasure. Desire is always elusive, somewhere else. The 
picked apples excite the senses and this tremor of apparently innocent 
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desire inevitably recalls the earliest Fall. The apples become a locus 
of the desire that pervades the text. Luring the gaze, the fruit has 
already instituted the return of desire, subverting the yearning for 
stability, for a state of original innocence expressed by "Cherish in 
hand, lift down, and not let fall. " The desire activated by the apple- 
harvest is only acknowledged by the text in its absence. Like the fallen 
fruit, it has already slipped through the fingers: "not let fall" is 
uttered retrospectively, in the wake of desire. Representative of all 
that is homely and long-familiar, the fallen fruit induces a nostalgic 
yearning for an "original" source of pleasure., -51" This nostalgia 
accords with Richard Boothby's comments on Lacan's reworking of Freud's 
das Di ng-. 
For Lacan, human desire is forever haunted by the dream 
of 'the thing', the dream of re-finding a primordially 
lost object, of recovering an original source of 
plenitude,,, human desire longs to 're-find' an object that 
was in fact never possessed, an object that existed only 
as a mirage, indeed, that may have existed only as the 
shadow of a mirage, "" 
Jane Gallop demonstrates how, in Lacan's topology of the human 
subject, the mirror stage is another version of the "tragedy" of Adam 
and Eve, "a fleeting moment of jubilation... doomed glory, a paradise 
lost". '156ý Adam and Eve are already created before being expelled from 
Paradise, thus truly entering the human condition; the child is already 
born but does not become a "self", cast out into the world, until the 
mirror stage. The mirror stage offers a sense of ideal completeness, "a 
perfect control that assures immediate satisfaction of desire". C57 " Like 
the eating of the apple, the mirror stage is an ambiguous moment of 
revelation, signifying both the entry into knowledge and the irreparable 
loss of original innocence, the inaugural wound in the human relation to 
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the world. As Gallop argues, the Fall and the mirror stage are mythic 
moments of (mis)recognition, illusory self-knowledge and nastery: 
When Adam and Eve eat from the tree of knowledge, 
they anticipate mastery, But what they actually 
gain is a horrified recognition of their nakedness, 
This resembles the movement by which the infant, 
having assumed by anticipation-a totalized, mastered 
body, then retroactively perceives his (sic) inadequacy 
(his 'nakedness'), (") 
Adam and Eve discover difference and desire; similarly, the subject's 
subsequent quest for the lost "self" is also predicated on this original 
loss and the discovery of difference. 
This longing for a return to an original condition can be 
characterized as an entropic pull, the desire to return to an 
undifferentiated state. The entropic pull looks back to the 
prelinguistic, pre-oedipal primitivism of earliest infancy, before the 
child begins to separate out from its surroundings. The child is 
"Pho-m lette", not yet a "self" but an uncoordinated, amorphous jumble 
of impulses, a matrix of unsymbolised somatic excitations. This chaos 
predates the mirror stage, the acquisition of identity and the insertion 
of the subject into language. A striking feature of the Garden of Eden 
as described in Genesis is its child-like innocence and freshness, a 
geographical representation of the primal state. I -""' Freud describes 
this nostalgia for an Edenic state of absolute satisfaction as a longing 
for Nirvana, where all tensions are reduced. Freud first refers to the 
Nirvana principle, a term attributed to Barbara Low, in Beyond and 
Pleasure Principle,, then elaborates on the term more fully in 'The 
Economic Problem of Masochism' (1923): 
,, we 
have unhesitatingly identified the pleasure-unpleasure 
principle with this Nirvana principle, Every unpleasure 
ought thus to coincide with a heightening, and every 
pleasure with a lowering, of mental tension due to 
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stimulus; the Nirvana principle (and the pleasure 
principle which is supposedly identical with it) would 
be entirely in the service of the death instincts, whose 
aim is to conduct the restlessness of life into the 
stability of the inorganic state, and it would have the 
function of giving warnings against the demands of the 
life instincts - the libido - which try to disturb the 
intended course of life, But such a view cannot be 
correct, (OM 414) 
(The last sentence attests to Freud's inability or unwillingness to take 
that step "beyond" the pleasure principle, his "a-thetic" hesitation or 
wavering. ) 
Lacan identifies the longing for unity, the zero point of entropy, 
as the profoundest desire of the subject: "an eternal desire for the 
non-relationship of zero, where identity is meaningless".,: "" The state 
of entropy inclines towards an end to all tension but, as Leo Bersani 
argues, the entropic impulse is profoundly ambivalent: 
If pleasure results from the reduction of tension due to 
stimuli, the ultimate pleasure is the elimination of all 
stimuli, and the wish to die is a fantasy of ecstatic 
inertia, "" 
In the pursuit of "ultimate pleasure", the "elimination" of stimuli, 
this fantasy of "ecstatic inertia" can be seen to contain elements of 
the erotic and aggressive drives of the organism. Although conflictual 
and irruptive, the entropic pull also signifies a tendency to move 
towards quiescence and stability. Plenitude will replace absence, 
reducing difference and distinction; the constant circulation, 
disruption and explosive displacements of desire can be arrested. (This 
desire for plenitude can also be traced in the paternal "fullness" 
I 
promised to Jacob in his dream. ) Rosemary Jackson characterises this 
oscillation: "Imlovement and stillness, life and death, subject and 
object, mind and matter, become as one. "'ý6: 2-) Strictly, entropy could be 
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described as a desire for rebirth without the rebirth of desire, an echo 
of the Christian concept of eternal life. Janus-like, it looks back to 
"Eden" and forward to the ultimate satisfaction of desire. Similarly, 
the infant subject is set on its path, conpelled to look forward to the 
satisfaction of desire and back to its own origins. 
It is tempting to categorize the apparently contrary impulses that 
characterize the entropic pull as progressive life instincts and 
reactionary death instincts. Yet this opposition is problenatic, not 
least because both drives move towards the end of desire, albeit in 
different directions. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud 
hypothesises the relationship between Eros and Thanatos, coming to see 
these instincts not as diametrically opposed but intricately linked. 
Freud emphasises the conservatism of all instincts, which seek to bring 
back earlier states of living substance. Nevertheless, a clear 
distinction is drawn between the death instincts and life instincts, 
which are subdivided into sexual and "self -preservative" instincts. The 
death instincts seek to return life to the inorganic stage that precedes 
life itself, a state that "totally undoes the organism. The sexual 
instincts also seek to bring back an earlier state but Thanatos seeks a 
return to an earlier state than Eros. As Gallop points out, Freud 
immediately contradicts himself, asserting that the sexual instincts do 
not seek to restore an earlier state. This seems to represent an 
attempt to separate out the life and death instincts, to make clear the 
11great opposition" between Eros and Thanatos. The self -preservational 
instincts struggle against dangers that would facilitate death, the 
ultimate return, more rapidly. In this sense, these instincts are not 
reactionary. Logically extended, however, this self-preservative 
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tendency does not protect life but ensures that the organism can look 
forward to death in its "own fashion": 
The instincts of self-preservation, of self-assertion and 
of mastery ... are component instincts whose function it is to assure that the organist shall follow its own path to 
death, and to ward off any possible ways of returning to 
inorganic existence other than those which are immanent in 
the organism itself ... Thus these guardians of life, too, 
were originally the myrmidons of death, Hence arises the 
the paradoxical situation that the living organism 
struggles most energetically against events (dangers, in 
fact) which might help it to attain its life's aim 
aim rapidly - by a kind of short-circuit, M 311-12) 
Mastery is drawn precisely to that which will end all mastery. Freud can 
only account for this paradoxical situation by concluding that the life 
instincts appear to serve the death instincts, at once denying and 
anticipating death. The life instincts, supposedly set on the pursuit of 
satisfaction, actually defend the organism's preordained path towards 
the end of desire, fulfilling its original life plan. Thus the impulse 
to return to origins and the drive towards complete satisfaction are not 
opposed movements but rather different trajectories of desire, 
performing a radical oscillation between violence and quietude, disorder 
and stability: ". . Aesire merely conveys what it maintains of an image 
of the past towards an ever short and limited future" (FFC 31). 
The text's nostalgic yearning is doomed: the Fall is final, and 
Paradise can never be regained. Any act of thought or representation, 
although it carries death within it, must necessarily elide the impulse 
towards non-being, the desire for the ultimate satisfaction 
I 
(elimination) of desire. The entropic pull supposes the completion of 
desire yet phantasy, the recreation and support of desire, must not 
reach the end of desire since it cannot function without a lack or gap, 
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however it strives to satisfy demand. That is why death remains 
unspoken, traceable only by its silence. 
A Sleep of Death 
A common facet of Frost's poetry is to present death as brutally 
f inal, stripped of any occasion, yet as Catherine Belsey argues, death 
is "the supreme fear of the modern self". The subject cannot easily 
contemplate its own extinction: "To say, 'I want to die' is 
simultaneously to produce the self and to will the abolition it 
dreads". "'-4-3 Of course, the "death drive" is not simply a case of the 
subject consciously willing its abolition. As Freud's tortuous reasoning 
demonstrates, any impulse towards self-annihilation does not follow a 
straightforward path. Death, the limit of the subject's historical 
function"'ý-51, remains extra-discursive, unnameable, outstripping 
language. The subject desires to remain immortal as a knowing self but 
death literally cannot be known, because it exceeds and brings an end to 
consciousness: 
That our own death is unknowable thus marks the sovereign 
subject as finite in more than a merely chronological 
sense, The fear of death is the recognition of the limits 
of the subject's imaginary sovereignty, (66) 
Death is the end of difference, but it is also the end of the coherent 
"self". Death weaves through writing as difference, and the shadow of 
death loons over thq text, representing an insistent other or the silent 
Ilcentre" of the poen, drawing attention to itself precisely through its 
significant absence. Never referred to explicitly, its presence 
acknowledged indirectly by hints and allusions, death may be the unnamed 
103 
/ 
pill 
"what" that will trouble the speaker's sleep. Meanings are offered by 
the text only through a process of indirection and constantly deferred 
revelation, and Bersani terms this lack or absence a "fantasmatic 
supplement": 
There is a fantasmatic supplement, an absent extension 
of itself which a text never explicitly articulates but 
incessantly refers to, which it 
- 
makes imperative only, 
as it were, by the high visibility of significant lacks, "" 
This visibility relates to what Derrrida terms the inaudibility of the 
"death drives" in Beyond the Pleasure Principle. They are "already at 
work", "written in silence" in Freud's essay long before they are 
named. "-z8: ) 
The interpenetration or imbrication of life and death, desire and 
the end of desire in the text is suggested by the ambiguous meanings 
attributed to "sleep" in the closing section: 
One can see what will trouble 
This sleep of mine, whatever sleep it is, 
Were he not gone, 
The woodchuck could say whether it's like his 
Long sleep, as I describe its coming on, 
Or just some human sleep, 
Who or what is the one that sees or overlooks: the one that witnesses 
the strangeness of sight, the one that observes the text's shifting 
scenes of phantasy, the reader? Indeed, is it/s/he "one" or multiple? If 
dreams are a matter of seeing, then seeing is also knowing: sleep is a 
state to be classified and a state of revelation. Vhat is described or 
written down here? It is not sleep, since that enigmatic state resists 
conclusive description. Equally, death can be "defined" only in its 
elusive mobility and shadowy presence, as it flits through writing. It 
is possible to argue that death "in" writing performs a de-scribing but 
cannot itself be described. Describing is also a venture, "a setting 
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forth in words" (OED). Returning to its Latin roots, de-scribing may be 
defined here as an entropic writing-down or away from, a drifting-off. 
Is the text sliding into the cellar-bin, into a final resting place, a 
closure, abolition or erasure that is simultaneously resisted by its own 
iterability? The text would then be testing its limits, playing a last 
gambit or enacting a final, reeling instance of fart1da. 
The whispering, entrancing phantom of death that flits through the 
text sends out a faint, muffled echo of Hamlet's famous speech: 
To die, to sleep - 
No more, and by a sleep to say we end 
The heart-ache, and the thousand natural shocks 
That flesh is heir to; 'tis a consummation 
Devoutly to be wished, To die, to sleep - 
To sleep - perchance to dream: ay there's the rub, 
For in that sleep of death what dreams may come 
When we have shuffled off this mortal coil 
Must give us pause ... 1691 
This passage, pausing reflectively before "sleep", raises precisely the 
question of what sleep, the "it" of Frost's poem, might be. There are 
several persuasive similarities between the poem and Hamlet's soliloquy. 
Firstly, the dreaming "sleep of death" represents the ultimate 
"consum-mation" of erotic and aggressive drives. Secondly, and more 
strikingly, the insistent repetition of "sleep" echoes through both 
passages, a rhythm that is both thematic and somatic. The currents that 
cross the text are lodged between the work of the mind and the 
exigencies of the body. (The body referred to here is not that of a 
weary represented speaker but the body in general, implicating all 
I 
subjects in, or of, language. ) 
This raises, in Freud's terminology, the problematic relationship 
of between "the psychical apparatus and its somatic substratum - Lacan 
insists that psychic life can never fully represent the body's animating 
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forces: the task of achieving "complete coincidence between the 
psychical and somatic" is strictly impossible, The "real" of the 
body, its ineffable need, is unthinkable in a text, an unrepresentable 
unconscious. As Richard Boothby comments, the union of word and flesh 
remains unimaginable: 
There can be no total psychical representation of the 
reality of the animate subject, The final implication of 
what is beyond the pleasure principle is that the real of 
the body remains beyond our powers to imagine it, (225) 
Yet the boundary between mind and body, at the limits of sense and 
signification, is necessarily a site of crossing and disruption, a 
moving point of difference. Human desire is mental and bodily, and those 
very categories can scarcely be thought separately. Perhaps 
paradoxically, another unimaginable reality - death - relates to the 
question of the unthinkability of the body. As Boothby argues: 
As we have interpreted it, the concept of the death drive 
bears directly on this issue, as the 'death' at stake is 
not the demise of the physical organism but rather the 
mutative effects on psychical structure exerted by energies 
that remain foreign to its organization, The action of the 
death drive effects a transmission across the boundary 
between the psychical and the somatic, (224) 
Here a parallel is suggested between somatic energies exerting pressure 
on "psychical structure" and the way in which the rhythms of the body 
work over reading and writing. It is the enigmatic death drive, inimical 
yet compelling, contaminating yet ineradicable, that effects this 
transmission, precisely through a disruption of distinctions and a 
disturbance of limits. 
The third strong connection between 'After Apple Picking' and 
Hamlet's speech lies in the notion of flesh as "heir", which suggests 
the genealogical strand in the poem. Yet who will inherit 'After Apple 
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Picking"? Assigned to an uncertain future, the text survives the flesh, 
but a name remains and becomes "heir" to language. In this way, as in 
Jacob's dream, flesh survives "in" the text. The woodchuck's hibernation 
offers a motif of physical survival: after winter sleep, a seasonal 
death, there is a reawakening in spring. Hibernation satisfies 
biological instinkt rather than ti-ieb, however: the woodchuck will be 
reborn into the natural, organic world. The woodchuck's winter dormancy 
responds to biological need like human sleep, but human sleep also 
possesses psychic signf icance. It is the state where dreams take place, 
and oneiric discourse "speaks" the language of desire. The relative 
constancy of the drive separates human from animal desire, as does "the 
greater latitude and openness to variation between the drive impulse and 
its mode and means of satisfaction". "I " The drive is a psychical 
representative of need arising within the organism; thus tr-ieb is a 
matter of representation as well as biology. The very presence of desire 
as it is imprinted in language - the woodchuck cannot say anything - 
distinguishes human beings from other living organisms. The woodchuck is 
not reborn into language. 
The "long sleep" of death is a traditional image; the conjunctions 
of night and the onset of winter, "hoary" grass, the changing of the 
seasons and the evocative and unspecific "all" striking the earth 
represent conventional and unmistakable allusions to age and death, 
underscored by reading "Were he not gone" as an isolated line. This 
could well 
I 
stand as an epitaph, and although contextually the line 
refers to the woodchuck, who or what might be already "gone" in the 
text? Does some ghost haunt the text, working in the earth? The 
woodchuck cannot speak about its long hibernatory sleep, but can the 
107 
dead speak from the "beyond" of their long sleep, froin beyond the death 
of the mortal body? Some uncanny, half-recognised phantom returns as 
these closing lines attempt to reel in something that lies beyond the 
text, at the limits of consciousness and the borders of the knowable. 
The text takes a risk, gambles on an uncertain outcome. A projective 
vision is displaced onto the figure of the woodchuck, which "could" 
report back from the "beyond" of its "long sleep". A futuristic prospect 
(in a visionary and financial sense) is a necessary and unavoidable risk 
or gamble, with an uncertain outcome: the dream of "living on" (and not 
just in the sense of a religious afterlife) represents the human 
subject's imaginary supplement to the blankness and finality of death. 
The text entrusts a name to an unknown, late other. ""' 
The text is pervaded with loss, incompletion: everything is "gone" - 
The harvest is gathered but incomplete, the year is drawing to a close, 
and the natural world is drifting off into winter sleep. Sleep is a 
provisional closure that does not arrest the circulation of desire. Only 
the longest human sleep - death - offers stability and quiescence. Here 
is one crux of the poem: how else to avoid desire and escape the 
strictures of human sleep, other than by moving beyond the mobility of 
erotic drives, by desiring the end of desire? This dual movement, back 
to Eden and forward to a "proper" death, nirrors the constant exchange 
on the ladder of dreams. Human sleep is a state of rest that is acutely 
marked by the inexhaustibility of desire, which never sleeps. Above all, 
sleep never truly comes to this text. In what sense does language sleep, 
with its echoes, traces and remainders? The poem can be read as under 
the sway of an arr-6t de mort, a death sentence but also a delay that 
arrests death, suspends its arrival. C73) Writing bears the mark of death 
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within it but also survives that death. 'After Apple Picking' patrols 
the borderline that Freud steps along in 'Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle', not quite naming death and not quite beyond its power. The 
text drowses to a form of resolution, yet that closure is put in 
question: "sleep" suggests both a temporary resting point (and one still 
traversed by desire) and death, a permanent sleep and the end to all 
tension. Such uncertainty perhaps bears out Frost's own comment that a 
poem is a temporary stay against confusion. The next chapter will 
examine another haunted, entranced text that hovers between conscious 
and unconscious, sleeping and waking. 
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III 
PLAY TIME: CREATIVE DAYDREAXING IN 'ODE TO A NIGHTINGALE' 
Was it a vision, or a waking dream? 
Fled is that music - Do I wake or sleep? "' 
Keats's closing lines in 'Ode to a Nightingale' display a radical 
uncertainty about the poem's status - its time, destination and the 
nature of its addressee or object. The Ode strains for stability, even 
transcendence, but remains ambiguously located between palpable and 
inpalpable worlds, between life and death, organic and inorganic. John 
Baker notes the placelessness of the poem' s theme and the namelessness 
of the speaker's desire'211, and this lack of grounding has its 
inplications for any act of interpretation. The text's aporias and 
divisions do not merely provide the opportunity for a triumphant 
critical resolution or restitution of gaps and contradictions. The act 
of reading poetry or reading the unconscious cannot assume a stable 
subject/object or form/content division. Dreams and poems are processes 
or events, and any act of interpretation is implicated in those 
processes: it is not safely outside that which it reads. This chapter 
considers how the 'Ode' puts in question the boundaries between 
conscious and unconscious thought, and its problematic representation of 
time, voice and the body. 
"Do I wake or sleep? " 
The 'Ode' can be seen as a text that shifts and disrupts the 
boundaries of the reading and writing process: it moves between 
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conscious and unconscious, hypnagogic and prophetic, active and passive. 
Already haunted, entranced, the poem opens as an act of interruption and 
instability, an act that tests its grounding, authority and coherence, 
and throws into question its reception or arrival: "My heart aches, and 
a drowsy numbness pains/ My sense". In the wake of this radical 
departure, closure and destination are always in question. It is a poem 
of yearning and "fancy", an instance of unfulfilled desire, and offers 
suggestive parallels with the work of dreams. Desire disrupts the 
coherent structure of the poem, disordering meaning and deferring 
closure, working over the text in a way similar to that in which dream- 
work transf orms the latent dreara-thoughts. Yet, as is becoming clear, it 
is a problematic task to assign definitively the "unconscious" of a text 
to an author, reader or character. The 'Ode' arrests itself on a 
threshold, in the undecidable space of "sense"; it offers a form of 
hypnopoetics where the "poet" or "reader" is suspended between waking 
and sleeping. Although the text refers to a "vision" or "waking dream" 
in the past tense, the closing line casts doubt upon whether the text is 
yet "awake": "Do I wake or sleep? ". In the closing act of 
(self) interrogation, the "or" represents a troubled resting point whose 
status is uncertain, and this disruption or suspension raises questions 
about the subject of writing and the subject of desire. 
Paul H. Fry 
argues that the moment represents a state of narcotic revery'31', 
but 
this presupposes a provisionally unifying consciousness in the text, 
for 
I 
whom this narcotic condition is temporarily other. 
With the poem hovering "without sustained direction or propulsion" 
in a state of " ontological in-def inition" 
141, 
t the reader's position is 
also problematised. If the text is structured as a 
dream inside a dream, 
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it necessarily produces a certain confusion for a critical reading that 
aims to remain "outside" that textual "dreaming". The text's waking 
dream is disturbed and displaced by its elusive addressee, and it proves 
problematic to ascribe a stable-relation between addresser and addressee 
in the text. Vho is the object of the apostrophe: the reader, the poet, 
the nightingale or the poem itself? The poetic and the apostrophic are 
interlinked, since the text is addressed "to a figure who is both the 
text's destination and its muse". 1-5ý1 Keats's Ode can be considered in 
terms of the complex poetic structure of address articulated by Derrida 
in 'Che cos'6 la poesial . In the ode, the apostrophe or vocative "you" 
is not only metapoetic, it is both singular and multiple: the "you" of a 
poem can be addressed both to the other and to itself as other. The 
intimacy of poetic address depends for its possibility on the 
established codes of language: a poetic event can occur here and now but 
this event is simultaneously readable and repeatable. Singular and 
iterable, the poetic 
is obliged to address itself to someone, singularly to you 
but as if to the being lost in anonymity, between city and 
nature, an imparted secret, at once public and private, 
absolutely one and the other,,, '6) 
It is possible to read dreams and texts as imparted secrets, their 
operations and their interpretation shifting across the boundaries of 
public and private. 
To consider dreams and poems as a question of secrecy means taking 
I 
account of Abraham and Torok's work of cryptanalysis, particularly the 
concepts of the crypt and the phantom. The crypt is defined as "an 
isolated region within the psyche in which an experience that is 
shameful, and therefore unspeakable, has been 'buried alive'. (71 
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Patients tormented by unspoken secrets elaborately conceal in their 
speech any elements that would reveal the contents of such secrets. The 
crypt is an effect of nourning and "works in the heart of the Ego as a 
special kind of Unconscious". Also of relevance is the notion of the 
phantom, which offers a psychoanalytic explanation for the belief that 
the dead return. The metapsychological phantom describes the situation 
whereby someone can be haunted by the effects of another's crypt in 
their unconscious. (Freud's haunting by the Volf Nan's case history is 
Torok's representative example. ) The work of the phantom is observed to 
coincide "in every respect with Freud's description of the death 
instinct". (s. ) 
The concepts of the crypt and the phantom offer suggestive 
parallels with the 'Ode. In terms of the death instinct, the poem 
offers an explicit example of the desire for obliteration or extinction: 
"Now more than ever seems it rich to die, / To cease upon the midnight 
with no pain". This is accompanied by a contiguous nostalgia for 
origins, the desire to return to quietude and stability suggested by 
"sick f or home". This entropic trajectory also performs an 
identification with a dissolving "other". A return to "my sole self" or 
the "self-same" would represent the assumption of full presence which 
"is" death. The poem opens as if in a dark, suffocating space, an 
llenbalm6d darkness" that could stand variously for the womb, the 
inorganic, the darý chamber of the mind or the "Chamber of Maiden 
Thought". "10: ' Yet the entombed darkness suggests a more ominous 
encrypting or living death. The text foresees burial in 
the form of a 
living death in the grave: "cooled a long age in the deep-delv6d earth", 
"leave the world unseen", "I cannot see what flowers are at my feet", 
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"To thy high requiem become a sod". The "requiem", the "plaintive 
anthem" and the "sod" are linked as constituent elements in an 
anticipated funeral service: the antitheses of high and low, life and 
death, triumph and defeat are brought into close relation. The text 
cannot see itself dead: it hovers between a day-world and "passing 
night". It is as if a body or ghost cannot be laid to rest. The 
nightingale remains other-worldly, a phantom: a "Dryad" or "Darkling", 
its "plaintive anthem" fades out of the text until it is "buried deep/ 
In the next valley glades". The nightingale is Immortal and almost a 
voiceless voice, and this again concerns the concept of the crypt, which 
is anasemic, and preoriginary. 1: 11 11 The enchanting song of this intangible 
bird is already buried, thus remaining deceptive and mysterious. There 
are hints of a buried secret, an entombed echo or trace in that already- 
ghostly bird's song. It is as if deciphering the nightingale's cryptic 
voice raises some spectre, the occulted trace of a name or a memory: "No 
hungry generations tread thee down". 
Yet whose encrypted menory could be adduced to support this 
speculation? A critical reading cannot turn to the unconscious of the 
author, the historical subject John Keats, however suggestive the 
biographical evidence. "12" Equally, can the crypt be attributed to the 
unconscious of the speaker, when it is problematic to identify the 'I' 
of the text? The poem is neither the speech of a patient nor a case 
study. Since psych6biographical and characterological approaches are 
clearly unsatisfactory, the endeavour to ascribe an unconscious to the 
text would have to consider the role of the interpreter/ analyst /critic, 
and the ghostliness or alterity of the reading process. The bird is 
other, but the reader too is other: the unconscious of a text can be 
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thought of as a different or other space. The 'Ode' opens itself out to 
otherness, to buried echoes and ghosts that return. A crypt or phantom 
can be traced as a nenory that the text cannot erase and that can never 
fully be brought to light, a secret it conceals and preserves, Just as 
the ancient Egyptians kept the dead in place by covering tombs with 
text. The crypt of the poem "remains incalculable, it does not conceal a 
single determinate secret", but its "ciphered singularity gathers a 
multiplicity". 1,13) 
Inaginative Licence 
In a letter to John Hamilton Reynolds, Keats outlines his version 
of the dreaming space of poetry: 
I have an idea that a man might pass a very pleasant life in 
this manner - let his on any certain day read a certain Page 
of full Poesy or distilled Prose and let him wander with it, 
and muse upon it, and reflect from it, and bring home to it, 
and prophesy upon it, and dream upon it - untill it becomes 
stale - but when will it do so: Never - when Man has arrived 
at a certain ripeness in intellect any one grand and spiritual 
passage serves him as a starting-post towards all *the two-and 
thirty Pallaces", How happy is such a 'voyage of conception', 
without delicious Indolence! A doze upon a sofa does not 
hinder it, and a nap upon clover engenders ethereal finger- 
pointings, 1111 
In its mix of the pleasurable, inexhaustible, prophetic and ethereal, 
the indolent daydreaming of Keats's letter shifts between activity and 
passivity, freedom And confinement, waking and sleeping. It perhaps 
serves as an ambiguous definition of "imaginative licence", which can 
be 
understood as "lexical or syntactical irregularity, difference" 
(OED) 
[italics mine]. While this definition is significant, a stricter 
consideration of licence provides an equally useful model 
for reading 
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poetry in terms of dream or phantasy. Licence is defined as (a) permit, 
leave, permission; (b) abuse of freedom, disregard of law or propriety. 
Licence suggests a potentially subversive, destabilizing sense of 
liberation, yet it can also imply contain nt and Jurisdiction. Poetry 
is a space that can offer on the one hand a radical alternative to 
normative reality; but it can also be read as a bounded zone, a site of 
jurisdiction, a place of sanction, force and Law, where the "world" 
intrudes and restraints can be imposed upon the imagination. " 5: 1 Thus a 
subject (that is, one already under the Law) can control (and have 
controlled) the work of desire. Equally, this legislative structure 
permits no escape fron time or space. 
This etymological digression can be mapped across the work of 
phantasy and desire in texts: "imaginative licence" characterizes 
writing as caught between the proper and improper, the legitimate and 
illegitimate. Under the sway of force and order, writing is also the 
site of disruption and difference. This double movement produces the 
violent, crumpling effect of desire. To return to "licence" for a 
moment: definitions of "licentiousness" follow a similar pattern. The 
word can mean that which is unruly, insatiable, sexually liberated; 
equally, it carries a weight of moral sanction, connoting a disregard 
for accepted rules or conventions. Licentiousness: not being able to 
help oneself, desire that is not one's "own". So, agency and passivity, 
subjects working desire and desire working on subjects. To begin to 
think through the relationship between dreanr-work and poetic texts means 
thinking through a series of related issues: the process of 
signification, the act of interpretation, the way in which desire 
to passes through" a text and what is meant by "the desire of the text". 
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Reading the work of texts means reading the work of desire, the 
disruption and transformation that desire performs on texts, the 
11primordial" violence done "to the order of utterance". (11ý1 Desire 
disfigures a text that is already subject to the disfigurative character 
of the figural dimension of language. II I" As Lyotard points out, Freud's 
word for distortion in the dream-work, Enstellung, indicates the use of 
force: sicb enstellen, to disfigure oneself, die Spracbe enstellen, to 
do violence to language. The work of desire can be construed as "the 
result of manhandling (sic) a text"., ' 191, Interpretation too is a work of 
desire and thus a form of violence. There is no reading without some 
form of investment; no interpretation that is not indebted. The desire 
to bring about the completion of meaning, to restore origins, is a final 
violence that owes its allegiance to the force of figuration; in effect, 
that which interpretation reads both admits and resists that reading. 
Thus, texts function as a site of licence, of resistance and 
submission. Any "psychoanalytic" reading of a text must trace not only 
violence "in" a text, but acknowledge the violence implicit in 
interpretive practice, the force employed by reading in the name of the 
text, the mark left on the "body" of a text. This reading of Keats's 
'Ode to a Nightingale' aims to trace the interweaving of time, the body 
and absence in the text, its various acts of violence, silences and 
occlusions. Far from effacing or recycling the body on a linguistic or 
rhetorical production line, interpretation is a matter of registering 
violence done to bodies by the text and violence done to the text when 
the body "speaks", when the figure actually figures. 
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Passing tim 
For Keats, poetry is a "vast region to wander in", a legitimate 
medium or locus of imaginative play or day-drean. Dreams and poems 
operate as an autonomous space of detachment and pleasurable escape, 
offering an alternative reality. Freud challenges this notion of dreams 
as separated off from the real world, and questions the "authority" 
ascribed to creative dreaming when he reviews the scientific literature 
on dreams in The Interpl: etation of Dreams. Citing the difficulties of 
reality-testing "in" dreams, Freud argues that the dream's "detachment 
from the external world" does not "account completely for its strange 
character" (TID 118). In response to earlier writers who praise the 
ability of dreanr-life to rise "superior to distance in time and 
space"(19", Freud argues that this advantage is illusory, factually 
incorrect: "... dreaming rises superior to time and space in precisely 
the same way as does waking thought, and for the very reason that it is 
merely a form of thought" (TID 131). Freud asserts that "psycbical 
reality is a particular form of existence not to be confused with 
material reality" (TID 782). It is important to consider the questions 
of marking time in dreams and their distinctive temporality and 
spatiality, and how this might involve the historical and corporeal. 
In 'Creative Writers and Day-dreaning' , Freud writes of the way in 
which a subject's imaginative activity receives a "date-mark": 
The relation of a phantasy to time is in general very 
important, We may say that it hovers, as it were, between 
three times - the three moments of time which our ideation 
involves, Mental work is linked to some current impression, 
some provoking occasion in the present which has been able 
to arouse one of the subject's major wishes, From there it 
harks back to a memory of an earlier experience (usually 
an infantile one) in which this wish was fulfilled; and it 
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now creates a situation relating to the future which 
represents a fulfilment of this wish, What it thus creates 
is a day-dream or phantasy, which carries about it traces 
of its origin from the occasion which provoked it and 
from the memory, Thus past, present and future are strung 
together, as it were, on the thread of the wish that runs 
through them, (AL 135) 
Freud's "dating" of phantasy remains heavily dependent on a theory of 
wishfulfilment. His subsequent revision of the claim that every dream 
fulfils a wish - "a dream is a (disguised) fulfilment of a (suppressed 
or repressed) wish" - indicates a major reformulation of the economy of 
desire. (A teleological strand remains in this theoretical modification: 
for a dream to be a repressed or suppressed wish, the dream--wish would 
have to be attempting to get somewhere or achieve some particular end. ) 
Freud acknowledges that dreams do not maintain the "chronological order" 
which he attributes to them: 
... what happens in reality is no doubt a simultaneous 
exploring of one path and another, a swinging of the 
excitation now this way and now that, until at last it 
accumulates in the direction that is most opportune and 
one particular grouping becomes the permanent one, (TID 731-2) 
As desire works over the dream, time is not effaced, but is transformed, 
folded, fractured. Freud terms the unconscious timeless, in the sense of 
an endless circulation and transformation: "... it is a prominent feature 
of unconscious processes that they are indestructible. In the 
unconscious nothing can be brought to an end, nothing is past or 
forgotten" (TID 733). 
The unconscious has a temporal dimension, in the history of human 
I 
relations, 'marked by time and space, but it is not chronological or 
linear. Freud identifies a futuristic prospect in dreams, a forward but 
hardly linear or chronological movement. Dreams have a past, present 
and future, yet desire, in the dreamr-work, disrupts and spills over 
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these distinctions: it transforms the linear or chronological marking of 
time in the dream-text. All these time-scales in dreams are interwoven, 
constitutive of and dependent upon each other. These times track across 
the text that dream-work produces, mutually implicated and implicating, 
interlinked but maintaining their particular time, their mode of 
operation, their specificity. There is similarity but there is also 
difference, which might be configured in other terms as the difference 
within history. 
The past time of dreams is situated in a matrix of memories, 
desires, day-residues, somatic stimuli, all the constituent elements of 
dreams and phantasies. This history is not af ixed private or social 
history; each phantasy is altered, a re- (that is, a transformed or 
reinscribed) presentation or constitution of elements. Notions of 
chronology, linearity, old and new influences, development and 
regression are suspended or put in doubt. Dreams have a history, 
localised and general, private and public, singular and collective, 
individual and cultural. Equally, the past of a text nay not be the 
author's past, but the relations of a textual past, present and 
projected future. (; 201 The reading of dreata-texts has a history and a 
condition mediated through historicized interpretive practices and 
structures. (Freud gives a short account of this interpretive history at 
the start of lbp Tnterpretation of Dreams. ) 
The dream--text has an ever-shifting, transformed and transforming 
I 
present, a now that is never wholly now, a present that is never fully 
present. The scene of a dream-text, like the scene of writing, is a 
temporary resting point of uncertain grounding, a site of negotiation 
between past and future penetrated by difference and absence. Reading, 
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and the text, takes place in the "present" tense, although that presence 
is always under erasure. Reading in the present - working on a text and 
being worked an - is a concept that will be pursued and, in tracing the 
inscription of the body, this chapter offers the possibility of some 
grounding for the activity of reading. A dream also has a future. This 
is not necessarily to return to the old conception of oneiric prophecy, 
or to subscribe to a teleology of the human subject, but a certain 
futuristic tendency can be traced in the operation of a dreant-text. 
Freud posits this forward-looking trajectory as the fundamental 
motivation, purpose and meaning of dreams: dreams aim to fulfil wishes 
that have not yet been fulfilled, to hallucinate scenes or situations, 
to anticipate outcomes. Even in Freud's narrow schema of wish- 
fulf ilment, it is clear that this trajectory is speculative and 
uncertain, gesturing towards a conditional futurity. (211 
Interpreting dreams and interpreting texts takes place in the 
"inpossible" time of reading and writing. Viewless not in the sense of 
flatness or blankness, but in the sense of a speculative, uncertain 
venture, dreams are a poetry of the future. This rethinks Freud's notion 
of the date-mark, if a text (or dream-text) is conceived of as a date- 
marked communication directed towards a future, with an implied but 
undesignated addressee or destination, a communication threatened by 
destinerrance. Poetic texts no less than dreamt-texts disturb 
distinctions between past, present and future. As such they do suspend 
11real" time, not as a gesture of strategic "creative" control but as a 
marking of the structure of reading and writing. Texts bear the mark of 
time, with all of its differences. In his essay 'Shibboleth: For Paul 
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Celan' , Derrida reconf igures the date-nark of a poem, bringing together 
history, the corporeal and the "present" of reading: 
We are ... concerned 
then with the date as a cut or 
incision which the poem bears in its body like a memory, 
like) at times, several memories in one, the mark of a 
provenance, of a place and of-a time, To speak of an 
incision or cut is to say that the poem is entered into, 
that it begins in the wounding of its date, (22) 
Where does this leave the -time of dreams? Freud illustrates how 
dream-interpretation must confront "chronological reversal" in the 
dream7-work. Interpretation has to reverse the time of the dreanr--text: 
"In some instances... it is only possible to arrive at the meaning of a 
dream after one has carried out quite a number of reversals of its 
content in various respects" (TID 441). Yet analysis does not reinstal 
correct time in its reading of a dream; dreams recognise no "real" time. 
Equally, interpretation reads outside "real" time. The recovered dream 
and its interpretation are reinscribed within another time-scale, 
perhaps the only time-scale in which we can read dreams: in textual 
time, the space and time of reading and writing. (This of course 
acknowleges that such a space is itself inscribed or framed within 
historical time. ) We must rethink the time of dreams partly in terms of 
the time of a text. Dreams, their interpretations, and psychoanalytic 
situations foreground the confusion between psychical and material 
realities. Such confusion produces the ambiguous "or" that both 
separates and links waking and sleeping, disturbing clear definitions of 
fact and fantasy, truth and fiction. A similar suspension or 
I 
displacement of stability and coherence takes place in literature. 
George Eliot writes that like "an Egyptian sorcerer", the novelist 
uses the magic of plain paper and dark ink to reveal "far-reaching 
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visions of the past". Such literary visions look far in different 
directions, into the distant past and into an uncertain future, a 
temporal displacement accentuated by the less-discursive form of poetry. 
These visions are situated in a text constructed fron the differences 
and spaces between plain paper and dark ink. Writing is contaminated by 
the traces of other texts and the shadows of other pasts: it is haunted 
by the ghosts of history, the abysmal possibility of absence and the 
iterability of writing, carrying the mark both of the future and of 
death. Death intervenes in writing as spacingý allowing signs to live 
whilst placing that "life" under erasure. Death permits us to read its 
absence: ". death furrows the space of writing, appearing only as the 
occulted mark of a trace which has never been present, as a palimpsest 
which permits what is obliterated to be dimly deciphered". C 
2: 3 :1 Reading 
a textual or oneiric history is a natter of deciphering a receding but 
insistent mark. Tracing a historical unconscious (or unconscious 
history) is a case of reading through a textual past to a space beyond 
the text, of re-membering or giving a voice to that which is past but 
insists in the margins of representation. 
'Ode to a Nightingale' has to do with time, but it is inhabited and 
marked by a temporality that disturbs any sense of linearity: the text 
moves fron present to past and future. The 'Ode' attenpts or experiments 
with controlled time travel in a way that destabilizes the lyric "I" 
that desires completion. The poen cannot see where it is going, but must 
envision a destinat, ion or future, one that is silent, invisible but 
insidious. As Timothy Clark comments, Derrida offers a futural poetics 
that arises out of his reconfiguration of the ode "as a node of writing 
whose temporality is often pro-jective, futural". 1124" Similarly, Timothy 
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Clark conceives of the muses as beings of the future, a notion that runs 
counter to critical thinking "saturated with a vocabulary of 
representation, restitution and retrieval" (64). Such a poetics posits 
memory "as a constitutive act of the mind bound to its own present and 
oriented toward the future of -its own elaboration" (65). Memory must 
destroy the very anteriority of the past in order to elaborate its 
figure in the present. <2s> 
Paul de Man's remarks on the large unfinished works of Keats's 
career suggest a future orientation that persuasively describes the Ode: 
"The circle never seems to close, as if he were haunted by a dream that 
always remains in the future". Yet this dream of the future risks 
effacing or obliterating the body and history. De Xan's art of memory is 
an act of selective forgetting, of remembering to f orget, and that is 
never an innocent endeavour. When considering the ef f ects of psychical 
censorship, Freud comments that there is "no lack of a hostile (i. e. 
resistant) purpose at work in the forgetting of a dream" (TID 662-3). By 
this Freud means the process of forgetting in the work of the dream, not 
the complete obliteration or effacement of the dream itself. This 
hostile purpose in forgetting echoes (the voice has already drifted 
away, after all) the poem's opening. To read the poem as a necessary 
forgetting is to ignore the operation of selective forgetting, a point 
that Freud himself acknowledges. The futural time of texts and dreams 
engages directly with questions of history, forgetting, the textual 
machine and the body. 
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Textual machinations 
The poet's dream is a transcendent vision of "faery lands" beyond 
the constraints of time and body, yet this reverie is disrupted by a 
profound anxiety about the allegorical force of language, the 
intoxicating ability of poetry_ to enact a radical displacement or 
dissolution of self. Identification with the "in rtal Bird" numbs the 
senses and takes the " I" of the Ode away from its own centre C27> . The 
"enraptured identification"Iýeý, with the nightingale represents less an 
escape into a realm of free play than the decentring or erasure of the 
subject. The conjunction with the nightingale "would be at once the 
sunmation of a human poetic yet, at the same time, also its 
annihilation". '29" Can there be a "self" in the text when that self is 
drawn towards oblivion at the end of the poem, to a place or moment 
where there is no differentiated self, no-thing at all? Being too happy 
in another's happiness suggests the impossible desire of desire itself, 
circling around an absent centre. Baker suggests that this impossible 
identification is a version of De Man's "upward fall". Alongside the 
ecstatic sense of exultation, or "pouring forth", there is also a sense 
of confusion, "as when one gets lost in a speculation or dreaia". "301 
This confusion may bear some relation to what Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen 
describes as the blind spot of a dream-scene. To "be" the nightingale, 
the poet would have to see as other, to see from a point of otherness 
I 
that Borch-Jacobsen describes as invisible to the subject in dreams. It 
is a truly impossible point of identification for the dreamer: 
,,, 
in order to see the invisible, or say the unsayable,, 
he would have to reflect himself, absent himself from the 
plane on which he is speaking, take himself as reference 
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point for his own discourse, "" 
To ask who is the subject of the unconscious, to say who thinks and 
wishes, is a question that goes beyond the self, beyond its 
representations, to a point of otherness. Im rtal, imnaterial, the 
nightingale is that site of alterity. The nightingale cannot be fully 
seen or spoken in poetry, because to do so, the poet would have to 
assume a point outside language. The poet can f ly away only as other, 
not as a "sole self", although that self is also riven by otherness, 
drifting between sleeping and waking. 
The poem both invites and is invaded by the nightingale's song. The 
means of escape - "the viewless wings of Poesy" - is also that which 
undoes the poet's rapture. The "forlorn" yearning sounds a warning bell 
"To toll me back from thee to my sole self". The very word "forlorn", 
Ifutterly in its archaic sense, implies that language has 
revoked its clains to be transcendent, self-identical or present-to- 
itself. Poetry is irreducible to a "self-same song", a secret, primal, 
magic word, the very word of poetry: "Adieu! the fancy cannot cheat so 
well/ As she is famed to do, deceiving elf". To be carried away on "the 
viewless wings of Poesy" offers the possibility of being endlessly 
folded or spun outwards by the imagination. Yet "carried away" also 
suggests being rendered supplementary, without agency, caught up in the 
circuitry, networks and channels of language. Language is "hemlock", 
narcotic sedative and potential poison. 
Poetry's viewless wings offer a mixture of flight, death and the 
future. The nightingale's invisibility as it transcends the limits of 
time and space is suggested by "viewless" and "unseen"; as Barnard 
stresses, however, the words can also be taken to mean sightless. "' As 
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an index of poetry, the nightingale is unseeing, and the flight of Poesy 
too high, ethereal and disembodied to see a corporeal, mutable world. 
Bl i nd, endlessly deferring completion, apparently immutable and 
iterable, poetry beguiles with -the offer of transcendence but remains 
indifferent and extrinsic to the subject. Thus a spectre of the machine 
age encroaches on the pastoral and synaesthetic phantasies accessed in 
the poem. The thwarted gesture of escape - "Away! Away! for I will fly 
to thee" - (impossibly) rejects history and the body; the dream of this 
text cannot rise above temporal and corporeal limits. 
'Ode to a Nightingale' still aspires to transcendence or originary 
voice; although the nightingale may act as a power of death"34-1, the 
workings of the textual machine remain a ghostly echo. A century later 
the fear of mechanization, of a wholly technologised mind, haunts Freud 
as he explores the "mechanisms" of the unconscious. It is tacitly 
acknowledged that this exploration will inevitably shatter notions of 
essence and the Self: "The subject of writing is a system of relations 
between strata: The Mystic Pad, the psyche, society, the world. Within 
that scene, on that stage, the punctual simplicity of the classical 
subject is not to be found". More than revealing the split subject, 
Freud's recourse to the trope of the Mystic Writing-Pad brings him face 
to face with the mind as pure machine, the automatic, "inhuman" psyche. 
Derrida articulates this anxious noment when Freud must abandon the 
analogy between mind, and machine, psychical and writing apparatus: 
Far from the machine being a pure absence of spontaneity, 
its reseloblal7ci? to the psychical apparatus, its existence 
and its necessity bear witness to the finitude of the 
mnemic spontaneity which is thus supplemented, The machine 
- and consequently, representation - is death and finitude 
ivil&17 the psyche, 
(36) 
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This machine does not run by itself: it is death, a mechanism without 
its own energy. The psyche is no longer regarded as a self-generating 
force: the logical consequence of Freud's trope is to conflate psyche 
and writing as machine. The -ghostly literature machine produces a 
radical finitude, rendering "empirical, historical man* 4.37 ý an effect of 
its impassive, indifferent workings: 
The touch of death, which Freud glimpsed and drew back from 
in his representation of the machine, is at work within the 
trope itself, The logic of this terrible obliteration works 
for both representation - literature - and the machine, That 
which had seemed to promise a future for the self is also the 
script which, with a wholly mechanical indifference, spells 
its death, 118' 
De Xan traces the moment in Rousseau's ]Revprie when "the text as 
body" is displaced by "the text as machine". If the text is no longer a 
figural body but a literal machine, the metaphorical integrity of the 
text is put in question: 
Far froin seeing 
psychic energy, 
construction of 
representations 
of the absolute 
figuration or mi 
language as an instrument in the service of a 
the possibility now arises that the entire 
drives, substitutions, repressions, and 
is the aberrant, metaphorical correlative 
randomness of language, prior to any 
? aning, "" 
Just as the psyche is conceived to be the product of an antecendent 
language machine, so the body is effaced by language. Within this 
mechanization, is the body located only as a waste product, a weave of 
textual traces, a remainder? Difference never allows a text to become 
enbodied as transcendental, but difference also opens a space for the 
I 
body. Derrida characterizes the poematic as a1 earni ng- by- heart, an act 
of love and desire- 
Reai-i,,, no longer names only pure interiority, independent 
spontaneity, the freedom to affect oneself actively by repro- 
ducing the beloved trace, The memory of the 'by heart' is 
confided like a prayer - that's safer - to a certain 
exteriority of the automaton, to the laws of mnemo- 
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/ 
technics, to that liturgy that mimes mechanics on the 
surface ... 1401 
Located between the body and the textual machine, Derrida's trope 
acknowledges affect and agency, and later in his essay there is a more 
explicit move to demechanize or in-corporate the poetic: 
The poem can roll itself up in a ball, 
order to turn its pointed signs toward 
sure, it can reflect language or speak 
relates back to itself, it never moves 
machines, bringers of death, Its event 
derails absolute knowledge, autotelic 
itself, 14" 
but it is still in 
the outside, To be 
poetry, but it never 
by itself like those 
always interrupts or 
being in proximity to 
The event of poetry is bound up with possibility, with the non- 
mechanistic, with that which supplements or exceeds the system of 
language. Derrida, restores a complicated sense of agency and an 
extratextual component to the event of poetry, under the guise of the 
sublime, but the body remains an ambiguous, shadowy presence. 
Helga Geyer-Ryan offers a more explicit engagement with the death- 
bringing trope of the language machine. Geyer-Ryan argues that De Man 
fails to examine the metaphor of the linguistic figure, the figurality 
of the figure. By privileging the text as the scene of the aesthetic 
event, thus repressing the sensual dimension of aesthetics and banishing 
the subject from texts, De Man also has to make the body disappear: 
,, de Man is only able 
to insist on the exclusively 
linguistic semiology of the literary text because he 
represses the corporeality of author and recipient whose 
presence in the literary communication is in fact 
represented by the metaphor of the linguistic figure in 
the text, Only -such a repression of sensuality rips the 
text so radically from its anchorage in objects and 
bodies that all that remains of it is the allegory of 
its own 'undecidability', its unreadability, CA2) 
This forceful repression of the body "involves destroying history, the 
traces of which are inscribed in-bodies". C 43 ) The figurality of 
133 
language, the metaphor of the language machine, the trope of the trope 
obliterate history, efface the conditions of the present and offer only 
mechanical, deathly futurity. 
Body Xatterr. 
The Ode's apostrophe is addressed to an elusive phantom, one of 
"the airy creations of phantasy" of which Freud writes (AL 136). Baker 
notes how the nightingale, as object of desire, always withdraws in the 
poem: 
But this withdrawal does not first occur in the fading of 
the nightingale's song, It has occurred all along the ode's 
rhythm of statement in which what seems ready to speak 
disappears each time with its utterance, (44) 
Invisible, pure breath, an airy spirit, the nightingale is already 
elsewhere, leaving a song in its wake. Its voice passes through the 
text, moving through the poem like a whispering other, visible in the 
traces of its passing. It can be seen as analogous to the way in which 
desire is conceived to "breathe" through a dream, working over the text 
of the dream-thoughts, compressing, crumpling, folding it, the way in 
which wind would blow a flag. 14-5: ' The nightingale's voice inspires and 
expires, filling the listener with rapture then fading away. The 
aspiration to ecstatic voice, the hope for insufflation (the breathing 
of spiritual life into a person) is imbricated with a desire to 
I 
dissolve, to become insubstantial: 
Darkling I listen; and, for many a time 
I have been half in love with easeful Death 
Called him soft names in many a musid rhyme, 
To take into the air my quiet breath,,, 
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Throughout the poem, the entropic desire for extinction 
characteristically oscillates between activity and passivity, between 
willingly surrendering the self and having it taken away. The poet is 
only "half in love" with Death, calling him "soft names. To take into 
the air my quiet breath". This exchange of whispers hinges on the force 
of "take": is the "quiet breath" . offered up in order to achieve the full 
voice of "rich" death, or will Death be only "drowsy nunbness"? As it 
is, pure voice is unattainable: "Still wouldst thou sing, and I have 
ears in vain -/ To thy high requiem become a sod". For all the heady 
delight of the bird's song, the poem's fancy is contingent on the body. 
The poem (dis)locates itself on the threshold of spirit and matter, 
the impulse to become impalpable leading to a sense of loss and 
disorientation. (This slippage between material and immaterial will be 
addressed in more detail in Chapter Four. ) The contrast of light and 
shade might be read in terms of how the work of poetry tends toward "a 
constantly shifting relationship between veiling and unveiling". "4r=-) Yet 
the "shadows numberless", "the forest dim", "verdurous glooms" where 
"there is no light" are places where the subject disappears, fading away 
and leaving the world "unseen". The body dissolves, becoming viewless, 
insubstantial. Although it grows "spectre-thin", however, the body 
cannot be rendered invisible in the text: 
Fade far away, dissolve, and quite forget 
What thou among the leaves hast never known, 
The weariness, the fever, and the fret 
Here, where men sit and hear each other groan; 
Where palsy shakes a few, sad, last grey hairs, 
Where youth grows pale, and spectre-thin, and dies; 
Where but to think is to be full of sorrow 
And leaden-eyed despairs; 
Where Beauty cannot keep her lustrous eyes, 
Or new Love pine at them beyond to-morrow, (11,21-30) 
135 
This stanza is caught between two worlds, between mortality and physical 
vulnerability and a transcendent time or space "beyond tomorrow". The 
nightingale rises above the naterial and corporeal; it cannot be trodden 
down by the "hungry generations". The mortal, historical world is a 
world of suffering and want, and "hungry" also inplies the insatiability 
of desire, borne out not least by the restless gaze of eyes that "cannot 
keep", that provoke only transient love. Death invades beauty as entropy 
and decay. <47 " The body too "cannot keep", yet it inevitably grounds the 
text's imaginative flight. The inmaterial can be thought only in the 
material, a paradox resolved only by the nightingale's ethereal status: 
"Thou wast not born for death, immortal Bird! " 
Lyotard argues that "language, at least in its poetic usage, is 
possessed, haunted by the figure", and that poetry is an example of 
"immanent rhythmic force". 14a 1 What figure haunts poetry: only the 
figurative figure or the bodily figure too? Are the rhythms of language 
and the rhythms of the body at work? The body cannot be reinstated as 
the locus of transcendent metaphysical unity or presence, it cannot be 
considered as extrinsic to the "essential" thinking subject, but equally 
the body is not merely another writing site. The body might write or 
figure as well as being written or figured. Bodily desires work through 
or counter to the disfigurative force of language. The word can never be 
made f lesh, yet desire in language becomes a ghostly supplement of 
bodily drives, their rhythms, eruptions and interruptions. The 
I 
figuration of desire in language is the ghost in the textual machine, 
and death is the ghost that whispers through the body and language. To 
conceive of the body working as the shadowy other of language, at the 
borders of representation, is not merely to inscribe the corporeal as 
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another trope or site of textual otherness or difference. There are very 
"material" and historical absences in the time and body of a text: 
bodies rendered insubstantial, silenced voices, ghosts. C49 IA body that 
longs for vocality, a voice that longs for corporeality, a bodied 
poetry: "Eat, drink, swallow my letter, carry it, transport it in you, 
like the law of a writing become your body*. '50) It is possible to trace 
a nightingale that, like Derrida's b6risson, is figured as "neither 
sublime, nor incorporeal". "'"" 
Interleavings 
The nightingale's "plaintive anthem" sends out many echoes. Paul 
Fry argues that, as a form, the Ode can be seen as the quest or yearning 
for a transcendent, originary voice that represents an absent presence 
in the text: "Voice, the knell of natural sound that echoes death, is 
the lost origin of an ode" The leavings or Shostliness of voice, 
echoes and traces of presence, the authentic and proper flit through the 
text. The poem opens with a radical absenting of grounding or origin, 
registering the fall into the beyond of language, a wrenching from the 
purely interior or primordial inseparation of self. Fry comments that 
the writing of the the ode "leafs" over the voice, displacing the 
logocentric privileging of the spoken word, implying that an active 
silencing takes place in the text. Writing ascribes "inaginary power" 
I 
over voice, "the knell of natural sound that echoes death". `31 The 
interleavings of voices in the Ode can be considered intertextually, as 
if by flicking through the pages of a writing past. Eleanor Cook traces 
a range of metaleptic echoes for the bird topos: the figure of a bird in 
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an earthly paradise functions as an image of voice for the poet, a topos 
that includes matters of "waking or sleeping, dreaming, death". ('-') 
This intertextual history contains a graphic silence, an absent 
"figure", however. Another echo can be discerned. The figurative status 
of the nightingale, self-consciously inscribed as a muse or motif of the 
poetic, recalls the myth of Philomel. Her silence "so rudely forc'd", 
Philomel is an analogue of tongueless desire, her fate inhabiting the 
text as a primal scene of silence and violence. The insistence of these 
shadowy echoes may be attributed to what Lyotard describes as "the 
effect on language of the force exerted by the figural", a force which 
"hinders hearing but makes us see". Philomel is silenced and invisible, 
but rendered visible and voiced in the text too, "a tongue lost in a 
hal luci-natory scenography, the f irst violence". 11 '-6: 1 The other' s voice 
does violence to the order of utterance, yet violence also arises from 
the desire to voice the other. The identification with the bird is a 
form of murder, but this "intertextual" echo is perhaps a voice from the 
crypt, returned to haunt the poem, to whisper in the shadows. The 
insistence of this haunting voice perhaps offers a parallel with Abraham 
and Torok's comments on what the analysand's tomb contains: 
,, 
the content is unique in that it cannot appear in the 
light of day as speech, And yet, it is precisely a matter 
of words, Without question, in the depth of the crypt are 
held fast, like owls in ceaseless vigil, unspeakable words 
buried alive, 166) 
The nightingale never "presents" itself in the light of day, yet equally 
I 
never disappears, insisting in representation even as it hovers at the 
limits of the representable, both silent and audible. 
The nyth of Philomel is a representation not only of the mechanical 
deathliness of figuration, the repetition of language or poetry; that 
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brutal silencing also represents actual force, how a history (or a 
representative female dead body) is written over in the name of 
aesthetic "escape".,: '-7" The oscillation between invitation and invasion 
attests to the process of inscription and elision, of re-covering the 
dead that takes place equally in dreams and poems. The nightingale acts 
as a phantasmal reminder of other leavings of voice: the echoes and 
remains of histories that are intra-, inter-, and extratextual, that 
cannot be elided by a dream of forgetting. The next chapter, which 
discusses Freud's essay on Jensen's Gradiva, will trace another effaced 
body that "lives" between waking and sleeping, dream and reality, buried 
on the surface of the text. 
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IV 
CHAPTER FOUR: DELUSIONS AND DREANS IN FREUD'S GRAT)TVA 
The renains of a text 
This chapter attempts to follow the detours, repetitions, strategic 
shifts and oversights of Freud's essay, Delusions and Dreams in Jensen's 
Gradiva, as he sets out to read psychoanalysis through Jensen's text. 
Initially the reading will trace Freud's somewhat cursory attempt to 
outline a theoretical position on how to "treat" literary dreams. In a 
series of manoevures, Freud comes to claim critical priority for 
psychoanalysis in textual interpretation and then to position himself as 
a creative artist. Yet it becomes clear in the essay that psychoanalysis 
and literature inscribe or traverse each other. The manner in which 
Freud retells Jensen's story puts the specificity of literature in 
doubt; the pristine creative text cannot be placed outside the bounds of 
psychoanalytic investigation. By the same token, literature comes to 
contaminate the boundaries of this youthful science. Psychoanalysis 
professes scientific objectivity, yet its analytic practices are 
"creative", and much of its conceptual izati on borrows from literary 
metaphors. A master/slave dialectic is never inverted or displaced; 
rather the two discourses inhabit each other as a foreign body, in turn 
I 
barely tolerated, misrecognised, confronted and accommodated. Freud's 
essay plays out a phantasy, fulfils a wish, a wish to occupy the 
masterful place of the other. Freud's first act of identification in 
143 
reading Gradiva is an attempt (conscious or unconscious, the two are so 
difficult to distinguish) to take the place and name of the other. 
The chapter will also examine the way in which Freud's phantasy 
construction of psychoanalysis hovers between archaeology and narrative 
fiction. (In doing so, the discussion focuses on poetics rather than 
specifically on poetry. ) Archaeology becomes more than a convenient 
metaphor for psychoanalytic practice; Freud's thinking begins to assume 
the character of an archaeological investigation. "', Equally, what 
archaeology signifies for Freud (fame and glory, time-travel, commerce 
with the dead, the representation of the unrepresentable) is bound up 
with the stakes of the essay. To know, be present, in the past is the 
ultimate archaeological phantasy. This delusion runs alongside another 
phantasy - that of psychoanalysis as narrative. Freud tells the story of 
an analysis, while ostensibly interpreting a fictional text. Fiction 
becomes Freud's interpretive method, which gives psychoanalysis an 
ambiguous identity; it is located between art and science, observation 
and speculation, fact and phantasy. Psychoanalysis is not the tool by 
means of which Freud discovers the unconscious, psychoanalysis is the 
field or site where it discovers itself. This is not to say that 
psychoanalysis has no experiential or material purchase, but even in the 
analytic situation the unconscious is performed, constructed and voiced 
rather than "revealed". 
For psychoanalysis, dreams are nodal points in which to trace the 
barely visible markings, lines and workings of texts. It is difficult to 
avoid the depth model - under the surface, buried lives, inner secrets - 
when thinking through a relationship between psychoanalysis, archaeology 
and traditional literary criticism. This chapter attempts to read the 
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other texts, the other f ables, that weave through and between Freud's 
essay. Freud explores the remains of Jensen's text, tracing a wealth of 
repressed material in the narrative. Freud articulates that repression 
through psychoanalysis and goes on to apply his investigation "outside" 
the site of the text, excavating Jensen too. In tracing this field of 
excavation, this chapter scrutinizes, turns over Freud's readings, to 
see what has been made less visible in his work. 
The role of Zoe as an ideal analyst is also considered. She 
occupies an ambiguous space in Freud's essay, positioned as 
interpreter/interpreted, analyst/patient, active subject/ passive 
object, thus disrupting the categories of subject and object, the 
outside and inside of the narrative. Freud's identification with Zoe 
remains ambivalent: it will be seen to take the shape of an erotic and 
also a rivalrous (even murderous) identification. Given the masterful 
position Zoe occupies in the text, this phantasy of identificati'on and 
rivalry is played out over power, knowledge and priority; the cathexis 
(if such it is) remains both erotic and appropriative in character. 
Freud' s closing remarks touch on death, time-travel, mastery, situating 
Hanold's first dream as an occasion for Freud's own archaeology and as a 
nodal point which draws the various threads of the essay's narrative 
together. 
Familiar Faces 
It is far from being generally believed that dreams have a 
meaning and can be interpreted, Science and the majority of 
educated people smile if they are set the task of interpreting 
a dream, Only the common people, who cling to superstitions 
and who on this point are carrying on the convictions of 
antiquity, continue to insist that dreams can be interpreted, 
The author of The Interpretation of Dreams has ventured, in 
the face of the reproaches of strict science, to become a 
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partisan of antiquity and superstition, He is, it is true, 
far from believing that dreams foretell the future, for 
the unveiling of which men have vainly striven from time 
immemorial by every forbidden means, But even he has not 
been able entirely to reject the relation of dreams to the 
future, For the dream, when the laborious work of translating 
it had been accomplished, revealed itself to him as a wish 
of the dreamer's represented as fulfilled; and who could 
deny that wishes are predominantly turned towards the 
future? (AL 33) 
This opening passage from Freud's essay on Gradiva falls somewhere 
between a nanifesto and justification for the institution of 
psychoanalysis. Freud alludes to points of contact or currency - 
prophesy, superstition, unveiling of the truth, exploring history, 
restoring the dead - that are recurrent and imbricated features of his 
work on dreams and literature. This study of Freud's text aims to draw 
out the weave of effects and concerns that cross dreaia-texts and 
"literary" texts, in differing but associated ways. Freud's Gradiva is a 
text much concerned with strict science, classical antiquity and 
forbidden knowledge. It is marked by a complex network of movements, a 
series of points of contact, that run through this thesis: the future, 
translation, desire, death and time. It also represents an attempt to 
investigate the grounds for knowing, what there is to know or possess 
"in" texts and dreams. The "dreams" in Gradiva must be read in the light 
of these interrelated issues and aspects. 
This study does not intend to read dreams in Jensen's text as if 
they were the dreams of a real patient, but will attempt to develop a 
methodology, explore a form of encounter, test a strategy of reading 
I 
that will take account of the process of dream texts and will implicate 
the hermeneutic techniques traditionally applied to texts in general. 
The Gradiva that will be referred to is Freud's essay on Gradiva, for 
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reasons of argument and not priority, or to repeat Freud' s appropriative 
gesture. 1: 2: 1 Freud writes on, before and after, Jensen; a network of 
connections, traces, conjunctions, coincidences, all dependent on 
reading time, on the time for and of reading. The terms and conditions 
under which Freud reads the "literary" dreams in Gradiva are at least as 
important as the accuracy or inaccuracy of his reading of those dreams. 
If dreams can be understood as texts, a matter of figuration and fantasy 
at whatever stage of elaboration, then the practice of reading those 
texts (including the following interpretation) is itself subject to 
these same formative conditions. Thus the term "textual dream! ' must take 
account of how dreams are f igured and interpreted in texts, tracing a 
writing effect of dreans the identification, transformation, 
figuration and staging that take place in the construction and 
interpretation of dreams. The dreams in Gradiva may be understood as 
nodal points in the text, moments that draw together various strands 
which cross the narrative; this approach recognises that there exists 
some correspondence between text and dream, the laws of f iction and the 
laws of the unconscious. 
Freud indicateta that Jung drew his attention to the potential of 
Gradiva, a potential whose value can be realised by confirming the 
insight of Freud's theory of dreams. Both are attracted, beguiled by 
Jensen's story, Just as Hanold is entranced by the mysterious, fleeting 
figure of "Gradiva". Several dreams in Jensen's text had looked at Jung 
"with familiar faces and invited him to attempt to apply to them the 
method of The Interpretation of Dreams" (AL 36). This is an odd way of 
describing interest in a text, but it is a description that raises the 
question of what "faces" interpreters (who are themselves dreamers) see 
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or wish to see in dreans or texts. Who sees or f aces who, and who sees 
who first? Jung sees a familiart expected aspect in Jensen's textual 
dreams, as if anticipating or forereading the story in the light of 
psychoanalytic theory. 
The dreams in the text can be read as processes of identification 
and appropriation, precisely the processes that takes place in Freud' s 
essay on Jensen's story. It is a strategy perhaps similar to the 
rivalrous correspondence between Freud and Jung remarked upon by Mikkel 
Borch-Jacobsen. 131 Freud proposes a contract of "intellectual 
communisdl, the terms of which are part collaborative, part 
appropriative, "a matter of thinking and speculating together (in this 
instance, on delusion), with each partner having the right to 
appropriate the other' s thoughts, so that the other becones by that very 
token a double, another self, and/or a different - an other - self" 
(50). This conpetitive relationship is conceived of less in biographical 
ter3ns - with two strong individuals vying for fame and mastery - than as 
an act of countersigning. The writings of "Freud" and "Jung" are "signed 
witb another, against the other, in intimate opposition to the other" 
(62). Suggestively for a reading of Freud's Gradiva, the term 
"intellectual commi nism" crops up in a study of delusion. If this study 
weaves between delusion and dream, it is not a deliberate or unwitting 
blurring of the distinctions between these separate yet linked psychic 
processes; rather, it is an acknowledgement that Freud's own approach to 
reading Hanold's &ýlusion is closely associated with his reading of 
dreams in the text. 
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Dreams never dreamt at all 
In his essay, Freud addresses himself to "the question of the class 
of dreams that have never been dreamt at all - dreams created by 
imaginative writers and ascribed to invented characters in the course of 
a story" (AL 33). He traces the formation of these "dreans" as if their 
constituent materials were taken from real life, although in his 
concluding paragraph Freud reluctantly acknowledges that these dreams 
are not to be taken literally: "But we must stop here, or we may really 
forget that Hanold and Gradiva are only creatures of their author's 
mind" (AL 116). (Precisely who authors Hanold and Zoe/Gradiva in Freud's 
text is a question that will be taken up. ) Freud continually blurs the 
distinctions between real people and fictional characters, a slippage 
that attests less to a naively ref lectionist theory of literature than 
to a continuing methodological problem for psychoanalytic criticism. 
Readings of both dreams in Jensen's text may treat these "dreams" only 
as analogies or metaphorical stagings of Hanold's phantasies, but 
readings or knowledge of dreams are never other than metaphorical. The 
concerns of any analysis of dreams in texts remain those of Freud's, 
even if these difficulties are elided or suppressed in his text: how do 
we read "literary" dreams, or account for their "place" and role in 
texts? How or where do we identify the "subject of phantasy", and to 
whom do we attribute the wishes or phantasies figured in dreams? 
Freud neither resolves the position of psychoanalysis in relation 
I 
to a literary text, nor does he establish how and when a reader of 
fiction can regard an incident as "real" or literal in a narrative. 
Equally problenatic is the question of what constitutes part of a 
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writer's conscious strategy and, in the particular case of GrAdiva, when 
a character is "in" and "out" of his/her delusion. In reading literary 
dreams, the psychoanalyst lacks a dreamer who could provide associations 
and "copious explanations" (AL 84) relevant to the dream being 
interpreted. The reading of Hanold's first dream falters through lack 
of further detail about the dreamer's life: 
If only we had some reason for 
noisier than usual that mornin 
author had not omitted to tell 
usual practice, had slept that 
What a pity the author did not 
supposing that the town was 
g! If only, for instance, the 
us that Hanold, against his 
night with his windows open! 
take the trouble to do that! 
(AL 81) 
This frustration at the lack of access to an author's mind, to a life 
beneath the surface of the text, does not prevent Freud from drawing on 
his own work on dreams, the "life" of his consulting room, to fill this 
gap. The analyst becones the author as nuch as the interpreter of the 
text. It is left to Freud (and, by inplication, any reader) to supply or 
invent the associations that the author omits, chooses not to provide or 
unconsciously represses. 
In order to test the validity of his theory of dreams, to read 
Hanold as if he were a real person, Freud must treat the dreams in 
Jensen's story as if they were actual phenomena. Freud seeks to 
distinguish between an objective, real world and Hanold's phantasy 
world, the same endeavour he must undertake in the consulting room. 
After recounting Hanold's first sighting of Gradiva in Pompeii, Freud 
fleshes out this phaptom with some empirical detail: 
A large lizard was lying sotionless, stretched out in the 
sunshine, but fled at the approach of Gradiva's foot and 
darted away across the lava paving-stones, So it was no 
hallucination, but something outside our dreamer's mind, 
But could the reality of a rediviva startle a lizard? (AL 43) 
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The resolution of Gradiva's mysterious appearance is not as 
straightforward as Freud allows. The lizard may be another element in 
Hanold' s daydream, part of his mid-day madness. Jensen story does not 
present any obvious conclusion about the status of the lizard; Peter 
Benson points out that "if a man is capable of hallucinating the figure 
of a woman, he would presumably be equally capable of hallucinating a 
lizard to add definition to the image". C4) How can a reader know that 
the lizard is outside the dreamer's mind, or indeed that anything is 
real in a text, "outside" the narrative? Hanold could be read as being 
trapped in an impermeable subectivism, and Jensen's story has Hanold 
wondering if all of the events and experiences in Germany and Pompeii 
are a product of his own imagination, if he is in touch with reality. "' 
Yet no reading can readily stand "outside" delusion; there is no 
objective reality against which to test a character's actions or 
behaviour. Indeed, what is a character in a text? Hanold's uncertain 
relation to the "outside" world arises from his uncertain relation to an 
otherness "embodied" (although sbe is a phantom) in Gradiva, but whether 
this otherness takes on representation "outside" of Hanold's imagination 
is problematic. Is anything real in a dream, and is there a dream- 
subject prior to the dreamr-scene, one who actively stages a wish? Is the 
notion of a dreant-subject as chimerical as "character" in a text, as 
elusive as Gradiva amid the ruins of Pompeii? 
This ambiguity or confusion in reading the scene, arising in part 
from Freud's own descriptions of the construction of dreams, is not just 
methodological: it acquires a structural force. The "matter" of dreams, 
their origin in real experience, is highly problematic: the formative 
dream-materials or elements are already fictive, already caught up in 
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representation. Rather than looking on from outside, the dream-aubjec--t 
(if such it can be called) takes part in the scene of phantasy. Even if 
the idea of an articulated latent wish behind the dreanr-facade can be 
accepted, the dreant-work is never fully present to itself. In striving 
to fulfil desire, a dream looks forward to a destination, if not a 
destiny, but the problematics of subjectivity Q am not "I", even in the 
secret, "private" depths of the unconscious) renders that aim 
unattainable though inescapable. Freud's ability to ground a reading of 
dreams in Jensen's text is ineluctably complicated and traversed by his 
theoretical endeavour to trace the enigmatic status and operation of 
dreams. 
Freud's difficulties in distinguishing what is "outside" and 
"inside" delusion also inevitably derive from his status as reader. 
Although as an analyst Freud must affect masterly detachment, as a 
reader he is drawn into the narrative, forgetting himself. He sets out 
to isolate, record and explain the deternining elements of Hanold' s 
dreams, but succumbs to the overall lure of the story: 
... what we really intended to do originally was only 
to 
investigate two or three dreams that are to be found here 
and there in Gradiva with the help of certain analytic 
methods, How has it come about, then, that we have been 
led into dissecting the whole story and exasining the 
mental processes in the two chief characters? (AL 66) 
The clinical force of "dissecting", "analytic" and "examining" suggests 
that the text and/or author has become the patient, an object of 
surgical study. Despite the authority of this medico-scientif ic 
language, Freud admits to puzzlement, even a "painful sense of 
bewilderment" (AL 42), as a representative reader. In part this is 
disingenous, and can be regarded as a rather obvious rhetorical ploy to 
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highlight the subsequent enlightment brought about by psychoanalysis; in 
one sense Freud already knows what course the narrative and his reading 
of that narrative will take. Freud does not explicitly consider the 
conditions of his reading yet, in the sense of proposing an 
interpretation, of undergoing a reading experience, Freud's essay 
necessarily suggests that reading texts is a complex, uncertain process, 
an economy of libidinal investment, a site of strategies, 
identifications and multiple meanings. Reading is also an affective 
experience, a cause of pain and bewilderment. When Freud forgets 
himself, taking the text and its characters as real people, that 
forgetting may resemble what he describes as repressive "forgetting" (AL 
59), a forgetting that expresses a reluctance to acknowledge the 
provisional, fictional status of the text and thus of any psychoanalytic 
speculation. Freud does not simply read the phantasy that is revealed 
in Gradiva: phantasy insists in his own reading of the text. He is both 
"inside" and "outside" the play of phantasy, a doubled position 
"impossibly" occupied by Zoe in the story. 
Authorizing Science 
In his essay Freud undertakes (it is a text concerned with the 
dead) to read the "dreams created by imaginative writers". Some issues 
surrounding the status of those dreams have been raised, but in order to 
I 
examine this endeavour, and the stakes that are being played for, it is 
necessary to consider the status granted by Freud to imaginative 
writers, since it has bearing on the appropriative tendencies of all 
acts of interpretation. Freud often appears to admit the supplementary 
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status of psychoanalysis, portraying it as a discourse trailing on the 
coat-tails of great artists, continually deferring to the insight (and 
masculine authority) of creative writers, particularly poets. How the 
creative writer produces phantasies that give great pleasure to his 
readers or audience "is his innermost secret" ('Creative Writers and 
Daydreaming' AL 140). On the question of imaginative licence, Freud 
accepts the "ruling in every case" of the writer CThe Uncanny' , AL 
373). Most tellingly, the "secret" of artists defeats the interpretive 
strategies of psychoanalysis: "Before the problem of the creative artist 
analysis must, alas, lay down its arms" ('Dostoevsky and Parricide' , AL 
441). The creative writer has been describing "pathological mental 
states" long before psychoanalysis: "he has from time immemorial been 
the precursor of science, and so too of scientific psychology" (AL 68). 
Authors (including Jensen) have anticipated Freud and have thereby 
articulated psychoanalysis already. 
Despite this professed humility in acknowledging the priority of 
literature over psychoanalysis, Freud's essay challenges and attempts to 
invert this hierarchy. Peter Benson argues that Freud's reading of 
Gradiva is structured by the oedipal relationship to literature of his 
infant science: "Psychoanalysis wishes to be in the place of 
literature's knowledge, while maintaining an analytic distance from its 
respected precursor". '11ý1' Benson overestimates the respectful distance 
that Freud keeps from literature. Freud's study of Gradiva cannot 
suppress the contest of (nasculine) priority, authority and ownership 
over the discoveries to be made in Jensen's work. In the intellectual 
arena, psychoanalysis cannot easily concede the genius and autonomy of 
writers. The text gradually unseats the primacy of the writer, 
154 
hesitantly, progressively establishing monopoly rights on reading the 
mind. The doctor first achieves equal status with the author, is then 
granted prior status and, by the end of the essay, the "author" has been 
subsumed into the "doctor", positing a composite creative figure with 
predominantly scientific and clinical characteristics. "ý' 
Freud defers to writers as "far in advance" of other thinkers, 
while proposing a degree of mutuality, in content if not form, between 
author and doctor. In ascribing significance to dreams, "creative 
writers are valuable allies and their evidence is to be prized highly, 
for they are apt to know a whole host of things between heaven and earth 
of which our philosophy has not yet let us dream" (AL 34). Authors not 
only write about dreams, they "dream" in writing beyond the imaginative 
level of the philosopher/scientist. Nevertheless, Freud traces a 
distinct but simultaneous working towards the truth of the mind between 
the writer and the psychoanalyst, finding confirmation of his theories 
in creative writings. As valuable allies, author and doctor are engaged 
in mapping the mysteries of the mind, describing "pathological mental 
states" (AL 68). Psychoanalysts and authors "probably draw from the same 
source and work upon the same object, each of us by another method" (AL 
114); the writer and the doctor have either misunderstood the 
unconscious in the same way, or "they have both understood it correctly" 
(AL 115). Jensen produces a correct "imaginative picture of the history 
of a case and its treatment" (AL 69). Psychoanalysis brings something 
valuable to the study of literary texts, and the writer meddles 
productively in psychiatry. Hence the domains of doctor and author 
necessarily and unavoidably interpenetrate: 
,,, the creative writer cannot evade the psychiatrist nor the 
psychiatrist the creative writer, and the poetic treatment of 
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a psychiatric theme can turn out to be correct without any 
sacrifice of its beauty, (AL 69) 
This statement contains several deft evasions. It glosses over any 
differences between poetry and psychiatry as practices, proposing that 
each poetic treatment is as clinical and discursive as a psychiatric 
case study. Correlatively, the shift from psychoanalysis to "psychiatry" 
and medicine situates Freud in the domain of science, eliding the 
"poetic treatment" of which a psychoanalytic case study partakes. Sarah 
Kofman argues that Freud, in his "summarizing" of Gradiva, replaces 
descriptions and metaphors in Jensen's story with concepts. Science is 
substituted for "art" and the reader is prevented "from falling into a 
delusion, from falling asleep, from dreaming, from falling under the 
spell of the text's poetry". Freud's transfornations of the text effect 
"a movement from poetry, which contains the truth without being aware of 
it, to science, which delivers the truth up in proper and adequate 
terms". 1131' Separating poetry and science is the essay's precise 
difficulty: "poetic treatment" is inscribed in the insitution and 
discourse of psychoanalysis. ': 91 
In his essay on the case of "Little Hans", Freud considers the 
objection that much of the evidence for the boy's phobia was actually 
inferred or prompted by his father. Although this detracts from the 
evidential value of the analysis, it follows a comm n procedure: ". .. a 
psychoanalysis is not an impartial scientific investigation, but a 
therapeutic measure. Its essence is not to prove anything, but merely to 
alter something" CAnalysis of a Phobia in a Five-year-old Boy' p (SE X 
104). Sixteen pages later he claims: 
Therapeutic success, however, is not our primary aim; 
we endeavour rather to enable the patient to obtain a 
conscious grasp of his unconscious wishes, And this we 
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can achieve by working upon the basis of the hints he 
throws out, and so, with the help of our interpretive 
technique, presenting the unconscious complex to his 
consciousness in oup own Avords, (SE X 120) 
The analyst aims to reveal, demonstrate and make clear what is hidden, 
bringing to light the objective reality of unconscious pathogenic 
material . This desire for scientific objectivity is only enacted, 
however, by the analyst's creative and transformative intervention. 
Whatever the authority invested in the phrase, "our own words" suggests 
the provisonality of art as much as the clinical detachment of science. 
The "nature" of writers and the workings of texts fascinate, puzzle 
and resist the drive to mastery that psychoanalysis directs toward other 
functions and activities of the human mind. Freud reluctantly cedes 
Jensen a troubling, intriguing independence: " ... since access to the 
sources in the author's mind is not open to us, we will leave him with 
an undiminished right to construct a development that is wholly true to 
life upon an improbable premiss" (AL 68). It is as if the writer, or 
writing itself, witholds a divine secret, something out of reach, beyond 
the interpretative capabilities of a fledgling field of enquiry: 
In their knowledge of the mind they are far in advance of 
us everyday people, for they draw upon sources which we 
have not yet opened up for science, If only this support 
given by writers in favour of dreams having a meaning were 
less ambiguous! (AL 34-5) 
Freud frequently stresses that ambiguity condensation and 
displacement, undecidable meaning - is a made of articulation common to 
dreams and creative writing, in particular poetry. Ambiguity as a 
rhetorical device is also deployed in the discourse, the "poetic 
treatment" of the analyst. Yet the youthful science (which may not be a 
science at all) of psychoanalysis, which tracks down hidden or obscured 
157 
meaning and uses ambiguity in its therapeutic practice, needs to speak 
clearly, in a determinable way, to confront overdetermination and 
displacement in dreans, phantasy and creative writing with a systematic 
reading. Despite the professed humility of "us everyday people", Freud's 
endeavour is to render dreams meaningful in unambiguous and masterly 
fashion: analysis must read ambiguity correctly and authoritatively. 
Freud attempts to separate the reading of the story f rom the proper 
investigation, instituting "a functional split between the language of 
the text and his presentation of the text". 1ý IIý Freud distinguishes 
between Hanold's ambiguous speeches and Zoe's interpretive powers to 
make sense of this ambiguity, an "idealizing gesture" that identifies 
Zoe with the psychoanalyst and therefore himself. 411 ) Yet Zoe's role in 
the text is not exclusively interpretive: she is also the author of 
controlled ambiguity. Her speech is "full of ambiguities" (AL 106). Zoe 
may be responsible for solving the ambiguities of Hanold's speech and 
behaviour, but her own enigmatic statements and allusions in the conduct 
of her analysis have an ambiguous meaning; it is left to Hanold (and the 
reader) to decipher her ironic comments. (12) Thus Zoe's position can 
be 
read more as a double movement than a functional split: she deploys and 
interprets ambiguity, a function already attributed (though not without 
question) to the creative writer by Freud. (This anticipates 
the 
"appropriate" ambiguity and sublimation of ego-psychology. ) The 
analyst's controlled ambiguity comes to resemble that 
deployed by the 
I 
writer. 
If repetition is one of the manifestations of the drive for mastery 
or will to power, then Freud not only wants to understand writing, 
he 
longs to reproduce and assume its strategic and affective power. At 
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moments in the essay psychoanalysis is granted priority over art more 
explicitly. Zoe's therapeutic conduct inerely reproduces in fictional 
form well-established psychoanalytical practice: 
The procedure which the author makes his Zoe adopt for 
curing her childhood friend's delusion shows a far-reaching 
similarity - no, a complete agreement in its essence - with 
a therapeutic method which was introduced into medical 
practice in 1895 by Dr Josef Breuer and myself, and to the 
perfecting of which I have since then devoted myself, 
(AL 111-112) 
Here the discourse of psychoanalysis precedes, foreshadows and foreknows 
literature. As part of Freud's appropriation or colonization of creative 
writing, the essay rehearses the main approaches to art of classical 
psychoanalysis. Freud tests the possibilities for psychoanalytic 
criticism of a characterological approach to fiction, and gestures in 
the PostScript towards a psychopathology of the author. In a 
transitional moment where both of these approaches are offered from a 
hypothetically literalist or common-sense position, Freud proposes that 
there is no convincing explanation for Hanold's delusioa: ". ought we 
not to argue in this kind of way either with Norbert Hanold or with the 
author himself? " (AL 81) Since character and author are unavailable for 
questioning, neither party provides a "path to an understanding". 
For the most part, Freud concentrates on a characterological method 
of enquiry, but he alludes to his abortive dialogue with Jensen, who 
refuses to co-operate with Freud in psychoanalytic research. Since 
access to the authorý's mind "is not open to us", his motives must remain 
a matter for speculation. With increasing boldness, Freud sketches an 
outline of a psychobiography. The authority of the author is called into 
question: readers can legitimately and revealingly track down meanings 
in a text that need not be consciously offered or sanctioned by the 
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writer. Freud wonders whether Jensen's imagination "was determined by 
forces other than his own arbitrary choice" (AL 40). After this first 
"timid" question, Freud considers the problem of interpretive 
partiality. Jensen has written 
_a 
story which "might have been designed 
to emphasise certain fundamental theories of medical psychology" (AL 
68). This may be happy coincidence or a matter of convenience for the 
interested reader, only too willing to read something "into" the text; 
Freud acknowledges "how easy it is to find what one is looking for and 
what is occupying one's mind" (AL 114). The author may legitimately deny 
that any such neaning was intended. After all, as Freud adnits (and 
uneasily recognises from his analytic experience), the interpretive 
process is faltering and often obscure: "It is so easy to draw analogies 
and to read meanings into things. Is it not rather we who have slipped 
into this charming poetic story a secret meaning very far from its 
author's intentions? Possibly" (AL 68). 
This tacitly acknowledges that the reading of phantasy in a text is 
at least as much a matter of the reader's phantasy as the pathology of 
the writer. With an unavoidable circularity, Freud's objection becomes 
ripe for Freudian decipherment. Might "slipped into" suggest some erotic 
charge attached to reading narrative and discovering its hidden secrets? 
After the uncertain "possibly" Freud returns to the question with much 
less equivocation. Either his psychoanalytic interpretation is a 
caricature, a symptomatic reading merely revealing his own 
preoccupations, or psychoanalysis has something to say about texts and 
the workings of the mind that neither writers nor conventional readers 
are conscious of: "Our opinion is that the author need have known 
nothing of these rules and purposes, so that he could disavow them in 
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good faith, but that nevertheless we have not discovered anything in his 
work that is not already in it" (AL 114). 
Freud's version of events suggests that Jensen replied "in the 
negative" and "somewhat brusquely" when asked by Jung if he knew 
anything of Freud' s theories. In the postscript, Freud reveals that 
Jensen refused to engage in dialogue about the "scientific theories" in 
his story or co-operate in "the new tasks of psychoanalytic research" - 
This apparent rebuff lends an air of danger to the enterprise, hinting 
at some strong resistance by artists to psychoanalytic speculations 
about latent levels of meaning. According to Jensen, and backed by the 
evidence of three published letters, his response to Freud's enquiries 
was not brusque but courteous. Freud's version of the correspondence, 
accurate or not, stresses Jensen's discomf ort and represents another 
manoevure to circumscribe and then assume the role of the creative 
writer. Jensen offers a rather dismissive and bland explanation for his 
story: 
His imagination, he said, had inspired 6radiva, and he had 
enjoyed it; if there was anyone who it did not please, let him 
simply leave it alone, He had no suspicion of how greatly it 
had in fact pleased his readers, (AL 114) 
The author is presented as unaware of the effect of his text, showing 
how much goes on under his nose, how tenuous his conscious control, how 
percipient the psychoanalytic critic ("Freud") who reveals to the author 
("Jensen") the hidden treasures of his (the attribution of the pronoun 
is necessarily ambiguous) text. Is Freud writing "Jensen" and thus 
writing Gradlya? 
In the most ambitious and yet risky move, Freud conflates the 
roles, contaminates the diet inct ions, of doctor and writcar., It bac. amap, 
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apparent that Jensen has conducted his own "investigations" into the 
origin of mental disturbances: 
I was thus more than a little surprised to find that the 
author of 6radiya, which was published in 1903, 
had taken as the basis of its. creation the very thing that 
I believed myself to have freshly discovered from the sources 
of my medical knowledge, How was it that the author arrived 
at the same knowledge as the doctor - or at least behaved as 
though he possessed the same knowledge? (AL 79) 
Freud does not resolve this question; with the supernatural connotations 
of "possessed", the intertextual. or intellectual connections he traces 
between his own and Jensen's work take on the character of an uncanny 
coincidence or telepathic co=unication. Insights into the mind's 
secrets are a strange possession. Does the doctor's knowledge "possess" 
the writer's knowledge or vice versa? Another form of possession, a 
strange merging of "doctor" and "author", nay be suggested. Each 
"thinker" assumes the other's character, invades the other's domain 
(intellectual communism or imperialism? ), a movement or oscillation 
suggestively similar to that which Freud describes in Hanold's second 
dream. 
In interpreting this dream of lizard-catching, Freud cannot consult 
Hanold's "impressions, memories, and free associations" (AL 97). He 
confronts this difficulty by suggesting that "we nay very tentatively 
put our own associations in place of his. 11 However apologetic the tone, 
Freud advocates an act of appropriation, a becoming or taking the place 
of another, a speaking from, for and as that other. This colonizing 
I 
gesture testifies to the fact that there is good deal more than a lizard 
up for grabs in the interpretation of texts and dreans. Initially, Freud 
terms the dream "a remarkably senseless affair... obviously hashed up 
from his day's experiences": 
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"Somewhere in the sun Gradiva was sitting, making a snare 
out of a blade of grass to catch a lizard in, and said: 
'Please keep quite still, Our lady colleague is right; the 
method is a really good one and she has made use of it with 
excellent results, ' He fended off this dream while he was 
still asleep, with the critical thought that it was utter 
madness, and he succeeded in freeing himself from it with 
the help of an invisible bird which uttered a short laughing 
call and carried off the lizard in its beak, " (AL 50) 
There are two phases, and perhaps two voices, in this short narrative. 
In the first phase, the recounted dream--text positions the dreamer and 
reader as a spectator or passive onlooker. The second phase ascribes 
Hanold an "active" role in sleep, where he deploys his "critical" 
faculties in fending off this dream, though strangely this defensive 
move culminates in an image of attack. Instead of concentrating on the 
"defence mechanisms" of a single dream-subject (Hanold), it is crucial 
to consider where identificatory desire might reside in Freud's reading 
of the dream. 
The lizard can be read as the nodal point of the dream, knotting 
together several chains of meaning in the "original" narrative and 
Freud's analysis. Gradiva's speech is a modified form of the old 
zoologist's speech; under Freud's rules, this conflation of two people 
shows similarity between them: "'Gradiva catches lizards Just like the 
old man; she is skilled in lizard-catching Just as he is" (AL 98). By 
tracing other associations, this translation is extended: "the lizard- 
catching has come to signify man-catching" (AL 99). So Freud interprets 
"the penetration of' Zoe's intentions" in the dream. (Are we meant to 
read this phrase as active or passive? ) Subsequent events reveal that 
the zoologist is Professor Bertgang, Zoe's father: thus Zoe speaks 
"through" her father, in terms of similarity and difference. Hanold 
transgresses paternal authority by carrying off Professor Bertgang's 
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prize exhibit, his daughter. Yet perhaps the Professor's professional or 
intellectual authority is also at stake. In the dream, the invisible 
bird frustrates the zoologist's investigations by snatching the lizard, 
removing the object of study. The bird's derisive laughter suggests 
pleasure in undermining the zoologist's mastery. This contest of 
authority can be mapped on to Hanold's relation to the zoologist as 
Zoe's father. It nay even inplicate Freud's own interpretation: events 
in the dream uncannily seem to play out the struggle for scientific 
legitimacy that permeates his essay. It will be recalled that 
psychoanalysis recognises the "familiar" faces of the dreams in Jensen's 
text; the interpretation of this textual dream may play out a similar 
strange movement between seeing ahead and reading back. 
Freud returns to the drean in his closing remarks, this time 
considering the more radical motivations behind the dream. Hanold's 
identification with the lizard, the wish to be taken captive and 
subjected to Zoe, is "of a passive, nasochistic character" (AL 116). Yet 
Freud stresses Hanold's act of violence to Zoe the day after the dream, 
evidence "of a contrary erotic current'. This oscillation can already be 
detected in the "lizard" dream. There appears to be some equivalence 
between Hanold and the lizard. The lizard escapes the snare, but it is 
seized by the invisible bird; Hanold eludes Zoe' s man-catching snare, 
but like the lizard is subsequently caught. Significantly, however, it 
is Zoe/ Gradiva who' is compared to a lizard throughout the story. She 
resembles an "agile little lizard" (AL 100) whose apparent ability to 
slip through narrow cracks and gaps in Pompeii's ruins so bewilders 
Hanold. Freud emphasises that Hanold's curiosity about her "bodily 
nature-cannot disavow its origin in a young man's erotic curiosity 
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about a woman's body, even if it is involved in a scientif ic question by 
the conscious insistence on Gradiva's peculiar oscillation between death 
and life" (AL 103). This statement makes a revealing connection between 
sexual and scientific, physical and intellectual desire. Hanold's 
masochistic desire to be caught by Zoe cannot be divorced from the 
sadistic desire to possess her, to keep her as still as a marble relief 
and not let her wander or slip away. His passive desire to be "cured" by 
Zoe runs parallel with the desire to possess her knowledge, assume her 
position of authority. Freud's investment in Zoe's therapeutic abilities 
acknowledges his impulse to take on Zoe's authority and knowledge, to 
speak and act with her clinical confidence and insight in "real" life. 
As a site, Zoe's body permits the interpenetration of "erotic" and 
"scientific" desires, as well as the intermingling of professional 
roles. 
In the work of dreams and phantasies, desire "trespasses" into the 
place of an other, challenging rights, occupancy and authority, 
destabilizing subjectivity. In Freud's explanation of the lizard- 
catching dream, a complex network of motives, the contaminating of 
professional or academic boundaries, partly mutual, partly competitive, 
is caught up with a relatively more private desire for supremacy. Zoe 
tells her newly-married friend that she will "dig out something 
interesting in Pompeii": 
Here she was trespassing into the field of archaeology, just 
as he had trespassed, with his simile of lizard-catching, into 
the field of zoology; it was as though they were struggling 
towards each other and each were trying to assume the other's 
character, (AL 106) 
Freud sanctions the act of trespass by citing "the emergence of 
Zoe as a 
physician" (AL 110); she is read as becoming or assuming 
the guise of 
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the omniscient doctor. What are the benefits of combining the character 
of the creative writer and the psychoanalyst? The analyst may become an 
object of love for the patient during the period of treatment, but must 
not return that love: "the doctor has been a stranger, and must 
endeavour to become a stranger once more after the cure" (AL 113). Zoe, 
however, has never been a stranger to Hanold and after the cure wins the 
prize of marriage. This is a reward that Freud, in his exemplary role of 
noble self-sacrifice, cannot claim. In such innocuous moments, it is 
possible to observe Freud assuming the ideal roles, playing out the same 
infantile phantasies of titanic proportions that he attributes to 
creative writers, asserting that the artist "desires to win honour, 
power, love, wealth, fame and the love of women" ULP 423). For all the 
stoic self-denial, these are the rewards of one who can assune the roles 
of both author and doctor. 
Psychoanalysis as Archaeology 
As a way of discovering psychoanalysis, of vindicating 
Interpretation of Dreams, the layout of this essay's terrain is familiar 
- its buried life, its lines, traces and excavated features. Freud finds 
archaeology a most striking and insistent metaphor for psychoanalytic 
practice and, even more opportunely, Pompeii's fate supplies the ideal 
metaphor for repression: "There is. no better analogy for repression, by 
which something in the mind is at once made inaccessible and preserved, 
than burial of the sort to which Pompeii fell a victim and from which it 
could emerge once nore through the work of spades" (AL 65). Ponpeii 
emblenatises the "unaccountable preservation of psychic traces" 1: 13", and 
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Freud sets out, in the time-worn footsteps of archaeology, to 
demonstrate how psychoanalysis too can preserve the effects of the past. 
The arche-therapist maps, follows the contours and detours of a life- 
history or clinical site, reading both with and against the evidence 
extracted by analysis, until the origin of a disorder is laid bare. 
Malcolm Bowie con nts that archaeology offers psychoanalysis the 
"enticing picture of tine nade perfectly legible in layered deposits of 
matter". 1: 
141, In the "spadework" of psychoanalytic practice, the patient 
is helped to carry herself or himself "back into the life that had been 
buried" (AL 42), in order better to understand the present. Archaeology 
as a visionary excavation, the science of f irst things, "arrives" (it 
can never be present) at the dawn of civilization, just as 
psychoanalysis "uncovers" the primal beginnings of the human subject. In 
his essay, Freud embarks on his Journey of discovery with echoes of his 
hero Heinrich Schliemann at Mycenae: "Let us, then, see what we find! " 
(AL 35) On the one hand, as the master strategist, Freud already knows 
what will be found, already, recognises the signatures of all things he 
is here to read. Yet, by committing his researches to writing, by 
adducing a speculative project like archaeology, he raises questions 
about the certainty, the destination of his essay. Psychoanalysis 
observes and clarifies, but it also unveils and makes revelations. Once 
more Freud is caught in the conflicting identities constructed for 
psychoanalysis: scie-ntific fact and superstitious imagination. 
Freud turns to ancient history and other cultures to find support 
for his theory of dreams. He never explicitly rejects superstition or 
archaic belief as a basis f or understanding dreams. In lba 
Interpretation of Dreams, Freud cites James Sully's essay 'The Dream as 
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a Revelation' :"... we may say that, like some palimpsest, the dream 
discloses beneath its worthless surface-characters traces of an old and 
precious communication. " An editorial note points out that Freud 
emphasises this sentence by printing it in spaced type (TID 216n). This 
is bound up with hunting for buried treasure, deciphering and decoding 
the secrets of the past. Freud acknowledges the "painstaking study of 
dream- i nterpretati on" made by Artemidorus of Daldis, probably in the 
second century AD, and also uses the Old Testament example of Joseph 
interpreting Pharaoh's dreams. There is a common thread to these 
examples: ancient Egypt, the world of hieroglyphics. In calling his art 
oneirocriticism (the interpretation of dreams) Artemidorus may have been 
acknowledging the high science of priests in ancient Egypt, that of 
divine prophecy and dreant-interpretation. Derrida focuses on this in 
'Freud and the Scene of Writing' . This "science" drew its resources from 
hieroglyphic writing, a pictographic form of writing that Freud 
initially proposes as the language of dreams. Vhereas the Egyptian 
priests could turn to an established code of symbols to interpret 
hieroglyphics, however, Freud has no Linear B script with which to read 
dreams conclusively. He proposes no Traumbucb, no dream-dictionary or 
encyclopedia of dream-signs, though he toyed with the idea before 
dropping it. In interpreting dreams, Freud travels back to the dawn of 
the human subject, tracing the original infantile phantasies that 
underlie the present psychological disposition. In this respect, 
analysis is a work of translation, a carrying-across-time, and the 
knowledge, theories and interpetive methodologies of dreams are passed 
on in writing and as writing, with all the attendant problematics of 
writing, Freud stresses that dream-symbols do not have fixed meaning, 
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1 ike grarmalogues in shorthand. He compares dream-symbols to Chinese 
script, since they admit several meanings, and might even lead to over- 
interpretation: "the correct interpretation can only be arrived at on 
each occasion from the context"-(TID 470). 
For psychoanalysis, interpreting dreams foregrounds the problems of 
transcription, of carrying meaning across time and context, and from 
unconscious to conscious. Freud' s brief historical survey of dream- 
interpretation highlights the integral role of transcription: dream- 
decoding, the reading of hieroglyphs, is traced from Egypt, through the 
texts of Aristotle and Artimedorus in Greece to the "modern" Arabs of 
Mesopotamia. This survey itself is a history or fable of transmission, 
mediation and translation. The history of oneirocriticism is 
inextricably bound up with the history of writing; both offer up only 
irrecoverable origins. Like archaeological translation, dreaur-- 
interpretation is always an inadequate, partial, selective procedure, 
only as complete as the next discovery that itself cannot be final. 
Foucault argues that Freudian dreanr-interpretation fails to recognise 
the overall structure of language, that neaning in dreams is only a part 
of something greater, less reducible: 
Meaning does not appear, for psychoanalysis, through 
recognition of a linguistic structure, but must be 
extracted, deduced, gleaned from a word taken by itself, 
And dream interpretation, naturally, becomes a method 
designed to discover the meanings of words in a language 
whose grammar one does not understand: it becomes a 
method of cross. ý-referencing of the sort used by the 
archaeologist for lost languages, a method of 
probabilistic confirmation, as in the deciphering of 
secret codes, a method of meaningful coincidings as 
in the most traditional arts of divination ... Freudian 
analysis retrieves only one meaning among the many 
possible meanings by the shortcut of divination or the 
longer route of probability, "61 
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Foucault's remarks evoke the allure and excitement of discovery that 
accompanies Freud's pioneering work on dreams and the unconscious, his 
rearticulation of "lost languages". Psychoanalytic dream- i nterpretat ion 
replicates "the most traditional arts of divination"; the proclaimed 
ability to decipher "secret codes" and "meaningful coincidings" suggests 
the "magic power of words" that underpins the therapeutic efficacy of 
psychoanalytic practice. Yet "divination" suggests the foretelling of 
the future as much. as a forgotten past, another example of how Freud's 
archaeology hovers between prophetic and physical science, between 
projection and recovery. 
Do Freud's methods of dreant-interpretation write across time in 
every sense, writing or crossing out time in the way that Derrida 
conceives of the word "origin" as always already crossed out, under 
erasure? Derrida emphasises that the conscious text (f or example, a 
dream-interpretation that Freud produces) is not a transcription, 
"because there is no text present elsewhere as an unconscious one to be 
transposed or transported". There is no original unconscious text, 
no originary archive: 
There is no present text in general, and there is not even 
a past present text, a text which is past as having been 
present, The text is not conceivable in an originary or 
modified form of presence, The unconscious text is already 
a weave of pure traces, differences in which meaning and 
force are united -a text nowhere present, consisting of 
archives which are always already transcriptions, (17) 
Dreams are only available to us as fragmentary reconstructions, a making 
new of a previous fiction. The dream7work irrecoverably defers, 
supplements rather than recovers an origin of a dream, its ultimate 
meaning. Mobile, shifting, making and transforming meaning, (ab)using 
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materials, dream-work is the dream, a process never authentic or present 
to itself. 
Psychoanalysis as narrative, or the Tail of the Lizard 
Consider the tale of psychoanalysis: it appears to be a 
progressive, chronological unveiling of events (the patient's neurosis), 
a making clear to the other, or making clear of an "other" to the other 
(yet surface appearances can be deceptive). Having arrogated to himself 
the status of author, Freud makes a strong case for the efficacy and 
supremacy of the "narrative" practice of psychoanalysis. Freud 
privileges the investigative and therapeutic trajectory of the text, in 
its progression or linearity. Norbert Hanold becomes a patient and Zoe 
becomes the ideal analyst, an identificatory model for the "father" of 
psychoanalysis: the notion of becoming, of assuming and playing out a 
role is a vital constitutive element in the structure and configuration 
of phantasy throughout the story. Zoe conducts a "psychical treatment" 
(AL 62) of Hanold's delusion, excavating his repression and thereby 
facilitating his "cure"; Hanold slowly shakes off his repression, comes 
to awareness of himself and is thus able to benefit from her 
"treatment". Hanold is dependent on Zoe's therapy; he stumbles on truth, 
turning up his past as he wanders around Pompeii. He is a subject- 
revealed-to rather than a subject-who-reveals. 
In Freud' s theoretical work, the author/analyst chooses when to 
reveal a further secret, another piece of a Jigsaw. Perhaps beguiled by 
the subtlety and litheness of his own reading, Freud accords the author 
(himself? ) an omniscient status and priority: "Our author, who... never 
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introciuces a single idle or unintentional feature into his story" (AL 
92). The characters that never lived, the dreams never dreamed, become 
elements in the fable of psychoanalysis, a theoretical fiction in a 
strict sense, since a fictional case history "proves" or bears out 
psychoanalytic concepts and investigative methods. (The rationalization 
of the patient's behaviour and the demonstration of clinical mastery at 
the conclusion of Hitchcock's Psycho is a famous example. ) Jensen's text 
lures in Freud, persuading him to read it as a psychoanalytic case 
study, but it is precisely this narrative lure that thwarts and resists 
Freud's totalizing impulse. He displays some awareness of the problems 
of founding a proof of psychoanalytic theory on a literary fiction, 
treating (in every sense) characters as real people, and placing trust 
in a text as authentic, self-present. He admits his reading is in danger 
of being conducted "as though the author's mind were an absolutely 
transparent medium and not a refractive or obscuring one" (AL 66). 
Obscure, refractive: the author's narrative strategies prevent the 
interpreter seeing clearly, attempting to mislead, disorientate, throw 
off the scent. 
Psychoanalysis "falls" somewhere between a hermeneutic enterprise 
and speculation, between clinical observation and deduction and 
theoretical fiction. Does Freud simply write up his laboratory notes, or 
does he write to propose and speculate out of the discrete experiences 
and materials encountered I 
in his practice? In formulating general 
psychoanalytic principles from his findings, simultaneously 
investigating and writing the structures of the mind, Freud is drawn to 
locate authority and knowledge in a privileged analyst-subject who works 
on an already delineated excavation site, with its hidden but 
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discernible structures that follow the patterns observed from previous, 
painstaking digs. The author/analyst knows in advance, can predict what 
site or field s/he will encounter, can foresee what type of story will 
be told by the patient/text. On the excavated site of Gradiva, Freud 
impresses himself on ground already marked, imprinted, traced out, not 
least by his own previous texts. The construction of this subject 
presuned to know, who "knows" in advance, is predicated upon the 
intention and control of the author/analyst. This authoritative figure 
is less an interpreter than an artist, inscribing each patient, each 
psychic structure, in the fiction of psychoanalysis. 
Nevertheless, while Gradiva confirms this "fictive" impulse for 
Freud, it also destabilizes the centrality and privilege of any 
authorship. Freud's entire text privileges and must necessarily devolve 
and disperse the activity of interpretation. Hanold reads Zoe/Gradiva, 
Zoe/Gradiva reads Hanold, Freud reads Zoe/Gradiva. and Hanold, Freud 
reads Zoe/Gradiva reading Hanold, Freud reads psychoanalysis through 
Jensen's story, his text "reading" all these readings: for all his 
pleasure in the unexpected narrative twists and turns, Freud's Gradiva 
is penetrated through and through by the drive to know, to foreclose 
interpretation, to understand how to understand. Zoe tells Hanold's 
story, provides the narrative interest, explains events, and leads the 
story to a conclusion. She also remains part of Hanold' s phantasy, 
positioned as "autho, r", narrator and character in this fiction. Thus the 
clear distinctions of "outside" and "inside" in the narrative structure 
are disrupted. When does Zoe speak the truth as foreknowing and when 
does she uncertainly respond to events? When does a "knowing" reading 
define her as equally in the know? Equally pertinently, in what way or 
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in whose name does Freud read Jensen's text, or any patient's dream7 
text? Storytelling takes on a strange volition and countenance (remember 
Jung's familiar faces) in Freud's version of Jensen's story. Who is 
telling whose story? Who might be the "real" author of Gradiva? Subject 
and object, analyst and patient are caught up in the strategies of the 
analytic encounter, just as writer and reader are woven into textuality. 
By not clearly separating "fact" and "fiction" in presenting the case of 
psychoanalysis, Freud risks imitating the deluded Hanold, who "proved 
that his science was now completely in the service of his imagination" 
(AL 43). 
Living in History 
Retelling Gradiva is a chancy, halting affair, a speculative 
project or Journey in the way that Derrida terms Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle a step beyond. "E" Freud's text oscillates between the 
unveiling of knowledge and a more uncertain crossing between past, 
present and future. With professed modesty and an apparent 
perfunctoriness that does not conceal his evident relish for narrative, 
Freud leads the reader through Jensen's story, though the route is 
hardly linear. At these stopping-points Freud assesses the validity of 
past psychoanalytic writings, particularly The Interpretation of Dreams. 
Not only does Freud consider where the text has reached, he speculates 
I 
on and tests the ground ahead. To move forward in analysis, to move 
forward in a reading, means to think forward and back and to consider 
the present of this thinking, the conditions and context of this event, 
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Freud's texts go "before", testing and speculating as well as presenting 
data or empirical evidence. 
In the essay Freud stresses that Jensen makes use of chance in his 
narrative (AL 67), yet "there i-s far less freedom and arbitrariness in 
mental life... than we are inclined to assume - there may even be none at 
all" (AL 35). Freud rejects the idea of totally "free" play, purely 
unbound energy, either in creative writing or psychic life. (191, Real 
dreams are not "unrestrained and unregulated" structures, and a creative 
imagination that imitates dreams is never "unfettered". Chance can be 
resolved into laws in the outside and inside world: ". what we call 
arbitrariness in the mind rests upon laws, which we are only now 
beginning dimly to suspect" (AL 35). Freud's suspicions offer a way of 
shifting knowledge from chance and superstition to demonstrable 
scientific laws, although these laws are only tenporary stopping points 
on the Journey of interpretation and discovery. This legal framework is 
always already established and its frame constantly shifts, always 
carrying within it the necessity of another reading. Chance and law have 
equal status in a fictional text. 
Random events need not mean anything in "real" life, but they can 
have "meaning" in a dream or a text enclosed between two covers. As 
Freud enphasises, nothing in a dream is arbitrary or wasted. Equally, 
nothing in the reading of a text is ever totally irrelevant, superfluous 
or improper; iterability and non-saturable context are inscribed in the 
I 
structure of writing. The reading process takes account of only 
relatively determined meaning and chance: a text is never complete or 
fully present to itself. In dreams, overdetermination is a knot, 
superimposition or blurring of signifying chains, but the nodal point of 
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the dreanr--text offers no single unitary meaning. 1--O1 It is only a 
provisional centre, a temporary resting point for analysis and does not 
irretrievably tie down the movement of reading. It is possible to write 
of the chance of reading, the accidental detours, routes (mis)taken in 
the sense of making and taking meaning. The road of a reading is a road 
taken in chance, a calculated gamble, a risk. There is always a road not 
taken, a road spaced from the road of a reading. The royal road of 
"dreams", the highway to the unconscious, is spaced, differentiated from 
and related to other roads. It is not the only road to be read on the 
map, the road in itself: the road is not flawlessly signposted, marked 
or charted. 
Different journeys, different destinations, different departure 
times; for a text so buried, entangled in the "past" at every level of 
narrative, its "time" is singularly problematic. The text constructs 
readings that operate on different time-scales. If reading follows the 
contours of the text, it traces the chances, coincidences, apparently 
prophetic moments that are seen as psychically or historically 
determined only at a later date, a further space, in the narrative. This 
text is going somewhere, perhaps back to Pompeii. Freud keeps alive, in 
modified form, the ancient belief that dreams constitute a privileged 
means to explain what has gone before, what is happening, and what will 
happen in a dreamer's life. 
In Hanold's first dream, it is important to follow the complex 
I 
narrative sequence, to follow the chronology, to mark time. It is rather 
difficult to trace where and when the dreamer "is" in the dream. Hanold 
finds himself in Pompeii on the day of the eruption, arriving before the 
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main event. When he sees Gradiva he is convinced that he is her 
contenporary: he is back in ber time and place: 
Till then he had had no thought of her presence, but now 
it occurred to him all at once and as though it was something 
natural that, since she was a Pompeiian, she was living in 
her native town, and, without his having susopch? d it, 
living as his contexporapy, (AL 38) 
The last phrase actually inplies that Gradiva lives in Hanold's time, 
which would be the present if it were not for the fact that he has been 
transported into antiquity. He sees Gradiva become monumentalized, her 
face growing paler as though "turning into marble", before the ashes 
bury her form. Thus he witnesses her become the relief that activates 
his obsessive phantasy. Hanold outlives Gradiva, watches her death, and 
awakes into a present that nerges with the past of his drean. 
Reluctantly disclaiming the "reality of what he had dreamt" (AL p. 39), 
he retains a conviction that Gradiva had lived and perished in Ponpeii. 
When Hanold sees (or imagines he sees) Zoe/Gradiva from his window in 
41present" time, her presence is fleeting, enigmatic, offering only an 
alluring glimpse. This structure of deferred desire is played out in 
Pompeii, where Hanold goes back in time to meet Gradiva, who he knew and 
played with as a child. Since waking and sleeping are blurred, there is 
never any "real time" in this episode. Historical time-scales and 
perspectives seem to collapse together, like buildings in a ruined city. 
In this dream, Hanold is seeing a figure in relief (a marble woman) 
come to life in a fantastic tableau, situated out of time, out of her 
I 
previous context. Freud writes of the ways in which dreams treat 
chronological sequence: 
In the first place, dreams take into account in a general 
way the connection which undeniably exists between all the 
portions of the dream-thoughts by combining the whole 
material into a single situation or event, They reproduce 
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logical connection by siloullaneily in tip)e, Here they are 
acting like the painter who, in a picture of the School of 
Athens of Parnassus, represents in one group all the 
philosophers or all the poets, It is true that they were 
never in fact assembled in a single hall or on a single 
mountain-top; but they certainly form a group in the 
conceptual sense, (TIO 424-5) 
This mise-en-sc6ne of phantasy, this relief, brings together figures 
from different times and places, just as dreams can bring together the 
living and dead. This sinultaneity adheres to a conceptual logic, 
collapsing time and emphasising the fictionality of phantasy production. 
Amidst this dream-logic, it possible to conceive of phantasy as having 
no absolute origin. Dreams stage a past and future beyond the confines 
of an individual subject's history; in his case study of "Little Hans" 
Freud tacitly acknowledges that to concentrate on the role of infantile 
sexual impulses and parental prohibition in the production of phantasy 
and neuroses excludes "eventualities of life" (SE X 146). So, 
interpretations of dreans, phantasy and texts need to be read in a 
different time, a reconfigured sense of past, present and future. 
Peter Benson highlights alternative approaches to reading 
narrative. Criticism can read inside the text, considering its features 
as the narrative progresses, or it can stand outside the finished work, 
scrutinizing the text from a secure position of absolute knowledge, a 
position that acknowledges a debt to Hegel: 
Criticism is not coppelled, even confronting a decisively 
circular text, to adopt this secure and stable stance as its 
framework, But Freud explicitly locates psychoanalysis 
('science') in the place of Absolute Knowledge, outside the 
finished text, from where a 'better view' can be obtained, 
From here alone can Norbert's dreams be understood, since 
the necessary information about his life is only provided 
towards the end of the story, (21) 
178 
Neither writers nor analysts stand outside the text; they are enmeshed 
in the system of writing, which destabilizes assumptions about 
intention, meaning and communication. Equally, authors and doctors are 
not outside, but themselves subject to, the operations of the 
unconscious. Is the work of the writer ever outside textuality? Is 
psychoanalysis ever outside that which it treats? Benson notes that in 
Freud's text the coming-to-awareness of madness never becomes present, 
clear to itself, available for analysis or locatable (459). As analyst 
and character, Zoe speaks from sanity but "in" madness. Can a writer 
"stand in" for the unconscious? The classic text offers a contract 
guaranteeing eventual sanity (457), yet it is not clear who or what 
guarantees sanity in Freud's reading of Gradiva. 
If psychoanalysis adopts the approach of standing outside the text, 
Hanold's behaviour can be explained retrospectively. The story makes it 
apparent that much of Hanold's delusion derives its material from 
childhood memories. Psychic fragments can be pieced together to trace 
the aetiology of his delusion. Yet this totalising reading presupposes a 
linear narrative and that the origin of the delusional structure can be 
traced. Freud retells the story in f its and starts; he repeats Jensen's 
narrative and therefore produces a different version. Zoe "as" Gradiva 
cures the fixation "on" Gradiva, poison thus beconing cure. Her 
treatment proceeds "by taking up the same ground as the delusional 
structure and then investigating it as completely as possible" (AL 47). 
Zoe is at once "in" Hanold's phantasy (in this case as analyst and 
character) and outside it: she must reproduce and unseat Hanold' s 
delusion. She takes up a metalinguistic position, just as the analyst 
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must attempt to take up the ground of the dream-work while providing a 
logical, coherent reading of the incoherent, illogical dream-text. 
Zoe's strategy outlines the ideal analytic encounter: 
It would be a strange coincidence but, nevertheless, 
not without an example or parallel if the treatment of 
the delusion were to coincide with its investigation and 
if the explanation of its origin were to be revealed 
precisely while it was being dissected, (AL 47) 
Note the latter part of the sentence: an origin that can be 
simultaneously revealed and dissected; presence and absence, completion 
and deferral, a supplementarity at the "centre" of delusion, phantasy or 
dream: "The disorder vanishes while being traced back to its origin; 
analysis, too, brings simultaneous cure" (AL 112). Here the analyst 
resembles a hybrid of explorer, archaeologist, intepreter, doctor and 
shaman. For all these knowing subject positions, however, it is striking 
that an origin is never recovered; it is precisely in tracing the 
structure of the disorder that an "origin" vanishes. It is an 
ungrounding similar to that which takes place in language as the effect 
of difference. 
Zoe is a margin between two fields of force: text and meaning, 
author and truth. She represents the active analyst, both reader and 
author, an interpeter of events and the pivotal figure in text. Yet for 
all her activity in the narrative, Zoe is equally a passive object. As a 
representative of ideal femininity, she is gazed upon by Hanold and 
Freud; the corollary to this scopic drive is a will to mastery, and both 
male onlookers evenýually solve the mystery of Zoe/Gradiva, though in a 
sense she herself has enacted this desire to know and control. She 
becomes both explanation and prize. Zoe also figures a site of 
possibility displaced across the roles or positions of author, character 
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and reader. She is ambiguously located between an allknowing individual 
"consciousness", a subject who spectates at the scene of phantasy and a 
figure who is caught up in that phantasy. 
Zoe occupies the positions made available both to the dreamer and 
dreanr-interpreter. She shifts inside and outside the narrative, inside 
and outside Hanold's delusion. 
- 
She is a participant in, and a 
commentator on, Hanold's dreams and phantasies. Zoe/Gradiva performs a 
"peculiar oscillation between death and life" (AL 103), speaking for and 
as the dead: "I have long grown used to being dead" (AL 47). In this 
gravitation or Gradivation, she is origin of the delusion and author of 
the cure, disturbing yet guaranteeing sanity, living in and out of the 
time of the narrative. Prefigured in Hanold's unconscious, she 
anticipates, plans ahead his cure, overseeing and foreseeing the course 
of events. She disturbs the distinctions between the inside and outside 
of the narrative, past and present, life and death, a lininal figure who 
inpossibly bridges these divides. If dreans are bridges to the 
unconscious for Freud, the interpretation of dreams is an attempt to 
represent the unrepresentable, to construct a bridge between conscious 
and unconscious "territory", a bridge that leads strictly nowhere. Freud 
attempts to bring to light the shadowy activity of the unconscious, 
reading the unreadable: dreams, neuroses, hysteria, psychic disorder. 
Freud's complex identification with Zoe can be read as an idealized 
attempt to situate himself in her place among the living and the dead, 
I 
the past and present, internal and external reality. Zoe is guarantor of 
sanity, reader of Hanold's delusion, because she has crossed over these 
divides. Like the Sphinx, she occupies and speaks from a borderland or 
uncertain realm: for Hanold, Zoe "is that 'third possibility' in every 
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dimension in which his mind is confused". Is Zoe a bridge, a matter 
of the mind, a third possibility between mind and matter? Might texts 
be read as occupying this third site of possibility, a place of 
ceaseless interchange, at the margins of sense and non-sense, material 
and inmaterial, science and literature, conscious and unconscious? In 
short, is Zoe an "ideal" reader? 
Science as a mistress 
Towards the end of the essay, a different trajectory can be 
detected in Freud's reading. He appears not to endorse or go along 
totally with the "cure" of Hanold, nor does he seem particularly 
gratified (to use his own embryonic reader-response term) by the text's 
subsidence into a conventional love-story, with Hanold restored to 
masculine superiority, the epitome of psychic health. This return to 
normality might seem to be the desired outcome of psychoanalytic 
treatment, but Freud bemoans the com rcial imperatives that persuaded 
Jensen to "insert" some conventional love interest "no doubt to the 
satisfaction of his female readers" (AL 110). The happy ending detracts 
from the real significance and intrigue of the work: "The author, in 
short, had quite arbitrarily tacked a love story on to his 
archaeological phantasy" (AL 110). Does this patronising tone display 
frustration at the ending of analysis, leaving no more text/patient to 
work on, no further opportunity for psychoanalysis to display its 
hermenuetic authority? Such a conclusion to the story grants an 
insufficient degree of pleasure, unsuccessfully assuaging the reader's 
curiosity and desire for mastery. 1123-11 
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Freud's investment in his interpretation of Jensen's text is 
strongly suggested by the phrase "archaeological phantasy". if 
intellectual pleasure is curtailed, this aggressive desire must be 
displaced onto a more openly sexual arena. As will become clear, Norbert 
Hanold may not be the only male figure in this fabulation of Gradiva who 
begins to confuse science and desire. Once devoted to the pursuit of 
science, Hanold restlessly wanders the streets of Pompeii in search of 
Gradiva, engrossed in his delusion, estranged from his former object of 
passion: 
In this frame of mind he was even furious with his mistress - 
with science, When in the heat of the mid-day sun he wandered 
for the first time through Pompeii, 'the whole of his science 
had not merely abandoned him, but had left him without the 
slightest desire to find her again, (AL 89) 
The slippage from "mistress" to "science" acknowledges the erotic 
investment of Pompeii as a site of archaeological fascination and as the 
haunt of the elusive Gradiva. When his cure is complete, Hanold imposes 
erotic mastery over Zoe. The motivation and conduct of this role has 
ambiguous status for Freud, wavering between naturalness ("the 
aggressiveness which is a nan's inevitable duty in love-naking" - (AL 
63) and violence ("his brutal masculine instinct for mastery" - (AL 
111). 
The latter part of Freud' s reading may be moved by the more radical 
trajectory and itinerary of desire that he broaches at the end of the 
essay, and which derives from the interruption or annulling of Freud's 
interpretive mastery. There is a correlation in content if not in 
intensity between Freud's dismissal of the love-story conclusion, 
Hanold's hostility towards the lovers in Pompeii and Freud's expressed 
wish, imbricated with Hanold's phantasy, to be present at 
the 
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destruction of Pompeii. At the end of his essay, Freud returns to 
Hanold's first dream, locating and articulating its 
desire: 
In Norbert Hanold's first dream two wishes competed with 
each other in making the dream; one of them was actually 
admissible to consciousness, while the other belonged to 
the unconscious and operated from out of repression, The 
first was a wish, understandable in any archaeologist, to 
have been present as an eyewitness at the catastrophe in 
the year 79 A. 0, What sacrifice would an archaeologist 
think too great if this wish could be realized in any way 
other than in a dream! The other wish, the other constructor 
of the dream, was of an erotic nature: it might be crudely 
and also incompletely stated as a wish to be there when 
the girl he loved lay down to sleep, This was the wish 
the rejection of which caused the dream to become an 
anxiety-dream, The wishes that were the motive forces of 
the second dream are perhaps less conspicious; but if we 
recall its translation we shall not hesitate to describe 
them too as erotic, The wish to be taken captive by the 
girl he loved, to fall in with her wishes and to be 
subjected to her - for so we may construe the wish behind 
the situation of the lizard-catching - was in fact of a 
passive, masochistic character, Next day the dreamer hit 
the girl, as though he was dominated by the contrary 
erotic current ... But we must stop here, or we may really forget that Hanold and 6radiva are only creatures of 
their author's mind, (AL 116) 
strategies of 
This passage - abruptly foreclosed - can be seen as prophetic in Freud's 
work. Caught in the swirling, contradictory currents of desire, Freud 
begins to map territory beyond the pleasure principle, tracing the 
economy of the " death- instinct", the desire for mastery, compulsive 
repetitions and sado-masochistic drives, territory only charted in 
published form a decade later. '-: 24" The reluctant disclaimer regarding 
the reality of literary characters raises questions about the 
distinctions between science and art, theoretical fictions and creative 
fictions. The wish-fulfilling motivations and capacities of dreams are 
also put in question; the strategies of desire, indeed the nature and 
dominance of the pleasure principle are thrown open to challenge. Dream- 
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work and dream-wishes are too complex to be covered by a simple formula 
that "dreams are wishes represented as fulfilled" (AL 115). The wish, 
not the drean7subject, is the "constructor of the dream": it is 
suggested that the wish produces the subject, not vice versa. This 
desire to look on, to witness and spectate describes or stages a scene 
of phantasy, a scene that testifies to the force of the death drive. Is 
it a desire for identification? Where does this desire come from? Is 
there a wish not to watch but be watched? Is it Freud or Hanold in the 
dream? 
For Hanold, the dreanr--wish of seeing Pompeii at the moment of its 
ruin can be traced as a blending of "intellectual" and erotic desires, 
desires that can never be definitively separated. Archaeology can appear 
a cold science, with its fascination with marble women rather than flesh 
and blood, the morbid pleasure in living and feasting among the dead. 
Hanold remembers science only as an old aunt (AL 89); no longer a 
ravishing mistress, it offers only stale delights. Hanold's 
archaeological desire is reinvested, displaced, taken up by the desire 
to solve the enigma of Gradiva; by recovering this history, Hanold 
discovers the secrets of his own past, thus opening up a new life for 
himself. Freud's desire is to solve the enigma of the dream7-wish and 
dream-work, and thus discover psychoanalysis. He seeks proof of laws of 
the mind, so that evidence of these shadowy laws can fill in gaps in 
human knowledge; psychoanalysis is engaged in excavating, uncovering 
structures that always already existed, though in different historical 
form and circumstances. Thus Freud can become an object of admiration 
and envy, a figure to be desired, loved like the unnamed doctor he 
writes of earlier. Freud's identificatory desire for Zoe is a move to 
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acquire her analytic authority and insight: Zoe becomes a scientific (or 
at least therapeutic) mistress. 
Hanold feels rage and Jealousy, both to Gradiva and other "real", 
contemporary tourist couples; in its way, a desire to appropriate that 
relationship, to "be" in the place of that couple and thus obliterate 
thein. This destructive inpulse directed towards others is strangely 
complementary to an apparently contradictory drive in his archaeological 
phantasy, where he desires self -obliteration, the completion of desire 
by annihilation. Such would be the effect on a "real" onlooker of the 
final events at Pompeii. Yet both Hanold and Freud are positioned as 
onlookers, inscribed in but still "outside" this scene; the subject-in- 
phantasy is not seen, but remains a structural element that is a 
presence, if not present to itself, in the scene of phantasy. The 
desire to know, control, maintain mastery over an object of study is as 
much a component of the death drive as the sado-masochistic aggression, 
the effects of which can be traced in this dream-scene. 
The dream anticipates (it cannot actually imagine) the witnessing 
of a imajor historical event, thereby putting flesh back on the buried 
bodies, life into the devastated city, filling in the blanks of this 
filled-in moment of history in a manner that archaeology can never 
achieve. The significance of Pompeii lies in the fact that it is not 
"ruined", but preserved as a scene of phantasy: 
The first was a wish, understandable in any archaeologist, 
to have been present as an eyewitness at the catastrophe in 
the year 79 A, D,, What sacrifice would an archaeologist think 
too great if this wish could be realized in any way other 
than in a dreaml 
This wish, "located" in "Hanold's dream", represents the apotheosis of 
time-travel, the zenith of Slory, fame and recognition - the precise 
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desires, motivations attributed to creative writers by Freud. This 
desire for recognition as an archaeologist is readily displaceable onto 
psychoanalysis, indeed perhaps a means to characterize its investigative 
methods. A field of enquiry without a weight of tradition, in its early 
years psychoanalysis took on the appearance of an enfant terrible for 
conventional science and philosophy. For its followers, it offered 
exciting discoveries, new methods of uncovering the secrets of human 
life. The "archaeological phantasy" is a re-living, the impossibility of 
living that time once more, but also the possibility of living that time 
(in) another time, in a foreseen but unforeseeable future, finding a 
future in the past. 
Thus, a double movement: a desire to go back and forward, 
uncovering a desire to return to origins and to move forward to the 
completion, the fulfilment of desire. Freud, Hanold, Zoe/Gradiva, the 
reader of Jensen and the reader of Freud, all participants in three 
versions of Pompeii, one held in time, a liminal site between life and 
death (present), one at the moment of its destruction (past), and one 
that makes it possible to look forward in order to look back, to re- 
experience, to wish to become a resident of that city in its last 
catastrophic hours in 79 A. D. (future). To become a time-traveller, not 
out of tine but across time, is not to deny the historical limits of the 
subject but to test a different temporality. Where can this temporality 
be found? In dreams, in texts. Who encounters this temporality, who 
encounters all thqse separate but interwoven moments? All those 
11subjects" caught up, implicated, engaged in reading and writing. Let us 
follow in the footsteps of Freud Bertgang/Gradiva - "one who steps along 
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brilliantly" - to look at two texts that foreground "dreams" of the body 
and "dreams" of history. 
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Footnotes 
1. An archaeological motif runs throughout Freud's work. His essay on 
Jensen's Gradiva was published Just five years after his visit to 
Pompeii in 1902. Malcolm Bowie charts this archaeological interest in 
Freud, Proust 
-and 
LAcan: Theory as Fiction. For Freud, archaeology 
represents "the supreme conbination of art and science", exerting "a 
special fascination" upon him throughout his career (p. 18). As Bowie 
points out, Freud's career develops during a "golden age" of 
archaeology, with Schliemann unearthing Troy, Evans excavating Knossos 
and Carnarvon and Carter discovering the tomb of Tutenkhamen. Both 
psychoanalysis and archaeology are concerned "with burial and 
excavation, with the making-present of a previously-lost past" (p. 19). 
Both disciplines are engaged in the study of "anterior states", and the 
search for prehistoric origins resembles the search for original psychic 
material: "for Freud that wbicb came before, whether in the life of a 
civilization or in the life of the mind, has a peculiar and unparalleled 
capacity to organise our perception of that wbicb Id' (p. 18). Bowie also 
traces the competitive edge between psychoanalysis and archaeology. 
Freud endeavours to beat archaeology at its own game, allowing "the 
mental scientist access to an archaic order that the archaeologist as 
archaeologist cannot know" (P. 21). That archaic order is the "fixed 
psychical structure" which psychoanalysis discovers in its daily 
practice (p. 23). This contest of priority and authority may be seen as 
analogous to Freud's struggle with creative writers that is traced in 
this chapter. 
In Lan"age and the Origins of Psychoanalysis, John Forrester also 
traces the connections between psychoanalysis and archaeology. 
Archaeology requires "a theory of the productions of signs, a theory of 
representation"; if it is to prove a useful model through which to read 
the psyche, then psychoanalysis must read signs that "are first and 
foremost signs of absence and death": "If psychoanalysis is an 
archaeology of the living, it is no less true that its central 
preoccupation is absence and its signs, now complicated by the dimension 
of time, so that not only do signs witness absence, but also witness the 
change of such absence over time" (p. 2). Freud's essay can be read 
persuasively as an archaeology of the living, an endeavour that 
necessarily must confront absence, death and "the dimension of time". In 
his excavation, not everything is brought to light. 
2. Sarah Kofman discusses the ways in which Freud's "sumniary" of Gradiva 
breaks the "rules" of Freudian interpretive methods, since it separates 
form and content and reads the text in an exclusive and selective 
manner: -ii, in oraer To maise a ttuujY u. L e. LA= 
L4ý. ý------- 
at it in its totality, then the summary seems like a useless supplement 
tacked onto a text that is already full of meaning. Useless and even 
dangerous, since while giving the impression of faithfully reproducing 
the text's content and merely removing the pleasure incentive, it would 
in fact be suppreseing part of its sense". In 'Summarize, Interpret 
(Gradiva)', trans. Sarah Wykes, in Freud and Rlctl. =, [Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 19911, pp. 87-8). Kofman argues that the effect of Freud's process 
of selection "is to make what is not (or does not seem to be) mysterious 
into a mystery, or to erase what is truly puzzling" (p. 96). 
3. Borch-Jacobsen, pp. 57-65. (Further references given in main text. ) 
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4. 'Divisions of deliria in GrAdival, in Textual Practice, Vol 4, No. 3, 
(Winter 1990), p. 455. 
5. ibid. , p. 460. 
6. ibid., p. 451. 
7. Freud might be said to follow in the footsteps of Marlowe's Faustus: 
"ubl desinlt pb1losopbus, ibi Incipit medicus. 11 ("Where the philosopher 
leaves off, the physician begins"), in The Tragical History of Dr. 
Faustus, ed John J. Jump (London: Methuen, 1965), 1.1.13. 
8. Kofman, p. 97. 
9. 'On Narcissism' illustrates Freud's characteristic oscillation 
between empiricism and speculative theory. Freud addresses the problem 
of differentiating the ego-instincts, ego-libido and object-libido. He 
expresses distaste at "abandoning observation for barren theoretical 
controversy", but cannot "shirk an attempt at clarification": "It is 
true that notions such as that of an ego-libido, an energy of the ego- 
instincts, and so on, are neither particularly easy to grasp, nor 
sufficiently rich in content; a speculative theory of the relations in 
question would begin by seeking to obtain a sharply defined concept as 
its basis. But I am of the opinion that that is Just the difference 
between a speculative theory and a science erected on empirical 
interpretation. The latter will not envy speculation its privilege of 
having a smooth, logically unassailable foundation, but will gladly 
content itself with nebulous, scarcely imaginable basic concepts, which 
it hopes to apprehend more clearly in the course of its development, or 
which it is even prepared to replace by others. For these ideas are not 
the foundation of science, upon which everything rests: that foundation 
is observation alone. They are not the bottom but the top of the whole 
structure, and they can be replaced and discarded without damaging it. 
The same thing is happening in our day in the science of physics, the 
basic notions of which as regards matter, centres of force, attraction, 
etc., are scarcely less debatable than the corresponding notions in 
psychoanalysis" (ON 69-70). Nowhere in this passage does Freud ascribe 
conclusive status to psychoanalysis as a field of enquiry. Is 
psychoanalytic investigation based on the solid foundation of 
"observation", or does it possess a "logically unassailable" foundation 
that lights up the nebulous uncertainties of empiricism? (The question 
of "speculation" has already been discussed in Chapter Two. ) Freud also 
makes the strategic comparison of psychoanalysis with the respectable, 
established science of physics. 
10. Anne-Marie Smith, 'Gradiva and Freud: Breaking the mould of 
femininity' in Paragrapb, 15, No. 2, (July 1992), p-198 
11. ibid. , p. 198. 
12. See Benson, p. 458. Benson argues that Zoe's characterization in 
terms of "feminine charm! ' enables her to be without an unconscious: "As 
a woman, she can live without repression through her adeptness at 
doubleness, an ability to speak (like the Sphinx, or the Pythian oracle) 
a more-than-one of meaning". Smith reads Zoe's ambiguous discourse in 
terms of "masqueradefl and "the ironic function of femininity" (p. 203). 
13. Forrester, p-209. 
14. Freud. Proust and Lacan, p. 23. 
15. 'Dream, Inagination, Existence', p. 35. 
16. 'Freud and the Scene of Writing', in Writing and Difference, p. 211. 
17. ibid., p. 211. 
18. 'Speculations - On Freud', p. 78. 
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19. This would lead to a reconfiguration of poetic licence; see the 
discussion of this issue in Chapter Three. 
20. Bowie discusses the theoretical model that archaeology provides for 
psychoanalysis in terms of historical road-systens: "The straight causal 
road opened up by archaeology provdes not so much a logical foundation 
for Freudian historical and hermeneutic procedure as an escape from that 
procedure at its moments of crisis or overspill. For Freud, in his 
discussions of case-material, is a multilinear historian of the 
psychical life, and in his dream-interpretations the manipulator of 
ramifying and imbricated causal- schemes. Archaeology was more than a 
mere escape from all this analytic intrication: it was the dream of an 
alternative logic to the threatening and insidious logic of dreams" 
(Freud. Eroust and LacgUl, p. 26). . - 21. Benson, pp. 452-3. (Further references given in main text. ) 
22. ibid., p. 458. 
23. Freud's equivocal reaction can also be read as symptomatic of an 
anxiety provoked by Jensen's metaphorical sexual success in "satisfying" 
the demands and expectations of his female readership. 
24. The imbrication of the desire for mastery, death - "this most 
unwished for of all thoughts" - and archaeology surfaces in Freud's own 
dream-material: ".. I had already been in a grave once, but it was an 
excavated Etruscan grave near Orvieto, a narrow chamber with two stone 
benches along its walls, on which the skeletons of two grown-up men were 
lying. The inside of the wooden house in the dream looked exactly like 
it, except that the stone was replaced by wood. The drean seems to have 
been saying: 'If you must rest in a grave, let it be the Etruscan one. ' 
And, by making this replacement, it transformed the gloomiest of 
expectations into one that was highly desirable" (TID 588). The remains 
of this dream, an example of the transmutation of a "death-drive" into 
archaeological satisfaction, recur in Freud's Future of an Musion. 
(1927): "The sleeper may be seized with a presentiment of death, which 
threatens to place him in the grave. But the dream-work knows how to 
select a condition that will turn even that dreaded event into a wish- 
fulfilment: the dreamer sees himself in an ancient Etruscan grave which 
he has climbed down into, happy to find his archaeological interests 
satisfied" (PFL 12 196-7). 
25. Smith, pp. 200-1. Smith reads the dream as a phantasy of detachment 
that attempts to keep in place, to keep at a distance, sexual 
difference: "For Hanold, a form in which desire is acceptable means 
women cast in marble, bronze or plaster. This involves the repression of 
infantile sexuality and a corresponding fear of sexual 
difference... Zoe's irrecuperable distance is a projection but it is 
furthermore her ironic representation of his detachment. It is a 
function of femininity whereby she captures and flaunts the detachment 
of the male gaze with indifference". This can be read as an 
identification with an omniscient figure, if Gradiva as a marble relief 
is transformed into a bodied, analytic subject-presumed-to-know. But 
Hanold's (Freud's? ), identificatory desire is directed at Zoe/Gradiva's 
impassivity and immunity from historical change. Thus, this 
identification is with a dead, irrecoverable other, an other without 
difference that closes off the circulation of desire. This may explain 
why, according to Smith, Hanold is desubjectivised in his dream. Borch- 
Jacobsen would contend that the dream-subject is always other to itself, 
and that subjectivity in dreams is constituted through alterity. 
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ELIOT, THE UNCAM AND CULTURAL PHANTOXS 
Thus far a certain form of intra-and inter-textual "dreaming" has 
been elucidated, although questions of history and the body have been 
considered. The final two chapters will be concerned more thoroughly 
with reading a cultural or ideological "unconscious", through a range of 
nineteenth and twentieth century poetic texts. This chapter will examine 
T. S. Eliot's 'Gerontion' and The Waste Land alongside Freud's definition 
of the uncanny and a further exploration of Abraham and Torok's notion 
of the metapyschological "phantom". In doing so, a possible means of 
reading a private and public "unconscious" will be advanced. 
The Unconscious and the Individual Talent 
Even as magisterial critic, renovator of poetic diction, promoter 
of artistic impersonality and social commentator, T. S. Eliot continually 
broaches the question of unconscious process in his writing. A brief 
overview illustrates that there is sufficient warrant in Eliot's 
critical and creative writing to consider the question of unconscious 
"influences". Nost critics tend to stress Eliot's conscious command over 
his work, yet he writes that poetry "is a concentration which does not 
happen consciously or of deliberation". ' 11 Eliot appears to acknowledge 
a determining factor - the influence of the unconscious - outside the 
poet's conscious control. C. K. Stead indicates that Eliot was grappling 
with this question in the period leading up to The Waste Land: 
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Three essays written in 1919 - 'Tradition and the Individual 
Talent', 'Hamlet' and 'Ben Jonson, - indicate that Eliot in 
that year was wrestling with the problem of conscious 
direction and unconscious process in the writing of poetry. 12, 
Eliot's theory of artistic inpersonality suggests that the poet is a 
passive vehicle through which some outside agency, some "other", will 
communicate: technical considerations will be "enough to keep the poet's 
conscious inind fully occupied, as the painter's by the nanipulation of 
-t his tools". ': ý: ' For Eliot the cultural renovator that "other" is the 
ideal Tradition: for Eliot the practising artist, it is the "first", 
psychic voice of poetry, unbidden, ultinately unknowable. In an act of 
"continual surrender", the poet somehow taps into this unquantifiable 
resource. 
In Tradition and the Individual Talent, Eliot compares the poetic 
mind to a catalyst in a chemical reaction: the poet's mind is the shred 
of platinum, which remains "inert, neutral, and unchanged" during the 
process. This complex reaction brings about the correct combination of 
elements : 
The poet's mind is in fact a receptacle for seizing and 
storing up numberless feelings, phrases, images, which 
remain there until all the particles which can unite to 
form a new compound are present together, "' 
Eliot distinguishes between emotions and feelings, the elements that 
"enter the presence of the transforming catalyst": emotions pertain to 
the person "who suffers" while feelings inhere "in particular words or 
phrases or images" '(18). Emotions are deliberate, intentional, whereas 
feelings are associative: unconscious may "respond to unconscious" and 
"swarims of inarticulate feelings are aroused" (148). Antony Easthope 
suggests that "emotions" refer$' to the conscious or pre-conscious and 
"feelings" signif: lethe unconscious. I--" Eliot's analogy of the catalyst 
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curiously echoes the scientific or technological terms adopted by 
psychoanalysis in metapsychological theory. Eliot asks the same 
questions as Freud grapples with in his speculation on the 'Mystic 
Writing Pad': what makes the mind work; how can it be represented; does 
the psyche resemble a machine? This nachinic, trope may be seen to relate 
to the anxieties about technology and the "mechanical" status of urban 
life in The Waste Land. Before examining the "secrets" of this central 
modernist text, we must turn to I Gerontion' (ECP 39-41), a poem which 
appears to stage the workings of a mind, with a "swarm" of inarticulate 
thoughts flitting through the "windy spaces" between conscious and 
unconscious. In doing so, 'Gerontion' anticipates many formal and 
thematic strands of The Waste Land. 
'Gerontion' 
The house where the protagonist in 'Gerontion' muses has been 
consistently read as a figure for the mind, an image of the skull or 
head. This trope is linked to the connotations of ownership, authority 
and possession associated with property. The house is rented, 
dilapidated, riddled with draughty gaps and spaces. If the house is 
associated with the head, then this structural instability proposes an 
analogy with an ego whose integrity and authority is under erasure. The 
text's setting in 
Ia house that is both "literal" and metaphorical 
disorders clear distinctions between an inner and outer world, and this 
uncertainty is compounded by the status of the protagonist. F. R. Leavis 
states that the poem lacks narrative or logical continuity, and evokes 
the "iimediate consciousness" of an isolated old nan. Conversely, 
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Maud Ellmann argues the poem is a house of text where the speaker is 
immured in the prison-house of language: "The house in which the speaker 
stiffens is built out of the words he frames around his own vacuity". 17ý1 
Thoughts are "tenants" of the draughty house, and the outside world 
dissolves into reverie. For all the speaker's repetitious reflections, 
the prevailing sense is that of doubt and paradox. 
With a decentred "self" installed in the house, coupled with 
radical epistemological uncertainty, there is a curious echo of Beyond 
the Pleasure Pr i nc i ple-: "Vacant shuttles/ Weave the wind". The 
"shuttles" can be taken as another term for bobbins or reels. The 
tenancy of the house is concerned with genealogy, a matter of 
inheritance: the old man is read to "by a boy". This oddly recalls Freud 
observing little Ernst's game of fort1da: the poem rehearses a similar 
trajectory of repetitious and speculative reeling. The text speculates 
on an unknowable history and an uncertain future, despite the references 
to "Christ the tiger" coming in spring. With an insecure tenancy and a 
"dry brain", the protagonist has only modest investment in that future. 
(When the stakes about the future of culture are raised in The Waste 
Land, the dramatic breakdown takes place alongside the hope of 
renovation, in the guise of "a peace that passeth all understanding" -) 
The "beyond" of history, knowledge and the self returns in the closing 
lines to disrupt "a thousand snall deliberations". It is "Beyond the 
circuit" of the hes , itant, repetitive meditations on sex and knowledge, 
beyond the safety of the house. There is no closure, no textual "sleepy 
corner": the repeated emphasis on spacing attests to the violent gusts 
of difference sweeping through the text. 
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C. K. Stead suggests that the house is a brothel, where the speaker 
phallically stiffens "in a rented house". "81 This reading paves the way 
for an almost classic Freudian interpretation. There is phallic 
symbolism ("cutlass", "knob" and "Horn"), images of the female genitals 
("hot gates", "passages", "corridors" and the "Gulf"), oral imagery ("Us 
he devours", "pungent sauces", "To be eaten, to be divided, to be drunk/ 
Among whispers") and anal ("the salt marsh", "Rocks, moss, stonecrop, 
iron, merds"). The poem ends with "the circuit of the shuddering Bear/ 
In fractured atoms", which Hugh Kenner proposes as orgasm""-", but the 
image of dissolution might equally allude to the shattering 
reintrojection of sexual aggression. Sexual fulfilment is deferred or 
thwarted: "We have not yet reached conclusion". Just as the poem is 
saturated with allusions to sexual desire, so it is littered with images 
of sterility. Idealized love turns into fear and threat, instituting a 
sense of transcendent horror and absence: "I that was near your heart 
was removed therefrom/ To lose beauty in terror, terror in inquisition". 
This recollection produces a type of reversed synaesthesia - "I have 
lost my sight, smell, hearing, taste and touch" - but the protagonist's 
fate is to maintain "contact" with this "adulterated" passion. Memory is 
insistent, ineradicable. Desire is unappeasable - "the giving fainishes 
the craving" - but always posthumous. If "stiffen" recalls the 
Elizabethan pun "to die", which links sex and death, then the text plays 
out a living death. In this phantasy of sexual alienation and anxiety, 
sex leads inevitably to physical destruction, madness and death -a 
nightmarish schematism more fully elaborated in The Waste Land. 
Another "Freudian" reading of the house may provide a more 
persuasive connection with the trope of history and knowledge in the 
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poein. In 'The Uncanny', Freud conments that in dreams and phantasies the 
house can represent the womb, the "former Heim [hoinel of all human 
beings.. the place where each one of us lived once upon a time and in the 
beginning" (AL 368). Freud notes that this first home is an uncanny 
place, long forgotten but once familiar, evoking a much-repressed 
nostalgia. The womb's unbeimlicb character thus associates with the 
haunted house, another uncanny home traced in Freud's long etymological 
preamble. The "sleepy corner" of 'Gero-ntion' is a site of airy spirits 
and draughts, the old man a "Dull head among windy spaces". He declares 
that "I have no ghosts" but there are distracting noises off: the 
coughing goat, the sneezing woman and the ceaseless wind. Memories of 
mysterious but named figures drift through the ramshackle structure of 
the text, walking the house like ghosts, restless and insistent 
absences. Occupied by tenants, the house is not possessed in a legal 
sense but is possessed in the sense of supernatural inhabitation. If the 
head and the house are equated symbolically, then the I/ego/mind that 
provisionally centres the text can no longer be said to be master in its 
own house: 
Rather than the master of its mansion, the ego turns into 
the tenant of a rented house, Selfhood can no longer hold 
itself intact, any more than Gerontion can seal his house 
against the wind, for writing threatens the interiority on 
which the very fiction of the self depends, (10) 
The "wilderness of mirrors" suggests fractured identity, a self that 
sees itself only as multiplied "variety". The "tenants" of the 
penultimate line may refer to the old man and the boy, but equally to 
split subjectivity and multiple selves, As the nominal householder and 
self, the old man is articulated in his own displacement, an 
articulation emphasised by the deployment of recurrent negatives 
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throughout the text, This displacement modulates into dispersal when, 
with centrifugal force, the wind scatters the whirling "I" of the stormy 
conclusion. 
'Gerontion' offers and refuses any classic psychoanalytic reading; 
the unhelmlich character of its homely scenario ensures that it cannot 
be reduced to fixed symbolic equivalences. It is precisely the effect of 
the uncanny that it produces ambiguity and ambivalence: it both invites 
and resists symbolic decoding. The uncanny frames 'Gerontion' : the poem 
disturbs the boundaries between inside and outside, reality and fantasy. 
Gabriel Pearson concludes that the poem is "unreadable", reducible only 
to its grammatical components. 11" Maud Ellmann contends that 
traditional readings, which note the poem' s echoes and associations, 
replenish its broken images with memory and sense, actually reversing 
the text's insistence on gaps and emptiness, covering over its "eternal 
silence and infinite spaces". 11121 The echoes of 'Gerontion' have 
attracted and frustrated many critics. F. O. Matthiessen, for example, 
unequivocally states that the poem depicts "the horror of a life without 
f aith, its disillusioned weariness of knowledge, its agonized slow 
drying up of the springs of enotion". Yet he then remarks that the 
images in the text become "unconsciously general", without specifying 
what is meant by the general unconscious " 13: '; this latter comment runs 
counter to MatthiesEýen's previous magisterial pronouncement, since these 
"unconscious" images mitigate against secure or wholly objective 
interpretation. Such critical confusion reiterates the poem's 
oscillation between coherence and indeterninacy, holding out and 
forestalling the promise of revelation: 
Signs are taken for wonders, 'We would see a sign! ' 
The word within a word, unable to speak a word, 
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Swaddled with darkness, 
The echo from the nativity sermon delivered by Lancelot Andrewes 
underscores a yearning to convert words into the Word. "Swaddled" 
suggests a womb-like prelinguistic realm of wholeness. "Swaddled with 
darkness", meaning is enclosed, veiled, hidden: yet this very 
concealment ascribes an almost magical power to words. (This perhaps 
recalls the "magic word" that cryptanalysis seeks to uncover. ) Instead 
of a plenitude of meaning, however, the text offers digression, deferral 
and images of aridity and vacancy. In the poen, signs tend to fragment 
and disperse, confirming the enigmatic, deceitful potential of language 
to offer and withhold the hope of understanding. Each "word" is 
metonymically displaced by another "word", the repetition emphasising 
absence rather than completion. This displacement, frustrating the 
"swaddled" child of language, can be read in Lacanian terms: "Language 
inposes a chain of words along which the ego must nove while the 
unconscious remains in search of the object it has lost". 14 -' In this 
case, the lost "object" would be Logos yet, as Gabriel Pearson comments, 
"'Gerontion' implicitly demands Logos, while Logos does not inhere in 
the ordering of the poed'. 11-1: 1 The text's disorientating darkness is a 
challenge not only to the restlessly speculating protagonist but also to 
its readers. 
The passage on history is structured around a pattern of desire and 
denial. The text "would see" a sign in history, but history is perceived 
as a dark, bewildering maze: 
After such knowledge, what forgiveness? Think now 
History has many cunning passages, contrived corridors 
And issues, deceives with whispering ambitions, 
Guides us by vanities, Think now 
She gives when our attention is distracted 
And what she gives, gives with such supple confusions 
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That the giving famishes the craving, Gives too late 
What's not believed in, or if still believed, 
In memory only, reconsidered passion, 
History is portrayed as stereotypically feminine, contradictory and 
deceitful. Tony Finkney notes that the con- and cun- roots are 
etymologically affiliated within the range of meanings "to find, to 
imagine, to know". Sexuality (particularly the female) and epistemology 
are brought into "disquieting proximity". ': "----' This would relate again to 
the word being "Swaddled with darkness", which imbricates the sexual, 
epistemological and maternal. The "cunning passages" and "contrived 
corridors" of history recall the "dark caverns" of the female body in 
'Hysteria' (ECP 34). Femininity represents the unknowable, the "supple 
confusions" of history associated with the mysterious recesses of the 
female body. History, like sexual difference, is a labyrinth of blind 
alleys and secret spaces, a cryptic code to be deciphered. The 
repetitive enphasis on "giving" only accentuates absence: lack, and the 
endless circulation of desire structure the protagonist's speculations. 
Past and present resembles "a wilderness of mirrors". Hugh Kenner 
stresses that the poem is an image of Europe in 1919" " 7.1, but Stan Smith 
links this "wilderness" more specifically with the Hall of Nirrors at 
the Versailles peace treaty.,: "81 David Trotter argues that the empty 
public ceremony of the failed Paris Peace Conference exemplifies a sense 
of hollow history. This femininized history, with its duplicitous, 
echoing avenues and serpentine intricacies, excites and undermines 
ambition. Its "cunning passages" entangle and dissipate passion: it 
entombs and buries desire alive. History thus resembles a maze of 
catacombs, anticipating "rats' alley/ Vhere the dead men lost their 
bones" in The Waste Land. 
200 
/ 
The repeated injunction to "think now" is a vain response to the- 
supple confusions of memory and desire. It also implies a blank mind, 
the old man's dry brain or dull head. Cairns Craig argues that the poem 
displays the broken bridge of memory, and that culture indeed permits no 
memory. 12'-" Ellmann contends that the poem "erases history, if history 
is understood as the progressive revelation of the truth, rather than 
the traces of an alterity". I ý-: l :' The poem's repetitions are as much a 
means of forgetting as remembering, and Ellmann remarks that the poem is 
less to do with history than amnesia. History becomes an act of 
forgetting; this accords with Eliot's view that writing brings 
f orgetf ulness. Yet the ref erences to the squatting Jew indicate that 
some cultural memory returns, activating a seam of anti-senitism and 
racial tension that runs through Eliot's early poetry and nuch early 
twentieth century thought and aesthetic production. The Jewish owner 
squats on the window-sill, in a posture of physical grotesqueness which 
also implies that he produces the "merds". As landlord he presides over 
a slum dwelling, but as a squatter his ownership is rendered 
illegitimate, like his dubious lineage "Spawned in some estaminet of 
Antwerp". He is made to exemplify the squalor he foists on his tenants. 
The "jew" remains uncapitalized, Pearson arguing that "[als a linguistic 
act, it reads like paranoid retaliation, a cutting down to size by 
castration". ':: 23ý Ellmann proposes that the "fascistic" image of the Jew 
"reduces history to vagrancy, contagion, and miscegenation rather than 
I 
the revelation of the spirit". 12,4: ' The Jewish owner is representative of 
a wilful, disordered, sexually and spiritually corrupted history. For 
all the text's amnesia, the tremor of racial and political tension 
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(which resurfaces in The Waste Land) is an historical trace that the 
text cannot erase, an insistent memory it cannot evade. 
History is represented as a knowledge tantalisingly absent, a 
cryptic communication to be decoded, yet it is also vaguely terrifying. 
The house is an empty shell full of echoes and recesses, just as history 
is redolent with secret messages and corridors. Ghosts and whispers 
reverberate in the text's hollow centre, disturbing the protagonist's 
sleepy corner, which becomes a prison or tomb. In ' To Sleep' Keats 
invokes sleep to "Turn the key deftly in the oil6d wards, / And seal the 
hushE)d casket of my soul". " 2"" The " hush6d casket" suggests a cof fin or 
tomb, and the trope of sealing or locking up the "soul" evokes the 
notion of the crypt. Encrypting is a matter of entombing something -a 
memory, secret or "body" - that remains both dead and alive and is never 
fully laid to rest. Ghosts and whispers flit through the house's windy 
spaces. In 'Gerontion' the seals to restful sleep are already and 
irretrievably broken, reminiscent of the "seals broken. ./ In our empty 
rooms" in The Waste Land. The text simultaneously seeks the key to 
understanding and keeps the secrets of the house, exhibiting a 
conflicting impulse to set loose its ghosts and keep them buried. 
'Gerontion' acts as a visitation (in the sense of inspection and 
haunting) of the crypt of the mind. 
The repetitions and claims to transcendent knowledge that make up 
the brickwork of this rented house can be read as figuring psychic 
I 
fragmentation, explicable through categories like neurosis and 
megalomania. Yet, as has already been seen, it is problematic to apply a 
pathology to the bodies - author, character and reader - implicated 
in 
the traditional structure of reading. The range of cultural reference in 
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'Gerontion' suggests a much wider condition, one that is never fully 
subjective or intersubjective. The text is hollowed out, inscribing a 
vault or chamber of secret memories in various kinds of body: the 
textual body, the private body and the cultural body. The Waste Land is 
marked in similar fashion, and plays out a similar network of concerns 
surrounding sexuality, knowledge and social relations. It too is haunted 
by ghosts and bodies that will not rest. The first task in engaging with 
the poem is to consider the nature of the "mind" or "voice" represented 
in the text; then the text will be read through various categories of 
the uncanny and also with reference to Abraham and Torok's concepts of 
the phantom and the crypt. 
The First Voice of Poetry 
As Antony Easthope comments, The Waste Land typifies the modernist 
poetic text in its experimental formal composition: ". Ahe text releases 
words, writing, from its prison in any determinate context, surrounds it 
with space on the page and leaves it to attract a swarm of suggestions, 
overtones, connotations, resonances". "21-) Enacting transformations and 
shif ts in perspective through repetition, distortion, syntactical 
disruption and "local intensities" C :27 :), the poem operates in a mode 
suggestive of dream-work. As Lacan states, "Discontinuity... is the 
essential form in -which the unconscious first appears to us as a 
phenomenon" (FFC 25). Comparing the form of the poem to a dream is not a 
new critical enterprise; reading The Waste Land also throws into sharp 
perspective changing critical assumptions about reading culture, 
literature and the unconscious. Graham Hough claims that the text 
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illustrates "the disordered concreteness of dream'11: 2`11, and David Craig 
notes that the method of "running-on" from one social scene to another 
is like a dream-scape. Although couched in a tentative manner, Craig 
makes a telling comment: even critical responses to the poem move in 
shifts that are "not quite conscious". Stephen Medcalf also 
concentrates on the text's effect on critical reading: "The painful 
abrupt fragments of The Waste Land, like some kinds of memory and 
remorse at the end of sleep, make it their business to wake us and to 
keep us awake". "'-" 
Other critics concentrate less on the "unconscious" work of the 
poem than on its meaning. For Lionel Trilling the poem reads like a 
psychoanalytic dream interpretation, which perhaps accounts for the 
"lively" interest taken by literary criticism in the text's latent and 
ambiguous -meaning. 'ý: 31 :' To follow the implications of Trilling's 
argument, the writer is the analysand and the critic the analyst, 
treating (the therapeutic pun is intentional) the poetic text like a 
dream-text; the substance of the poem becomes an analogue f or the 
analysand's free association in the consulting room. To extend the 
analogy, the poem is a secondary elaboration, a waking report of an 
anterior "dream". Trilling takes account of the text's ambiguous content 
but overlooks the role of critic and reader in interpreting such an 
elusive text. David Craig's notion of critical responses and shifts that 
are "not quite conscious" is more persuasive in that it acknowledges the 
influence of the unconscious on both the reader and the writer. 
Cairns Craig argues that critical reading strives to close the gaps 
in a modernist text by supplying it with a coherence it appears to lack: 
Faced by the open poem we seek an ingress to the author's 
psyche, or his reading, or his personal life, or his 
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unconscious, in order to know that we are providing the 
poem with its appropriate links, "" 
This approach presupposes an "intention" behind the text, a clear 
expression of the the author's thought or personality that can be 
revealed if only readers and critics can make the "correct" response and 
interpret the clues "properly". This assumes that the writer is in 
conscious control of a text and that a successful reading depends upon 
maki ng the "appropriate" associations. Craig also attributes an 
unconscious only to the author. The Waste Land is charged with desire, 
but the figuration of desire in the text relates to readers and critics 
as well. As Freud suggests, the associative method of interpretation 
"fills in" the gaps in a recounted dream, makes its Juxtapositions 
intelligible: 
My patients were pledged to communicate to me every idea or 
thought that occurred to them in connection with some 
particular subject; amongst other things they told me that 
a dream can be inserted into the psychical chain that has 
to be traced backwards in the memory from a pathological 
idea, (TID 174) 
This description suggests the interpretative process of association and 
connotation demanded by the textual composition of The Wa,,: jte Land. Yet 
Freud does not claim that free association is an infallible 
interpretative method: dream-analysis arrives only at a partial 
interpretation of a dream. The dream-text cannot be reduced to a single 
phantasy or an essential meaning: other, irrecoverable, meanings are 
possible. The poem carries within it hints and lures to its meanings - 
the means of its interpretation - yet, Sphinx-like, frustrates and 
resists the act of understanding. The Waste Land, then, resembles a 
dream if, as Lacan argues, dreams are made for the recognition, if not 
the comprehension, of desire (E 260). Yet this returns to a recurrent 
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question: whose dream would the poem represent, and how could the text 
be analysed as such? In the wake of 'Gerontion' , it becomes clear that 
the textual unconscious is not definitively "personal" or "collective": 
these categories are interwoven, -- inseparable. 
Much critical debate on The Waste Land has surrounded the issue of 
the text' s narrative viewpoint; does the poem manifest a collective 
cultural consciousness, or a single dramatized consciousness? Antony 
Easthope offers several reasons for identifying a single (albeit 
qualified) speaker, or a consistent psychological disposition in the 
poem. The f irst person singular appears over thirty times in the text 
and the dialogue of each character is enclosed in inverted commas, 
rendering it grammatically distinct from the central speaker. These 
snatches of dialogue may be overheard, recollected or imagined; they may 
be attributable to "outside" speakers or inner voices, a characteristic 
effect of Eliot's poetry, typified by the figure of Prufrock. Such 
voices may represent a variety of guises and personae assumed by a 
central f igure who displays a consistent attitude towards events. Terry 
Eagleton argues that underneath the disrupted, discrete surface, the 
poem has a coherent structure: "The diverse, divided materials of 
Eliot's poem are tamed to a coherent narrative, the shattered human 
subjects of the work unified to a single ego".:: -: `I' 
For F. 0. Natthiessen, the poem projects an all-pervasive 
consciousness, a "whole complex state of mind". ":: -" C. K. Stead argues 
that this consistency of feeling lends the poem an organizing principle: 
The Waste Land is composed of a series of projections 
of states of feeling, having no fixed centre but their 
common origin in the depths of one man's mind, "" 
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Whose mind does Stead adduce here, and is it necessarily a nan's? This 
statement closely links protagonist and poet as locus of an organizing 
principle for the poem. Given the background to the writing of The Waste 
Land, it is tempting to regard the poem psychobiographically as the 
evocation of private trauma. Around the time of writing The Waste Land, 
both Eliot and his wife Vivien were suffering from various emotional and 
somatic disorders, and made therapeutic retreats to Margate and 
Lausanne, retreats which prompted the poem's completion. In The Use-Qf 
Poetry and The Use of Criticism, Eliot argues that some artistic 
creation can be a direct consequence of illness: 
I know, for instance, that some forms of ill-healtho 
debility or anaemia, may (if other circumstances are 
favourable) produce an efflux of poetry in a way 
approaching the condition of automatic writing, 
(36) 
Although hardly attributable to a "friendly demon", this efflux proves a 
powerful source of material or even Romantic "inspiration". Poetry can 
issue forth spontaneously, determined at least in part by drives or 
influences beyond the poet's conscious control, thereby relieving 
psychic tension and anxiety. Eliot claimed that writing ' What the 
Thunder Said' , textually the most complex section of the poem, proved 
therapeutic. 
In total contrast, Barbara Everett asserts that the poein possesses 
neither meaning, protagonist nor nythic wholeness: 
The only rhetorical rule is the extreme discreteness of its 
mixed and broken formalism: hardly a word in the whole that 
does not rest within a local convention, but hardly a 
convention that is not violated and confused, All the 
attempts to rectify the poem by imposing upon it unifying 
categories that improve this situation merely distort its 
essential medium, The Waste land has neither 'story' nor 
'narrator' nor 'protagonist' nor 'myth' nor 'themes' nor 
'music' nor 'locale': these are exact and technical terms 
deriving from conventions which the poem includes only to 
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fragment and deny, "" 
Everett sees the poem as an endless, anarchic play of textuality, 
utterly open, disrupting and denying any subject position for the 
reader. This decentring process has repercussions at the level of the 
unconscious, ensuring that the ego is not master in its own house. Her 
reading is open to challenge: the claim that the text has no meaning or 
coherence imposes a totalising view, a view that must in fact remain 
partial and provisional. Nonetheless, Everett makes a forceful case 
against the notion of a protagonist. 
Similarly, Graham Hough asserts that The Waste Land preserves no 
psychological continuity inherent in a single represented consciousness, 
foregoing any unifying principle: 
Who was Tiresias? A man who had also been a woman, who lived 
for ever and could foretell the future, That is to say, not 
a single human consciousness, but a mythological catch-all, 
and as a unifying factor of no effect whatever, (36) 
Cairns Craig, too, suggests that the poem's images are freed from 
_I . location "in any particular psyche". 1ý*ýI' While some critics confront 
this apparent decentredness by attesting that The Waste Land is full of 
separate characters and voices, others attribute the central voice to 
Tiresias, encouraged or misled by Eliot's own note: 
Tiresias, although a mere spectator and not indeed a 
'character', is yet the most important personage in the 
poem, uniting all the rest,,, what Tiresias sees, in fact, 
is the substance of the poem, (ECP 82) 
Leavis declares the poen "an effort to focus an inclusive human 
consciousness" of which Tiresias is an "appropriate impersonation". "'" 
The text's divergent voices are merged; Tiresias is not an isolated 
individual but emblematic of cultural consciousness, a unifying factor 
for the discrete material of the poem. Thus Tiresias can be seen as a 
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representative figure that speaks "culturally" and "individually", 
located as omniscient observer and commentator. 
So, Eliot's critics suggest, variously, that The Waste Land either 
dramatizes a single speaker, with an internalized vision projected onto 
the world; that only an utterly dispersed, discrete series of 
perspectives is offered; or that a more general state of mind occupies 
the text's available space and monopolizes its narrative perspective. 
This point of view appears all-encompassing, its pervasive narrative 
"eye" testifying to a scopophilic drive to master the world. Yet a 
reading cannot concentrate on tracing who or what sees at the expense of 
. bow the text sees. The manner of the text's seeing and knowing is as 
important as what it sees and comprehends. Two readings, fifty years 
apart, inply that the poem rehearses a "nightmare" or phantasy that is 
both private and public. Operating fron a Jungian perspective, Maud 
Bodkin writes that via myth and legend The Waste Land depicts a cultural 
and private "phantasmagoria - the shifting play of figures, as in dream, 
delirium, or the half-discerned undercurrents of consciousness". '41 ' 
Gareth Reeves regards the poem's projected "nightmare" as private, yet 
its portrayal is derived from a particular literary source and has 
particular cultural implications. Reeves highlights Eliot's indebtedness 
to The Aeneid, which contains moments of nightmarish vision, obsessive 
despair and obsessed consciousness: "One way of regarding The Waste 
Land's urban visions. is as private and nightmarish illusion. Vatic 
pretension becomes private phantasmagoria". From markedly different 
critical perspectives, Bodkin and Reeves each propose readings of the 
poem that interweave notions of both a private and a cultural 
"unconscious", whilst also evoking ghosts and phantoms. In the poem an 
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hostility to the "immense panorama of futility and anarchy which is 
contemporary history"': 1: 3 -1 runs alongside anxiety about "private" and 
social relations. With the border between reality and fantasy blurred or 
dissolved, the categories of public and private become inextricably 
entwined. The next section proposes to map this reticulation of 
individual and cultural traces. 
Secret histories 
Allan Lloyd-Smith links Freud's notion of the uncanny with Abraham 
and Torok' s. theory of the phantom. He argues that "unresolved 
contradictions, unadmitted fears and desires, and incompatible 
assertions of the culture" produce the slippage, estrangement and 
discontinuity that characterises uncanny effects in a literary text. 
Thus the uncanny is seen in cultural terms, and not only as a feature of 
individual psychopathology. Abraham and Torok depart from the 
universalizing tendency of traditional psychoanalysis to see patterns of 
individual development as uniform and highly scheimatized by stressing 
that childhood development does not proceed in predetermined ways. The 
process of individuation is non-linear, open to influences outside 
immediate or lived experience. Lloyd-Smith notes "the openness of their 
model to cultural determinants as well as to more strictly personal 
ones: the child is absorbing a cultural inheritance incorporating 
certain secrets, absences, or silences". "" 
The phantom can be understood to mean "a delusion of the living 
provoked by the tormenting unconscious suspicion that something had been 
left unsaid during the life of the deceased". "'I Abraham argues that 
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the effect of the phantom can be produced outside of individual 
experience and the family structure: he claims that "what haunts are not 
the dead, but the gaps left within us by the secrets of others". '411 
Nicholas Rand comments that "the phantom represents the interpersonal 
and transgenerational consequences of silence". 141--11 Freud shows that 
beimlich can mean not only familiar and known, but that which is 
concealed, withheld or hidden. Even in its etymological definition, the 
uncanny ciphers secrets, evoking a strangeness or magic in the 
homeliness of language. As a figure of psychic concealment which 
functions as the unwitting reception or the encrypted awareness of 
another's secret, the phanton connects with the uncanny in its relation 
to secret or forgotten histories and silenced transmissions. Nicholas 
Rand remarks: "The combined theories of individual psychic concealment 
and secret transmissions over the generations have the wider potential 
of enriching our ideas of political history, social movements, and 
ideological currents". 1: 431 By associating the uncanny and the phantom, 
Lloyd-Smith proposes a model of reading that thinks together individual 
and social hauntings, private trauma and a culture's silenced historical 
"secrets": 
Abraham and Torok's theories of the phantom and cryptonomy 
offer a possibly larger purchase on the determinants of the 
uncanny if we are able to interpret them in this wider 
cultural sense: that is, not simply as descriptive of 
individual neurosis, as in the Wolf Man's pathology, but 
interpretive of cultural encryptment, of the magic words 
a culture does not say to itself , 1501 
The notion of the crypt also involves ghosts. The Waste Land is 
filled with ghosts, echoes and buried traces. Tiresias, who can be 
located as the hollow "centre" of the text, can be read as a ghost or 
phantom within this cryptonymic structure. As indicated earlier, for 
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Abraham the phantom coincides with Freud's conception of the death 
instinct. Thus, a radical otherness flits through Tiresias -a foreign 
body, like Torok's characterisation of the death instinct - and thereby 
through the text. Following Derrida's differentiation between the crypt 
and the ghost, Tiresias can be read still further as an unsettling, 
disturbing f igure. Derrida argues that, though connected to the crypt, 
the ghost is a more complicated concept: the ghost is "the effect of 
another's crypt in my unconscious". ý Tiresias would therefore be the 
effect of cultural mourning, a figure bearing the memory of the dead and 
historical loss, doomed to stalk the earth and awaken the reader's 
memory. Michael Levenson notes that "a strain exists between the 
presumed identity of the poem's speaker and instability of the speaker's 
world". (s: 2 " Tiresias represents an "intermittent phenomenon", and the 
"heterogeneity of attitude" in the poem makes it difficult to posit a 
single, or many, speakers (171). Levenson links the topos of the risen 
god and the return of the dead "as wandering ghosts that haunt the 
living": both gods and ghosts are caught between a return to life and an 
inability to die (173). This has bearing on the "loss of clear 
boundaries between life and death" and "the disenbodied character of 
consciousness" in the poem: "both textually and historically. the poem 
oversteps boundaries, moving among voices, between bodies, over space 
and through time" (175). Levenson's notion of wandering ghosts in the 
text intertwines the traces of lost faith and cultural "absence" that 
connect the uncanny and the concept of the phantom. Tiresias f igures a 
form of wandering ghost in modern society, bearing secrets within his 
absent presence, the carrier of buried and unspoken cultural memory. 
Tiresias is at once the knowing carrier of secrets - making them 
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beindicb - and also the unconscious transmitter of foreignness, unaware 
of the dislocations and visitations he effects. As repository of secret 
histories, Tiresias can be read as a participant in, and victim of, 
transgenerational haunting. lsýi-l 
To read Tiresias as a ghostly channel of communication, and to 
begin to consider what memories are concealed in the text, raises once 
more the question of automatic writing. Wayne Koestenbaum suggests that 
the condition of Vivien - it appears, for example, that she had an 
ability to lapse into trances and act as a medium - formed an integral 
part of Eliot's work. (Whilst resisting the biographical lure, this 
would connect with a prophetic strand in the poem, particularly the 
epigraph referring to the Cumaean Sybil and the figure of Madame 
Sosostris. ) Koestenbaum stresses a link between Eliot's ideas on 
automatic writing and psychoanalytic investigations into auto-hypnotic 
absence. In their analysis of Anna 0. , Freud and Breuer state that auto- 
hypnotic absence 
may well be likened to a dream in view of its wealth of 
imaginative products and hallucinations, its large gaps 
of memory and the lack of inhibition and control in its 
associations, (PFL 3 100) 
Here both hypnotic states and automatic writing are seen as analogous to 
the more disjointed, less inhibited psychic framework of dreaming. If 
poems are considered to be imaginative products, then much of Eliot's 
earlier poetry replays a form of auto-hypnotic absence, full of gaps in 
I 
memory and diverse associations. Poetry would thus be understood to 
speak hypnotically as "other", a cipher or unstable transmitter of 
"memory". This would perhaps accord with Eliot's thearisation of the act 
of writing in Tradition and the Individual Talent, where the poet 
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remains a passive attendant in the creative process. The poet is a 
"neutral" medium, a transmitter of that cultural "unconscious" which is 
the mind of Europe from Homer to the present day. Here, the notion of a 
textual memory or unconscious - cannot be decidably attributed to an 
author, character or reader. 
Stan Smith has recently mapped the function of Tiresias in the poem 
onto Eliot's theorisation. of the creative process, arguing that 
"Tiresias' doubleness lies in his being simultaneously the man who 
suffers and the artist who creates". I -*s: l This would position Tiresias as 
interpreter and interpreted, reader and text. Voices speak though 
Tiresias, af igure who is transmitter and receiver, a nodal point of 
communications between past and present, the living and the dead, 
reality and fantasy, stability and dissolution. Tiresias haunts a site 
where these categories invade and contaminate each other. A figure of 
"secret" significance, Tiresias voices and conceals his knowledge, 
consistently blinded or struck dumb at moments of crisis in the text. At 
these points, Tiresias resembles the subject of dreams, a figure (or 
phantom) that is non-reflexive, recognises no contradiction or 
difference, yet that encounters only difference in the dream-text. 
Positioned between agency and passivity, male and female, blindness 
and insight, Tiresias carries secrets that can be mapped onto gender and 
social relations. Tiresias is as much a symptom as a diagnostician of 
modern urban culturo. In Thebes, he witnessed familial conflict and 
political upheaval, foretelling the doom of Oedipus and Creon. Yet even 
as the text positions an omniscient, foresuffering observer whose gaze 
is restless and invasive, there are recurrent strategic instances of 
silence, blindness and incomprehension. Given his blindness and his role 
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in the Oedipal tragedy, the figure of Tiresias relates to the castration 
complex. (When referring to the bisexual Tiresias, the male pronoun can 
be considered as under erasure. ) The text emphasises the visual drives, 
the obsessive gaze and sightlessness; there is evidence to support a 
reading of the poem in terms of anxiety surrounding castration. 
Easthope, for example, places "castration" within the "overdetermined 
structure" of the speaker's experiences. (: ý57 ' To situate the fear of 
castration, or any pathological structure, as the key to interpreting a 
text, involves problems of attribution. It also presumes that Psychic 
development is uniform and universal, thus eliding cultural, gender and 
historical differences. While castration anxiety can be identified as a 
figurative structure in the poem, phallogocentric authority is 
undermined in terms of politics, textuality and sexuality. 
The cultural resonance of Tiresias raises the spectre of maternal 
incest which, according to Freud, motivates a tendency towards 
debasement in masculine love. Freud asserts that men are more likely to 
overvalue and remain fixated on the earliest sexual object; men seek new 
objects based on the the imago of infantile objects, and in certain 
circumstances the libido may turn from reality, becoming fixated on 
incestuous objects in the unconscious. Thus any love for another woman 
risks recalling the forbidden image of the mother. This explains a 
tendency on the part of men to separate sacred and profane (or animal) 
love: "Where they kove they do not desire and where they desire they 
cannot love" (SE XI 183). The consequence of this split is the 
debasement of the sexual object, with overvaluation being reserved for 
the incestuous object and its representatives. The masculine tendency is 
to regard the sexual act "basically as sonething degrading, which 
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defiles and pollutes not only the body" (SH XI 186), and this disgust 
can result in impotence. Freud's observations will be seen to provide an 
interesting gloss on Eliot's own comments about the "cheery automatism" 
of modern sexuality. 
The mythological neutrality of Tiresias - bisexual, blind, 
omniscient - is compromised by the context of his initial appearance in 
the text, as recipient of the honosexual overture by Mr. Eugenides. 
Wayne Koestenbaum offers a part-biographical interpretation of the poem, 
citing the homoerotic nature of Eliot's collaboration with Ezra Pound. 
He proposes that the Fisher King myth signifies not fear of castration 
but dread of anal penetration: "Despite New Critical smokescreens about 
Fisher Kings and symbolic wounds, castration is not the unmanning that 
the poem fears". (-sl" During his editing of the text, Pound readily 
identified hyacinths with homosexuality, so the approach by Mr Eugenides 
may be measured against the scene in the hyacinth garden as another 
moment of sexual crisis and inaction. This reading accounts for the 
images of shattered male sexuality and the evident horror of female 
sexuality that fills the poem. For Koestenbaum, the ambiguous sexuality 
of Tiresias casts the shadow of an unnerving, intangible "other" that 
haunts the text: 
,,, through 
Tiresias, Eliot describes (from the inside) 
an epoch we might call the Age of Inversion, when 
heterosexuality was in the process of being undermined 
and traduced by its eerie opposite, '") 
I 
The hooded f igure of Tiresias I do not know whether a man or a woman" 
- no longer acts as a mask, exemplary model or visionary guide. 
Not only 
does he cast the shadow of homosexuality, he occupies the "space" of 
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sexual difference. The sexual difference represented by Tiresias is 
mysterious and disruptive. 
morial Vays of Life 
Theories surrounding the predominance of the uncanny in nineteenth 
century literature focus on the shift from an age of religious faith to 
a secular understanding of the world. In the face of social change a 
nostalgia remains for an older "organic" society, "a suppositious lost 
commi nity". Lloyd-Smith comments that, particularly in nineteenth 
century fiction, "(t1he vanished lost order, which is invented as a 
compensatory fantasy in the face of levelling market forces, efficiency, 
and anonymity, is perceived fron the outside, but imagined to have an 
inside, to be a container of lost meaning". This empty centre is in some 
instances terimed the God-shaped hole. Following Foucault's definition of 
transgression as the profane in a secular world, Lloyd-Smith argues that 
the transgression which initiates uncanny effects produces "not a 
rediscovery of the sacred, but a realm of nothingness, of an unbearable 
absence of meaning". This notion of transgression suggests those 
hollow monents of paralysed vision and speech in much of Eliot's earlier 
poetry. The "ideological fable" I of a previous natural order pervades 
critical readings of The Waste Land; this nostalgia posits a dichotomy 
between tradition ýnd innovation, ancient over modern, organic and 
inorganic, the natural and mechanical world. In each case the former 
term is privileged. The poem's critics have consistently (mis)recognised 
this nostalgia, as if the text were uncannily anticipating their desires 
and designs. 
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Most literary criticism has tended to share and sympathize with 
Eliot's view of modern industrial society, echoing the poem's apparent 
lament for an idealized rural existence. Some opinion echoes Eliot's own 
line that the poem is merely a personal "grouse" against life, but the 
prevailing critical view has been that the poem offers an objective, 
valuable and entirely appropriate critique of twentieth century society. 
Eliot's deployment of the rebirth myth is a legitimate, necessary and 
inevitable intellectual response to "social disintegration". Such 
has been the unanimity between comnentators that the poen appears to 
have produced an uncanny reading effect, forereading critical responses, 
determining its reception and interpretation in advance. Graham Hough 
detects an underlying coherence granted by the rebirth inyth: 
Many of the great works of modern literature seem to 
exist in a vacuum, to spring from no particular society 
and to address no particular audience, The Waste Land 
is founded on a vegetation myth that is universal rather 
than particular, 1631 
Eliot's poen is perceived to engage directly with its own historical 
" moment " while also offering a mode 1 of universal cultural 
understanding. In fact, the poem does not exist in a vacuum; it 
addresses a narrow range of readers and applies the vegetation myth in a 
particular manner. Hough contradicts his own ahistorical assertion: "Lie- 
Waste Land presents the plight of our time, in the methods of our time. 
If is seens confused, well, so are we". "' Jewel Spears Brooker and 
Joseph Bentley have recently formalised this critical confusion, 
resolving the poem's dispersed textuality and implying the underlying 
coherence of its discourse whilst denying it "meaning": "The poem is a 
bundle of meanings that merely coexist, They cannot be analysed into a 
pure message, and that is the poem's pure message". 16" 
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It is Leavis who explicitly underscores and consolidates the poem's 
ideological significance, formulating the standard approach to the work. 
He dehistoricizes human existence into a mythical contrast between rural 
and urban, agrarian and industrial, "organic" and "manufactured" life. 
Leavis contends that The Wa5te Land recollects a lost pastoral 
innocence, when people existed in harmony with the natural environment: 
The traditions and cultures have mingled, and the 
historical imagination makes the past contemporary; no one 
tradition can digest so great a variety of materials, and 
the result is a break-down of forms and the irrevocable 
loss of that sense of absoluteness which seems necessary 
to a robust culture ... In considering our present plight 
we have also to take account of the incessant rapid change 
that characterizes the Machine Age, The result is breach 
of continuity and the uprooting of life, This last metaphor 
has a peculiar aptness, for what we are witnessing today is 
the final uprooting of the immemorial ways of life, of life 
rooted in the soil, 1661 
Here the "soil" is held to be a fertile, sustaining source of cultural 
validity and intrinsic good, a way of life that is not immutable, 
however: "It does not seem likely that it will ever again be possible 
for a distinguished mind to be formed. .. on the rhythms, sanctioned by 
nature and time, of rural culture" (45). Only the "sympathetic magic" of 
fertility rites and vegetation cults can "express an extreme sense of 
the unity of life" (93). (How an urbanized academic would react when 
witnessing such rites in their most "uncivilized" form is another 
matter. ) The nodern Machine Age is characterized by anomie, disorder and 
spiritual crisis. In contrast, traditional rural values signify 
I 
coherence, regeneration and spiritual truth. Leavis sees this pastoral 
ideal as reality, though the distinction between country and city is 
more a form of ideology than veritable truth. 
(6'7*. ) 
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Gareth Reeves argues that Eliot values rural tradition from a 
different perspective. Following the example of Virgil, Eliot 
establishes agriculture as the fundamental constituent of civilization. 
Rural life became the prototype or paradigm of orderly society, 
signifying piety, tradition, family values, loyalty to the state and 
reverence for its leader: 
The implication is not that all societies worthy of the name 
should be agrarian; rather, it is that they should maintain 
the sort of hierarchical relations, from the 'particular' to 
to the 'general', which are typical of an agrarian society, (68) 
Reeves stresses that Eliot regarded this agrarian Utopia as probably 
unrealizable, but as an ideal to which society should strive. Without 
doubt, the rural paradigm displaced onto Imperial rule represents the 
putative "robust" and "absolute" culture that Leavis espouses. This 
argument is strengthened by evidence from Eliot's own critical writings. 
In After Strange Gods, he formulates a quasi-fascist philosophy: 
The population should be homogenous; where two or more 
cultures exist in the same place they are likely either to 
be fiercely self-conscious or both to become adulterate, 
What is still more important is unity of religious 
background; and reasons of race and culture combine to 
make any large number of free-thinking Jews undesirable, 
There must be a proper balance between urban and rural, 
industrial and agricultural development, And a spirit of 
excessive tolerance is to be deprecated, (69) 
Social and artistic progression are inimical: The Waste Land exemplifies 
modernist technical innovation yet conflicts with the development of 
mass democratic urban society. This conflict -defines the dynamic of I 
Fascism, whicb endorses a radical social and industrial transformation 
based on traditional agrarian values. 
Terry Eagleton rehearses a familiar distinction between radical 
form and conservative content, arguing that the text formulates an 
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ideology of cultural knowledge rather than cultural disintegration. 
History is not futile or exhausted, since culture reimains available to 
renovate and restore: "The Waste Land's fragmentary content listlessly 
mimes the experience of cultural disintegration, while its totalising 
-mythological forms silently allude to a transcendence of such 
collapse". " This reading may be borne out by Eliot's own version of 
literary tradition, which attempts to resolve the conflict between 
innovation and convention. The ideal order absorbs innovative and 
progressive works, neutralising their radical and subversive qualities: 
"The existing monuments form an ideal order among themselves, which is 
modified by the introduction of the new (the really new) work of art 
among them! '. C-71 ý The new work thus integrated, the order is once more 
complete, speaking "with old authority and new culture". ý 
7: 2 -1 So, to 
conclude: The Waste Land and its critical "heritage" retains a lingering 
nostalgia for a pastoral ideal that signifies hierarchy, tradition and 
stability. Yet some of the political consequences of that ideal - with 
its elitist and implicitly authoritarian rejection of an urban, mass 
democratic culture - in the twentieth century remain the text's greatest 
silence, its unspeakable, secret history. 
The Uncanny 
It is not a difficult task to trace the more explicit ideological 
freight in the poem's critical heritage, yet it remains less easy to 
expose the ciphered secrets lodged in the body of the poem. To begin to 
trace its cryptic networks, its hidden script, we must return to Freud' s 
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work on the uncanny. Freud identifies the common causes of das 
un. beimlich: 
,, animism, magic and sorcery, -the omnipotence of thoughts, 
man's attitude to death, involuntary repetition and the 
castration complex comprise practically all the factors 
which turn something frightening into something uncanny, (AL 365) 
Eliot's early poetry in particular exhibits some, if not all, of these 
uncanny features. The omnipotence of thoughts harks back to "the old, 
animistic conception of the universe, and is characterized among other 
things by "the subject's narcissistic over valuation of his (sic) mental 
processes". It also involves magic and "the attribution to various 
outside persons and things of carefully graded magical powers" (AL 362- 
3). This animistic stage of human cultural development was a response to 
the "manifest prohibition of reality" (AL 363). The omnipotence of 
thoughts is thus related to the realm of spiritual belief. The poem 
fissures the notion of a coherent and rational modern self: there are 
recurrent motifs of magic and sorcery, and the distinctions between the 
literal and the figurative are disordered. The text is haunted by the 
representatives of ancient power and wisdon, as if it carries within it 
unknown knowledge that cannot be accessed except in cryptic echoes. The 
tone of vatic prophesy and megalomania in The Waste Land can be equated 
with the overvaluation of thoughts. 
Compulsive and "involuntary" repetition is bound up with the will 
to mastery and the death drive. Freud associates the double and 
compulsive repetition with the diabolical, an association that is 
suggested in Eliot's commentary on the German poet Gottfreid Benn. Eliot 
stresses that, in the act of writing, the poet is not simply concerned 
with finding the right form of words: 
He is oppressed by a burden which he must bring to birth in 
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order to obtain relief,, he is haunted by a demon, a demon 
against which he feels powerless, because in its first 
manifestation it has no face, no name, nothing; and the words, 
the poem he makes, are a kind of form of exorcism of this 
demon,, he is going to all that trouble, not in order to 
communicate with anyone, but to gain relief from acute 
discomfort,,, (73) 
Does this faceless, nameless other refer to desire, the death drive, or 
the other that is the self? The poem is not intended to communicate with 
anyone, just as Freud stresses that "a dream does not want to say 
anything to anyone" (ILP 270). This demon is an intimate yet 
unrecognisable phanton, a burden which is brought to birth. 
It is possible to link the f igure of the double, "man's attitude to 
death" and "involuntary repetition" with another factor in Hoffmann's 
story, the motif of the automaton. Freud's essay succumbs to its own 
uncanny effect, its silenced but insistent otherness. Freud considers 
that Olympia's wavering between living and inanimate is a relatively 
minor thematic strand of the story, its uncanny effect a residue of 
infantile fantasy. Yet the doll which is mistaken for a real human being 
is surely the most unbeimlich concept for the human subject. He goes on 
to emphasise that the uncanny is predominantly structured around the 
disruptions enacted by the double and the return of the dead, which 
again points to the significance of the automaton figure. The almost- 
perfect automaton, Olympia functions as a "human" figure almost 
indiscernible in its strangeness, performing a similar role to the 
double. Demonstrating the effacement yet necessary re-inscription of 
Olympia, H616ne Cixous argues that the double produces "the ghostly 
f igure of nonfulfilment and repression, and not the double as 
COUnterpart or reflection, but rather the doll that is neither dead nor 
alive". 17-4ý1 In The Waste Land# the female figures as an autonaton and a 
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frightening double. This motif at the heart of the text represents women 
as wavering between body and machine, the living and dead, their 
physical and Psychical impulses reduced to mechanized functions; 
equally, women offer a deathly reflection of the inale narcissistic gaze. 
The Ommipatence of Thought 
The text attempts to establish an authoritative voice which 
transcends each sterile, derelict panorama that it depicts. The mock 
epic tone of the opening passage of 'A Game of Chess' , for example, 
implies that the present is a shabby imitation of the past. Literary 
tradition and its treasure-house of language contrasts with the ragtime 
lyric and banal dialogue recorded in the section. The inflated, ornate 
diction inscribes a cherished literary tradition and cultural continuity 
as much as it describes a woman who exists in the passage as little more 
than an " impl ied, sensibi 1 ity" - "" The text privileges a field of 
cultural reference and knowledge elevated above "ordinary" life. The 
Baudelairean rhetorical address to the "hypocrite lecteur", however, 
shifts the locus of the text's gaze onto the reader: this strategy seeks 
to make the reader complicit in this phantasy, which then can be offered 
as a shared, public vision. In 'The Burial of the Dead' , the old 
Testament allusions, from Ezekiel, Ecclesiastes and Isaiah to prophets 
exiled in the wilderness imply a superior cultural wisdom able to 
override this vision of contenporary futility and devastation. 
The 
portentous vatic intensity attempts to impose some patriarchal order and 
meaning onto the "heap of broken images" and the 
"stony rubbish". From 
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the protective darkness of the red rock, the text offers spiritual 
insight that is deferred and unspecific: 
I will show you something different from either 
Your shadow at morning striding behind you 
Or your shadow at evening rising to meet you; 
I will show you fear in a handful of dust, 
(The War-to land, ECP 63-79) 11,27-30) 
Af ter the hiatus in the hyacinth garden, the text turns to another 
seer, Mne Sosostris. Possessor of psychic and cultural knowledge, she 
mediates mythic memory and the desire to foretell the future. Mme 
Sosostris represents the text's contradictory notions of knowledge and 
existence. At one level, the sinister potential of knowledge becomes 
palpable, and the hyacinth garden is just one example where the text 
recognises and knows the "horror" of the modern world, a horror that 
paradoxically remains unknowable and inexpressible. Fortune-telling 
becomes symptomatic of the decline of culture: tarot-reading is all that 
the modern age has to offer in terms of insight or knowledge. No longer 
does society turn to its poets and philosophers for a vision of the 
future. As such, Mme Sosostris may be an ironic refraction of Tiresias 
or even the intellectual who reads much of the night. They are the true 
possessors of knowledge. Yet the text privileges, although in veiled 
form, an alternative discourse. The folk wisdom of Mme Sosostris is not 
subverted or ridiculed; her predictions come true, at least within the 
"reality" of the text. The tone of familiarity perhaps characterizes 
her 
as "canny", in the dual sense of cosy and possessed of occult powers 
(AL 
345). The clairvoyant operates in some ways like a cultural curator: a 
secret, timeless knowledge underlies the business of fortune-telling. 
After positioning Tiresias as the superior cultural commentator, 
Mme 
Sasostris functions as a potentially bogus# but nonetheless 
insistent, 
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soothsayer. ImPlicitlY, it is the female who is ascribed the true voice 
of authority, a precedent already set by the epigraph's evocation of the 
Sibyl. Her cards depict emblems and figures from primeval myth, fusing 
the Grail legend, the Hanged God and the Fisher King myth. Tarot-reading 
suggests a latent system or structure to the blank universe, a 
hermeneutic of modern existence. The passage confirms, not the 
dissolution of faith, but the survival of cultural knowledge. 
In the final section, 'What the Thunder Said', the text adopts a 
megalomaniac tone, uttering mystical pronouncements in the guise of one 
(mainly a Hindu prophet) who possesses secret, ultimate knowledge. The 
key will break the "seals" to sexual freedom and mystical knowledge and 
unlock the prison of modern existence (11.411-14), thereby also 
reintegrating a shattered masculinity, reviving "for a moment a broken 
Coriolanus" (1.416). The poem ends with a collocation of textual, 
psychic and cultural breakdown, yet the text does not lose all sense of 
reference. The literary allusions imply a residue of cultural knowledge, 
providing some fragments to shore against the ruins of a crumbling 
"private" sanity and fracturing European civilization. Amid this 
scattering, the text is drawn to ancient cultures, the earliest 
repositories of knowledge and order. It offers a return 
to origins 
reminiscent of 'Burnt Norton' in FQur Quartets: "In my end 
is my 
beginning" GCP 204). The final utterances, aiming at vatic intensity, 
summArise a quest for transcendent knowledge, a 
desire to restore 
psychic potency and coherence to a culture. The 
textual emphasis rests 
on "Damyata" - control - striking the prophetic note 
and suggesting that 
authoritarian paradigm sought throughout 
the text. <76> It gestures 
towards a coherence which can reconcile conflicts 
both in the body and 
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in society, in subjects and between subjects. Such coherence can be 
brought about only by effacing certain bodies, both individual and 
collective. Yet these bodies remain ciphered, encrypted in the body of 
the text and the social body. 
Xemory and Desire 
The opening passage enacts a pattern of arousal and denial, desire 
and negation, a "trajectory of depletion" repeated and amplified 
throughout the poem. 1771, The first line recalls Chaucer's April, with 
its sweet showers, health and vigour; yet this new season begins in "the 
cruellest month", comparing unfavourably with deadening winter. Life 
reluctantly stirs: desire is automatic and mechanical. Spring, like the 
poem, emerges despite itself: 
April is the cruellest month, breeding 
Lilacs out of the dead land, mixing 
Memory and desire, stirring 
Dull roots with spring rain, 
Winter kept us warm, covering 
Earth in forgetful snow, feeding 
A little life with dried tubers, (11,1-7) 
Active reproductive verbs end each enjambed line, only to be negated 
immediately. April has to breed life out of a "dead land"; "stirring" 
and "covering" mingle with the lumpen, colourless "Dull" and "Earth". 
The covered earth suggests a grave-yard rather than crop planting, 
sexual coupling or natural regeneration. In this waste land, desire 
cannot remain buried. Daniel Gunn com nts: "Desire - even for an end - 
is always a beginning, here one which is fraught with resistance". 
k7c- > 
OU Quartets, a poem that Mick Burton Endings and beginnings echo Four 
contends is the "search for a form of subjectivity without Desire". 
C 7,3. ) 
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Such a reading could apply equally to The Waste Land p though it lacks 
the former's "authority". The "desire" to eradicate desire is doomed 
from the outset of the poem, -since the dull roots begin to remember. 
Memory - painfulg pleasurable, recalcitrant, irrepressible - links 
intimately with desire. The text's sterile, entombed centre of 
consciousness (if such it is) both welcomes and fears this reactivation 
of desire. Forgetful snow has dulled the edge of remembered desire and 
the paralysis or emptiness of the psychic grave has kept memory and 
desire in little need of nourishment. Yet, like the turning of the 
seasons, memory returns, like desire, in a voice that "is low" but whose 
"insistence is indestructible" (FFC 255). 
This hesitant natural awakening is displaced onto a social world 
emerging from the chaos of recent history, reeling from the turmoil of 
world war and the Russian Revolution. Remembering means confronting the 
upheaval and fragmentation of European civilization. Ostensibly set in 
pre-war Germany, the text recollects a world of high culture and 
privilege. The elegant, leisurely indulgence exemplifies an old 
aristocratic order. Amid the genteel conversation and behaviour, desire 
barely registers. Now defeated, Germany has most to remember and most to 
forget. Radically altered perceptions of national boundaries and ethnic 
identity in the wake of conflict threaten what remains of this decadent 
stability: "Bin gar, keine Russin, stamm' aus Litaeun, echt Deutsch. " ("I 
am not Russian at all; I come from Lithuania, a true German. ") 
In 'Death 
by Water', "Gentile or Jew" evokes the racial tension that has helped to 
destabilize post-war Europe, part of a cultural upheaval that challenges 
old order and tradition. Only death, picking "bones in whispers", 
is a 
certainty, the ultimate "handful of dust. " These tremors of racial 
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tension allude to what Eliot termed "the present decay of Eastern 
Europe" in his note on 'What the Thunder Said' (ECP 84). Memory then 
returns to idyllic childhood, although even in this world of innocence 
and purity, desire intrudes: 
And when we were children, staying at the arch-duke's 
My cousin's, he took me out on a sled, 
And I was frightened, He said, Marie, 
Marie, hold on tight, And down we went, 
In the mountains, there you feel free, UIJ3-17) 
Here childish play takes on a different dimension. In dreams, according 
to Freud, flying or rapid movement signifies "general sexual excitenent" 
ULP 158). "And down we went" is couched in childlike language but the 
reference has an implicitly sexual register. The physical contact 
between Marie and her cousin arouses both fear and stimulation, anxiety 
and release. "90" 
The anticipated revelation of "fear in a handful of dust" foretells 
an experience of transcendent horror rather than of consummate love or 
knowledge. The "shadow" signifies the presence of an "other", an effect 
of memory and desire which, like shadows, remaiqS indistinct, intangible 
but inescapable throughout the poem. The transaction between memory and 
desire is mapped onto a pitiless desert landscape: 
What are the roots that clutch, what branches grow 
Out of this stony rubbish? Son of man, 
You cannot say, or guess, for you know only 
A heap of broken images, where the sun beats, 
And the dead Vee gives no shelter, the cricket no relief , 
And the dry stone no sound of water, (11,19-24) 
Nothing clutches: civilization has expired and drought has withered 
Leavis's "inunemorial" ways of life rooted in the soil. Xodern urban 
society has destroyed a pastoral existence, the idealized harmony of man 
and nature. "Son of man" frames the scene in an explicitly masculine 
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context, but everywhere patriarchal ascendancy is subverted. Images of 
fractured masculinity abound: the man-made world lietea in ruins, This 
echoes Shelley's "Ozymandias", where a broken image of masculine power 
and lineage decays in the desert: "Round the decay/ Of that colossal 
Wreck, boundless and bare/ The lone and level sands stretch far away". 
The verse cited from Ecclesiastes - "And the dead tree gives no shelter, 
the cricket no relief" - depicts the desolation and decay of old 
age. cell Here lies the real ruin of masculinity; desire and sexuality 
evaporate to leave a barren waste land. Desire degenerates into 
sterility and fragmentation. The desert needs fertility, but the opening 
passage contends that it is precisely desire that turns the world to 
emptiness and waste. 
In the opening to 'What the Thunder Said' , any distinction between 
reality and fantasy is eroded: in this dead zone, everything is 
"unreal". Perceived cultural collapse is closely interwoven with the 
dissolution of reality. There are obsessive images, hallucinations ("Who 
is the third who walks always beside you? ") and imaginary noises like 
birdsong, dripping water and murmuring crowds. Above all, there is 
another wilderness of physical insufficiency and cultural decay: 
Here there is no water but only rock 
Rock and no water and the sandy road 
The road winding above among the mountains 
Which are mountains of rock without water 
If there were water we should stop and drink 
Amongst the rock one cannot stop or think 
Sweat is dry and feet are in the sand 
If there were only water amongst the rock 
Dead mountain mouth of carious teeth that cannot spit 
Here one can neither stand nor lie nor sit 
There is not even silence in the mountains 
But dry sterile thunder without rain 
There is not even solitude in the mountains 
But red sullen faces sneer and snarl 
From doors of mudcracked houses ... (11,331-45) 
230 
The repetitive force and patterns of images - rock, water, sand, 
mountains and repeated negatives - underscore bodily privation and fear. 
The overdetermined references to thirst, heat and pain attest to the 
uneasy, even traumatic in-corporation of bodily need. This desolate, 
inhospitable environment appears to come as an inevitable consequence of 
social fragmentation and turmoil: "The shouting and the crying/ Prison 
and palace and reverberation" (11-325-6). The text links the 
disintegration of contemporary Europe with fragmenting masculinity: 
"falling towers" at once provides an image of political upheaval and 
undermined phallic dominance. The "hooded hordes" that swarm "over 
endless plains" can be read as epitomizing the bewildering variety, 
rapidity and anonymity of urban civilization. Yet the image 
traditionally refers to the East; Leavis suggests that it applies to 
Russia, a reading made explicit and elaborated upon by David Craig and 
more recently Stan Smith, both of whom stress the poem's fraught 
engagement with the Russian Revolution. Yet, the poem employs this 
particular example of historical upheaval, not to confront the "present 
decay" of Europe, but to imply that the pattern of violence and chaos is 
an inescapable feature of cultures that cannot set their lands in order. 
Again the text enacts a pattern of desire and depletion: "The awful 
daring of a moment's surrender/ Which an age of prudence can never 
retract" (11.403-4). Alluring and desirable, the black-haired woman is 
surrounded by bats and bell-towers, the trappings of Gothic 
horor and 
phantasmagoria (11.377-84). The bell tolls for this momentary pulse of 
desire: the upside-down towers (1.352) suggest a limp phallus, while 
the 
"empty cisterns and exhausted wells" (1.354) sigmify 
impotence. Awakened 
desire leads only to despair and death, "tumbled graves" and 
"dry 
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bones". The "decayed hole among the mountains" (1.383) is another 
version of rat's alley". The "enpty chapel" betokens spiritual absence 
and also resembles a burial chamber. As in 'Gerontion', a building 
stands for a state of mind. Derelict, windowless, the chapel resembles a 
sightless, hollow skull. This picture of spiritual and psychic emptiness 
has its parallel in the Grail Legend; nearing the Chapel Perilous, the 
questing knight faces his final test, the vision of nothingness. The 
Gothic elements of this passage, and the recurrent motif of a hollow 
centre, once more bring together the uncanny and the crypt. The next 
task is to consider what it is that constitutes the central absence of 
the poem. 
The Hyacinth Garden 
The scene that takes place in the hyacinth garden constitutes a 
recurring nightnare, insisting in the text precisely because it 
dissolves the borders between the real and the fantastic. It forms the 
equivalent of an anchoring point in a dream, knotting together the 
threads of desire, memory and forgetting that track across the text. The 
passage ends in the haunting silence of a memory, or the dark silence of 
the tomb. Placed between quotations from Wagner, the passage should 
enact a passionate duet but desire is simultaneously ignited and 
extinguished: 
,,, when we came back, late, 
from the hyacinth garden, 
Your arms full, and your hair wet, I could not 
Speak, and my eyes failed, I was neither 
Living nor dead, and I knew nothing, 
Looking into the heart of light, the silence, (11,37-40) 
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An exemplary Romantic scenario is sabotaged; something occurs "to check 
the drive of desire". "': ' The positive words denoting action and human 
contact - "Speak", "Living" and "Looking" - are negated by the line 
endings that attest only to lack, absence and failure: 
11 not... neither... nothing... silence. " Instead of spiritual fulfillment or 
sexual release, there is overwhelming fear in the "heart of light, the 
silence. " Just as Adam and Eve are expelled from the Garden of Eden, the 
episode brings about a terminal Fall from a state of innocence and hope: 
the promise of fullness, completion and spiritual love is dashed. This 
knowledge threatens to fracture the text, bringing it up against its own 
abyssal silence. 'I" Potential paradise becomes a living hell and the 
spectator is left "neither/ Living nor dead". 
'A Game of Chess' follows a similar trajectory of depletion, 
projecting a vision of idealized feminine beauty and attraction which 
quickly declines into images of thwarted and debased sexuality. An 
obsessive, voyeuristic gaze is drawn to the woman seated at her dressing 
table. Positioned as an idealized, passive object within the text, she 
resembles Cleopatra, Dido, Belinda and Imogen: all literary constructs, 
elevated but limited by masculine imagination. Like the hyacinth girl, 
however, the woman's ineffable beauty proves alluring but false. 
Stirring sexual desire taints this ideal image, clouding the scene's 
lustrous looking-glass. ces> The female body no longer plays back an 
idealized reflectio' of the male voyeur, and the passage degenerates n 
into images of rape, violence and death: 
The change of Philomel, by the barbarous king 
So rudely forc'd; yet there the nightingale 
Filled all the desert with inviolable voice 
And still she cried, and still the world pursues 
'Jug Jug' to dirty ears, (11,99-103) 
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Obscene, filthy, sex connects intimately with Philomel's brutal murder 
and mythical transmutation. Desire leads only to death and destruction, 
resulting in the reverse of what it intends: "I think we are in rats' 
alley/ Where the dead men lost their bones" (11.115-116). "31E-11 The 
syntax implies that the men were already dead before entering the alley, 
a living death that makes sexual intercourse inpossible. "Withered 
stumps of time" - broken colunms, skeletons or decrepit old men - offers 
another fractured phallic image bound up with decay and death. The 
idealized female object frustrates desire, producing only blindness 
("Those are pearls that were his eyes") and emptiness ("Nothing again 
nothing). Tense urgent questioning disperses into frustration and near- 
inarticulacy: 
'My nerves are bad to-night, Yes, bad, Stay with me, 
Speak to me, Why do you never speak? Speak, 
What are you thinking of? What thinking? What? 
I never know what you are thinking, Think, ' (11.111-114) 
The text appears to record a woman's agitated, neurotic speech, yet the 
repetitious, disjointed words could be attributable to a male observer, 
whose own anxiety is projected onto the external figure of the woman in 
the guise of f enale "chatter". 'Hysteria' , for example, displaces male 
anxiety onto the f igure of the neurotic society woman, a contemporary 
stereotype. As Elizabeth Bronfen remarks, hysteria has other 
significance: the hysteric "exists within her cultural system by evoking 
the presence of a double; a rhetorical articulation of 
death". ('1: 111 This 
doubleness will be seen to acquire greater signficance 
in relation to 
the recurring motif of the automaton. 
The scenes by the Thames serve to silence 
this disturbing chatter, 
and yet this very act of silencing produc(ýýS an 
"other" female voice, 
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that gusts and resonates throughout the poem. The river - site of royal 
romance and literary imagination - has becone sullied by industrial 
progress and the pollution of modern urban society. Initially male 
potency seems to be spent, "departed": 
While I was fishing in the dull canal 
On a winter evening round behind the gashouse 
Musing upon the king my brother's wreck 
And on the king my father's death before him, (11,189-92) 
The "nymphs" no longer inhabit the river bank, depriving the Thames of 
its mythic status. This lost idealized femininity, tinged with classical 
beauty and carnality, leaves only debased sexuality in its wake. The 
archaic "Leiman" recalls the whore, the functional sexual object 
satisfying corporeal needs and the typical obverse of the virginal, 
spiritually valorized female figure. Sex again provokes images of death 
and dirt: the rat reappears, accompanied by "the rattle of the bones" 
(1.186). "White bodies naked on the low damp ground" (1.193) could be 
lovers or rotting corpses. The exalted river-boat ronance of Elizabeth I 
and Leicester is just one of a series of doomed affairs that are enacted 
in close proximity to water. The closing section recounts a more 
disconcerting encounter on the river: 
The boat responded 
Gaily, to the hand expert with sail or oar 
The sea was calm, your heart would have responded 
Gaily, when invited, beating obedient 
To controlling hands ... (11,418-22) 
Again the woman remains impassive; the text only stresses that she would 
have responded, not that she actually did respond. On this occasion, 
with aggression now surfacing, the man takes positive action of a 
violent kind. As Kenner argues, the "controlling hands" may refer to 
strangulation, the only means to achieve mastery over the woman, to make 
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her heart respond. " This instance of implicit male violence is placed 
inmediately prior to the text's final dissolution into apparently 
unrelated fragments. Tony Pinkney remarks that the strict classicism 
privileged in some Modernist practice (perhaps most notably by T. E. 
Hulme, who predicted Ila period of hard, dry classical verse") is engaged 
in violence against the elusive sign, and that this is also implicitly 
violence against women. The slippage of language can be controlled only 
by immobilizing the female in writing. cO91 In the case of this passage, 
neither the excesses of 6criture nor the figure of the female can be 
laid to rest. 
The death of Phlebas reiterates this textual thread. Salt water 
turns the mariner's eyes to pearl, echoing events in the hyacinth 
garden. As representative of a new social and economic organization the 
merchant, preoccupied with "profit and loss", subsides with his goods. 
This demise suggests a link between class, sexuality and death that is 
more pronounced in regard to female f igures in the text. The sea bed 
figures as a site of obliteration or dispersal, and the dilution of 
desire finds its index in the text's drowned figures: Ophelia, the 
Thames daughters who are all undone close to water, and even the 
hyacinth girl ("your hair wet"). An early draft of 'Death by Water' 
imakes clear that the passage is sailing into the realm of dream and 
nightmare, echoing Conrad, Melville and Coleridge: 
We ate slept drank 
Hot coffee, and kept watch, and no one dared 
To look into another's face or speak 
In the horror of the illimitable scream 
Of a whole world about us, One night 
On watch, I thought I saw in the fore (cross-trees) 
Three women leaning forward, with white hair 
Streaming behind, who sang above the wind 
Frightened beyond fear, horrified past horror, calm, 
(Nothing was real) for, I thought, now, when 
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I like, I can wake up and end the dream, 1901 
This passage rehearses a familiar set of patterns: alluring yet 
dangerous feminine sexuality, obsessive gazing and overwhelming horror. 
The Thames- daughters I stories testify to attempted seduction and 
thwarted desire. Like the commuters flowing mechanically over London 
Bridge, the first wonan has been "undone" by the city in an act of 
automatic, unfeeling seduction: 
'Trams and dusty trees, 
Highbury bore me, Richmond and Kew 
Undid me, By Richmond I raised my knees 
Supine on the floor of a narrow canoe, (11,292-5) 
Sexual failure is bound up with drab urban existence. In contrast to the 
ornate splendour of the royal barge, the woman is sexually betrayed on 
the river by an empty, listless sexual act. She echoes La Pia in 
PurgatoriQ, conflating love and death. The second woman, life and energy 
dissipated, manifests only entonbed desire: "My heart/ Under my feet" 
(1.296). Indifferent to the man's remorse - "After the event/ He wept" - 
she displays a similar lack of communication to that shown in the 
previous passage. The third woman sits on Margate sands, seduced, 
presumably rejected and in danger of lapsing into complete inarticulacy: 
"I can connect/ Nothing with Nothing" (11.301-2). Like the violated 
Philonel, the silence of these abused women "says everything and 
nothing". (91> In the text, women's knowledge is foreclosed, leaving 
their bodies to bea]r the marks of degradation: "The broken fingernails 
of dirty hands" (1.303). The reference to Aeneas ("To Carthage 
then I 
came") recalls Dido who, in a sacrificial gesture of mute 
despair, her 
destiny shaped and demarcated by masculine design, committed 
herself to 
the flames. Even as the text instals woman as pitiful victims, 
it is 
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attempting to eradicate their disruptive, alien presence. Stan Smith 
comments: 
, what The Waste L and repeatedly of f ers is the identification of the female with a mute, incommunicable 
atrocity,, The women of this poem all foregather round the 
concept of voice and its repression, 1921 
The scene in the hyacinth garden leaves a highly visible gap in the 
text, a gap that inscribes a silence: it is what renains unsaid about 
the episode that is most revealing. The experience cannot be fully 
comprehended or recollected; the text foreraembers desire but not its 
anatomical configurations". The smell of the flowers and the girl's 
wet hair provokes only a disavowal of all physicality in the scene. 
Sight and speech are nullified: the need to see and know, the impulse to 
scopophilic, mastery, is thwarted by a radiant vacancy. This lack or 
insufficiency is explicable in Lacanian terms: 
From the outset, we see, in 
and the gaze, that there is 
the contrary, a lure, When, 
what is profoundly unsatisf 
that - You never look at me 
I see you, Conversely, what 
I wish to see, (FFC 102-3) 
the dialectic of the eye 
no coincidence, but, on 
in love, I solicit a look, 
ying and always missing is 
from the place from which 
I look at is never what 
An unbridgeable gap exists between desiring subject and desired other, 
between signifier and signified. For Lacan, that gap or unsatisfied need 
constitutes desire, ever-dininishing but indestructible, A narcissistic 
tendency, the impulse to gaze, structures the scene in the garden. The 
hyacinth girl provides an ideal mirror image for the male onlooker: she 
I 
is situated in the text as an ego ideal. By defining the male subject 
in 
terms of its object as a single, unified ego, the 
heap of broken male 
inages that litter the poem can be reconstructed and reintegrated. 
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This narcissistic project tends towards sexual over-valuation: the 
C94> hyacinth girl is positioned as an "idealized loveliness" , provided 
with typical Romantic trappings. This idealized beauty is a version of 
self-love, although such narcissism is unstable: "Because of its 
fundamentally narcissistic structure, such love turns round easily into 
a complementary opposite". 11`-: ý4r-l This connects with the figure of the 
double, which according to Freud initially appears as "an assurance of 
immortality" in a state of primary narcissism, but returns at a later 
stage as a "harbinger of death" (AL 357). The appearance of the double 
provokes both fear and aggression. In 'A Game of Chess' the valorized 
self-image reflects back a terrifying blankness, a void of inadequacy 
and guilt. The imale voyeur loses his superiority; he certainly does not 
see what he wants to see. This reflection blinds and strikes the speaker 
dumb: his eyes are turned to pearl and he comes to see "the organic as 
mineral, the world as a desert". 196: ' Looking, the dialectic of eye and 
gaze, becomes central to the poem. Beginning 11 1 myself saw with my own 
eyes", the epigraph emphasises, even overdetermines, the act of 
voyeurism, anticipating the scopic drive within the text. 
'The Fire Sermon' alludes to the Buddhist Fire Sermon, where Buddha 
instructs his priests: 
The eye, is on fire; forms are on fire; eye-consciousness is 
on fire; impressions received by the eye are on fire; and 
whatever sensation, pleasant, unpleasant, or indifferent, 
originates in dependence on impression received by the eye, 
that also is on'fire, And with what are these on fire? With 
the fire of hatred, with the fire of infatuation ... I'll 
Here the eye is presented as an instrument or receptacle of "passion"; 
it both gazes with desire and receives back that desire. The scopophilic 
drive is thwarted, and the eyes are turned to pearl. Pearl is hard and 
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solid, however, and may suggest that the eye provides a locus Of 
stability and coherence, instituting a correspondence between world and 
body. The fire of hatred is natched by the fire of infatuation; the 
intensity of "burning", repeated five times in four lines, evokes an 
irresistible voyeurism and a desire to be purged (by f lame) of such a 
damaging compulsion. The passage can be read as following a masochistic 
trajectory. In 'The Economic Problem of Masochism', Freud argues that to 
sustain life, the libido must deflect the destructive tendency of the 
death instinct onto the outer world, but in certain circumstances this 
sadistic instinct can once more be introjected, producing a secondary 
masochism (OM 419). A sadistic instinct - which posits the Thames- 
daughters as helpless, degraded victims - is introjected back: the 
refining blaze extinguishes the heat of passion, fighting fire with 
fire, serving a desire for self-destruction. The repetition of "burning" 
not only mimics the compulsive fervency of the death instinct, it also 
recalls neurotic ritual, interesting in a passage where Eros and 
Thanatos are in close proximity. 
These pathological tendencies cannot be attributed solely to an 
author or a protagonist: these tendencies work at the level of 
figuration and they insist in cultural representations of the fenale, as 
the field of reference in the poem bears out. A recurrent pattern has 
been traced in this section: reflections, blindness, emptiness, silence, 
compulsive repetition and bodies that are both living and dead. These 
factors take us back to Freud's reading of Hoffmann's 'The Sandman': 
they recall not merely a castration complex, but also the figure of the 
double and the figure of Olympia, the female automaton. It will be seen 
240 
that these figures offer perhaps the most significant neans of linking 
The Waste Land, the uncanny and a cultural repressed. 
Autonatism and sexuality 
Freud defines the uncanny in terms of semantic instability: within 
the system of representation its rhetorical strategy is to subvert 
stable concepts, thus producing semantic slippage and ambivalence. The 
uncanny sets fixed limits and margins in notion. Elizabeth Bronfen 
comments that "the most important boundary blurring inhabited by the 
uncanny is that between the real and fantasy". ""E"' One of the most 
uncanny moments of undecidability occurs when it is uncertain if a body 
is animate or inanimate, hovering between living and dead, human or 
machine. Such a hesitation includes the figure of the automaton. As 
Bronfen points out, these undecidable situations can also refer to the 
appearance of ghosts and the return of the dead: 
One could extend Freud's definition to include instances 
that involve the ambivalent distinction between a material 
animate, immediate and literally self-present body and its 
representation, as immaterial, inanimate, belated 'figural' 
body signifying through the interplay of absence and 
presence, (113) 
Since this oscillation between absence and presence, visibility and 
invisibility also activates metaphorical fears of castration, "the 
uncanny always entails anxieties about fragmentation, about the 
I 
disruption or destruction of any narcissistically informed sense of 
personal stability, body integrity, immortal individuality" (113). Seen 
in this way, the shifting presence and absence of the female body 
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accounts persuasively for the images of breakdown, fractured identity 
and thwarted understanding in The Waste Land. 
The poem's female f igures are caught in a complex web of 
representation: idealised, attractive, repulsive, they provoke desire as 
well as horror and violence. Women are perceived to acquiesce 
automatically and passively to masculine desire, and it is this 
mechanical indifference that comes to represent the entire field of 
social relations. The hyacinth girl figures variously as an abused, 
neurotic or terrifying feimale, a rotting corpse and a skeleton. Her 
perceived emptiness or "mystery" (the two terms synonomous with absence) 
encode a silence within the poem: the female ciphers death. Death is 
understood here not as an abstract philosophical concept, but as, in 
turn, an absence at the heart of the structuration of identity; af igure 
of repetition that haunts the text; an entombed memory never brought to 
light; and the counterpart of a "feminine" history that the text tries 
to repress. 
The perception of the "Unreal City" resembles a recounted drean, 
comprising a helpless, obsessive gaze and a mixture of precise detail 
and bizarre logic. It confirms Mme Sosostris' predictions: "I see crowds 
of people, walking round in a ring. " The identities and purpose of the 
"people" remain indistinct; they may be engaged in a fertility rite, 
part of a funeral cortege, circus performers or, as here, rush-hour 
commuters. Nevertheless, the transfixing vision (the phrase connoting 
mobility and stasis) depicts an alienating social world lacking emotion 
or energy: 
Unreal City, 
Under the brown fog of a winter dawn, 
A crowd flowed over London Bridge, so many, 
I had not thought death had undone so many, 
242 
Sighs, short and infrequent, were exhaled, 
And each man fixed his eyes before his feet, 
Flowed up the hill and down King William Street, 
To where Saint Mary Woolnoth kept the hours 
With a dead sound on the final stroke of nine, (11,60-68) 
The city has become "death's dream kingdom! ': neither living nor dead, 
streaming relentlessly over the bridge like automatons, the commuters 
inhabit a mechanical urban wilderness. Human movement is regulated by 
the rigid monotony of the clock which, like all machines, carries death 
within its operations. Desire is posthumous, entombed: "undone" connotes 
both sexual violation and death. The "Sighs, short and infrequent" 
grimly parody sexual exertion. The "corpse" may signify a buried memory 
or buried desire, an encrypted body in the body of the text: this memory 
or body cannot be restored but cannot be erased, and figures as an 
absent presence. As with the ritual death of the fertility god, however, 
latent memory and desire stir again, rising like a crop in spring. The 
resurrection of the corpse corresponds to the return of the body in the 
text. The corpse resurfaces in the way that the body, the cor-pus 
occultuA turns up in language. 
The sexual encounter between the clerk and the typist develops out 
of a dull but insistent ache of desire. A version from the manuscript 
makes a sexual undercurrent more explicit, conflating sexuality and 
dream: ". . the human engine waits -/ Like a taxi throbbing waiting at a 
stand -/ To spring to pleasure through the horn or ivory gates*. 499ý1 The 
reference to "horn 'or ivory gates" moves this sexual image into the 
realm of dreams and the sphere of the unconscious. Even this classical 
allusion is ambiguous; dreams that come true pass through the gate of 
Horn, delusory dreams come through the ivory gate. This implies that the 
scene which follows is either a true or false "dream", challenging the 
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position of the Omniscient observer who is caught ambiguously between 
desire and disgust. This ambiguity also constitutes that blurred 
boundary between the real and fantasy inhabited by the uncanny. The 
final version of the scene describes physical fatigue at the end of a 
working day, but does not imply to the same degree that the witnessed 
scene resembles a dream or phantasy. Significantly, however, the 
mechanical allusion is retained: 
At the violet hour, when the eyes and back 
Turn upward from the desk, when the human engine waits 
Like a taxi throbbing waiting ... (11,215-17) 
This emphasises the monotony of office work, with the human being 
reduced to a repetitive machine, part of a highly technologised. network 
Df urban relations. It echoes the suggestive ballad earlier in the 
section, which imbricates the sounds of city life, popular culture and 
sexual desire: 
But at my back from time to time I hear 
The sound of horns and motors, which shall bring 
Sweeney to Mrs, Porter in the spring, (11,196-8) 
The episode constitutes the text's recurrent "dream! ', with its 
overdetermined elements: the womanq s passivity, mechanical "copulation" 
and lack of emotion. A voyeuristic gaze rests on the typist, noting the 
intimate details and disposition of her domestic life. There is a lack 
of physical detai 1; the prosaic diction dissipates any sexual 
excitement, merely lending the scene an ironic veneer of elegance and 
importance. The gaze averts at the noment of climax, shifting 
into 
parentheses and positing through Tiresias an historical perspective 
that 
keeps the physical actuality and detail of sex at a 
distance: a gap 
opens in the text at a crucial mome lit - Barely 
thinking, barely feeling, 
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the woman reacts automatically to male desire. The clerk's caresses are 
"unreproved if undesired", and sex is "a welcome of indifference": 
She turns and looks a moment in the glass, 
Hardly aware of her departed lover; 
Her brain allows one half-formed thought to pass: 
'Well now that's done: and I'm glad it's over, ' 
When lovely woman stoops to folly and 
Paces about her room again, alone, 
She smooths her hair with automatic hand, 
And puts a record on the gramophone, (11,249-56) 
Capable only of "half-formed thought" and automatic actions, the woman 
resembles an autonaton more than a sentient human being. It is left to a 
machine -a gramophone, literally sound-writing - to produce a 
meaningful utterance. Sex, language, thought and feeling - indeed the 
whole range of cultural relations - is mechanised. 
The passage attempts to perform a neat ideological manoevure. By 
describing the clerk as "one of the low on whom assurance sits/ As a 
silk hat on a Bradford millionaire" (11.233-4), the unseen narrator is 
accorded a privileged position from which to watch unfolding events. 
Like the self-made businessman, the clerk does not know his place, which 
is presumably as an intellectual and social inferior. The devalued 
nature of their sexual relations is equated with their social status. 
Down to the way in which it dwells with fascinated disgust on the drying 
laundry, the text presents a stereotypically sordid working-class world. 
David Trotter argues that this passage takes part in a contemporary 
debate about sexuality and contraception. The *enlightened" classes were 
perceived to practice contraception, while the lower class were 
believed 
to breed recklessly. Thus the socially efficient upper classes 
decreased, while the undesirable masses multiplied 
indiscriminately. In 
Ih2-YAS±B--La, nd sexuality and reproduction are seen 
to be constituted 
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differently for various social groups, 11 a truly formidable 
schematism". "101: 1: 1 Eliot Juxtaposes neurotic and frustrated bourgeois 
existence with the sexual "freedo&I of the working classes, exposing a 
gulf in attitudes and behaviour that "followed the line of a real social 
fissure which was asserting itself in terns of sexual conduct". < ',:, ' ) 
The fragnented dialogue in the pub "confirms" the cultural ubiquity 
of meaningless sexual intercourse: "He's been in the army four years, he 
wants a good time, / And if you don't give it to him, there's others 
will, I said" (11.148-9). Social existence is presented as vacuous, 
coarse and animalistic and sexual intercourse as a degrading, 
unfulfilling physical function. The women refer to sterilization 
(11.159-61), the medical equivalent of a modern society depicted as 
barren of value. The literary tone may be ironic - "good night, sweet 
ladies" (1.172) - but the allusion to mad Ophelia does nothing to dispel 
the implications of the women's conversation. The shadows of madness and 
death gather with the appearance of each f emale f igure. In an urban 
environment sexual relations are hampered, degraded, disgusting: women 
are seen as threatening, often repulsive. In the dehumanizing, 
manuf actured city, transcendent, wholesome romantic love proves 
impossible, a scenario to which Eliot's comments on Baudelaire attest: 
Baudelaire has perceived that what distinguishes the 
relations of man and woman from the copulation of beasts 
is the knowledge of 6ood and Evil ... Having an 
imperfect, 
vague romantic conception of 6ood, he was at least able 
to understand that the sexual act as evil is more 
dignified, less boring, than as the natural, 'Life- 
giving', cheery automatism of the modern world, ""' 
The Modern world is perceived to lack a true conception 
of Good: Eliot's 
argument, like the scene in the pub, links an aetiology 
of sexual and 
personal relations with a social aetiologY. 
The staccato chatter of the 
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woman in 'A Game of Chess' and the women who Prufrock overhears "come 
and go/ Talking of Michelangelo" recalls the clatter of nachinery. This 
speech is as deathly in the text's terms as the conversation in the pub, 
or the popular song about Mrs. Porter. The shadow of technology looms 
over human behaviour. The discourse of these women from different social 
strata is symptomatic of the "cheery automatisd' exemplified by the 
sexual encounter between the clerk and the typist. 
The perceived deathliness of this automatism may be given clearest 
expression in the closing section of the poem, which has often been read 
as representing cultural disintegration, textual incoherence or a fit of 
madness. The "fragments I have shored against my ruin" may well bear out 
all of these interpretations, yet the final section can also be taken as 
extending the machinic trope that has been traced thus far. The images 
of physical and mental breakdown in the closing section evoke Lacan's 
corps Marcel6, where the ego's unifying Gestalt is threatened by 
anxieties about the body's fragmentation. Just as social and textual 
relations are portrayed as fracturing, so bodily integrity is shattered, 
reduced to a unrelated sum of parts, like a dysfunctional machine. For 
Lacan, the classic drive components operate with reference to an image 
of bodily totality, and therefore Lacan ascribes priority to the scopic 
drive. A stable gaze guards against a return to the 
bodY_in-pieces of 
prematurity. The specular image functions by "framing 
the dream of 
wholeness and fleeiýag from the threat of fragmentation". 
"") Yet the 
male gaze has been consistently thwarted and dispersed 
in the text, its 
narcissistic mirror-image refracted and even 
fissured; the scopophilic 
eye can no longer centre the text. The return 
to the infantile corps 
-Mor'CeI6 is concomitant with the death 
drive's disruption of the ego's 
247 
inaginary Gestalt. The apparently inhuman mechanization of the field of 
sexual and social relations offers only the recurrent, deathly image of 
the uncanny lifelike automaton which institutes a compulsive, 
destructive otherness in the poem. The scattering of mind and body 
recalls the closing lines of 'Gerontion'. Once again the text ends with 
a draughty "ruin" offering only limited tenancy to the "masterful" ego. 
The next chapter will examine other dissolutions in texts where the 
motif of the sea produces a complex network of meanings: as a site of 
origins, of sexual difference and of cultural authority. The sea will 
also be seen to act as a site that both of f ers and disperses images of 
narcissistic and bodily unity, elusive dreams of "wholeness". 
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THAT OCEANIC FEELING: REFLECTIONS ON THE SEA 
Commenting on the restance at work in Beyond the Pleasure 
Princil2le, Derrida conceives of -the notion of "drift" in the text in 
distinctly maritime terms: 
Ariftin. q designates too continuous a movement: or rather 
too undifferentiated, too homogenous a movement that 
appears to travel away without saccade from a supposed 
origin, from a shore, a border, a coast with an invisible 
outline, Now the shore is divided in its very outline, and 
there are effects of anchoring, collapses of the coastline, 
strategies of approach and overflow, strictures of attachment 
or of mooring, places of reversion, strangulation or dL7ubIL- 
bind, II) 
Derrida nakes a connection between the sea, origins and borders in the 
course of engaging with an essay in which Freud confronts questions of 
origins and their relation to strange, unsettling and contradictory 
currents. The drift of Beyond the Pleasure Principle will return in this 
chapter, alongside Freud's associated work on narcissism and cultural 
pathology. The chapter considers the portrayal of the sea in work by 
Alfred Lord Tennyson, Matthew Arnold and Derek Walcott, assessing the 
ways in which the poems drift to a form of sleep, a sleep that is a 
drift from origins. The poems are structured across invisible or 
collapsing coastlines, sites where clear boundaries are breached and 
rendered indistinct. In the poems under discussion, the offer of self- 
present, originary plenitude ebbs and flows, and dreams of transcendence 
transform into anxieties of loss, engulfment or dissolution. The sea is 
figured as a contradictory and shifting dream-space, a site of wish- 
fulfillment and anxiety. Offering both a reflective and refractive 
254 
surface for the narcissistic gaze, the image of the sea sinultaneously 
confirms and unseats the authority and coherence of the subject. Just as 
divisions between land and ocean are represented as being traversed, so 
the sea overspills clear demarcations between self and other. In these 
poems, the sea is a dream-site across which track the recurrent concerns 
of this study: desire, death, origins, bodies and history. 
The Oceanic Feeling 
The symbolism of water and the ocean in dreams has long attracted 
the attention of psychoanalysis. 112ý Saturated with therapeutic discourse 
and "theological survivals" various kinds of psychoanalytic dream- 
interpretation have perhaps been beguiled by the figuratively "healing" 
or "redemptive" associations of water. Traditionally, literary criticism 
has also tended to invest representations of the sea in literature with 
religious significance: the sea is taken to symbolize timelessness, 
immutability and immanence, and is also associated with ideas of baptism 
and immersion, unity and dispersal, completion and obliteration. W. Y. 
Tindall typifies this approach: 
The motion and permanence of the sea, its depth and vast 
extent make it an image of refuge, danger, mystery, 
infinity, of all that is alien and welcoming, The sea is 
our origin and our end, and, whether in poem, dream, or 
myth, voyaging on it has always seemed our necessity; for 
life is a voyage and we embark in ships of society or self, "' 
Tindall attributes, variable symbolic value to the sea, before 
harbouring in the humanist clicht of the "sea of Life". Psychoanalytic 
criticism, particularly from a Jungian or archetypal perspective, often 
reads the sea in art as a metaphor of amniotic fluid, evoking a pre- 
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natal state. Maud Bodkin, for example, adduces a rebirth archetype that 
links dream and poetry that is characterised by a sense of sinking down 
towards quiescence, as in the womb. (sl For Freud, however, this return 
to af irst sleep is marked by ambivalence; in ' The Uncanny' he stresses 
that the phantasy of intra-uterine existence returns us to the most 
un. beimlic. b place of all (AL 367). - 
Significantly, however, Tindall and Bodkin raise questions of 
origins, instability and states of "otherness". The sea is a matter of 
beginnings and ends, danger and safety, "discovery" and loss. Freud's 
work on the "oceanic feeling" rehearses this oscillation between finding 
and losing the "self". In the opening section of Civilization and its 
Discontents, Freud considers the idea of an oceanic feeling which lies 
at the roots of the "religious attitude", a notion that causes Freud "no 
snall difficulty" (CSR 252). From the outset the discussion is beset by 
problems of separation and definition. Freud tentatively links this 
oceanic feeling, a quasi-religious notion of a "sensation of 'eternity', 
a feeling as of something limitless, unbounded" (CSR 251), with a 
primary narcissism fundamental to the constitution of the subject. The 
oceanic feeling "might seek something like the restoration of limitless 
narcissism" and thus the religious attitude may be traceable back to a 
feeling of infantile helplessness. From the oceanic feeling of infantile 
narcissism derives a sense of the ineffable that is mapped onto 
religious belief in adult life. Nonetheless, Freud contends that the 
I 
connection between this primary narcissism and religion comes at a later 
date in the subject's development. The ecstatic sense of "oneness with 
the universe" 
sounds like a first attempt at a religious consolation, as 
though it were another way of disclaiming the danger which 
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the ego recognizes as threatening it from the external 
world, (CSR 260) 
Freud makes clear, however, that disentangling and analysing 
intangible and ineffable quantities such as "feelings" frustrates any 
"scientific" discussion. Yet the difficulties of categorising feelings, 
or distinguishing between stages of psychic development, are 
structurally embedded in the section, since the development of ego- 
feeling is an ongoing process of separating inside from outside, 
pleasure from unpleasure, ego from world. The drift away from primary 
narcissisn imeans a constant renegotiation of boundaries. Initially the 
infant does not distinguisb between internal and external sensations, 
yet gradually learns to separate the ego and the external world as 
sources of excitation. A "further incentive" to disengage the ego from 
the external world and its "general mass of sensations" is prompted by 
the realisation that some sources of pleasure exist outside the infant's 
body (CSR 254). Only by a lengthy "rectification" through experience 
does the ego detach itself from the external world and learn to separate 
itself from unpleasurable excitations. Originally the ego "includes 
everything" and 
Colur present ego-feeling is, therefore, only a shrunken 
residue of a much more inclusive - indeed, an all-embraEing - 
feeling which corresponded to a more intimate bond between 
the ego and the world about it, (CSR 255) 
Ideational contents appropriate to this primary ego-feeling "would be 
"precisely those of limitlessness and of a bond with the universe" (CSR 
1 
255). In Lacanian terms, this "limitlessness" harks back to the 
"immersion of the human infant in the chaos of prematurity". The 
development of the ego - its maturing - is a process involving 
separation and detachment, isolation and bonding, a complex memory or 
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dream of origins. In Tennyson and Arnold's oceanic settings, the 
"religious attitude" and a desire for wholeness are effects of these 
conflicting trajectories and tendencies. 
"The unpluixb'd, salt, estranging sea" 
The sea is a resonant motif in Victorian literature and culture. 
Britain's sea-power guaranteed trade expansion and military domination, 
yet while the sea represented both the material locus and symbolic 
analogue of Imperial control, the sea was also literally and 
figuratively eroding the integrity and authority of Empire at its 
centre, the island of Britain itself, Long before Darwin began to trace 
the evolutionary development of the human species back to the ocean, 
Thomas Lyell's examination of Britain's changing geological state, its 
crumbling coastlines and long-term subsidence, began to undermine 
confidence in the stability and assurance of Britain as a geographical 
and cultural space. For Lyell, the sea is a subversive and corrosive 
element. Susan Gliserman cites some of his descriptions of the wilful 
destructiveness and antagonism of rivers and oceans in his Principles of 
Geology. The ocean "makes reprisals. scours out the channels. devours 
rich alluvial plains" and "commits ravages": the coast is "devoured by 
the merciless ocean", and "cliffs of great height are consumed every 
year". <7 :1 Land does not stay 
I 
stable: nature's laws are not immutable. 
The natural world is subject to endless process, change and ordered 
disorder, as Thomas Huxley stresses: "the most obvious attribute of the 
cosmos is its impermanence. It assumes the aspect not so much of a 
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permanent entity as of a changeful process.. Process, not matter, is the 
final reality". "-' 
Representations of the sea produce aporias in Victorian texts, 
radically challenging cultural, epistemological and ontological 
certainties. In the poems under discussion, the sea acts as a mirror in 
which the gaze seeks narcissistic solace or confirmation, but instead 
this mirror produces an unsettling moment of m6connaisance, where the 
subject sees itself as "other", drifting out beyond safe boundaries. 
This estrangement suggests an analogy with the dreaiir-space, where the 
"I" that looks is "estranged" from the other that "I" am. The poems 
offer synbolic geographies, with abraded coastlines and uncertain 
margins between land and water. The way in which representations of the 
sea break down clear oppositions in the poetry makes another connection 
with the dream-work: the poems operate across and erode distinctions 
between the familiar and alien, order and disorder, permanence and flux, 
creation and destruction. The sea f igures a mlse-en-sc6ne of phantasy 
where identity - both individual and cultural - is in dissolution. 
Antony Easthope terms this scenario a Darwinian phantasy, " the 
imbrication of ideological reference to the universe, faith and doubt 
with pathological forms of phantasy". "" In this phantasy, the masculine 
ego is in crisis, "threatened when the subject, faced particularly with 
the other-directed materiality of nature, can no longer find support 
for itself in a reflecting object". ': 10) This analysis can be extended by 
I 
asserting that the sea refuses a stable subject/object relationship; 
it 
is nature "in process", moving onto the subject's ground, encroaching on 
coastlines and spilling over boundaries. This disruptive process will 
be 
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traced in two poems by Tennyson, 'Crossing the Bar' and Section CXXIII 
of In Memoriam 
A_Xoving Tide 
'Crossing the Bar' 
Sunset and evening star, 
And one clear call for me! 
And may there be no moaning of the bar 
When I put out to sea, 
But such a tide as moving seems asleep 
Too full for sound and foam 
When that which drew from out the boundless deep 
Turns again home, 
Twilight and evening bell, 
And after that the dark! 
And may there be no sadness of farewell, 
When I embark; 
For though from out our bourne of Time and Place 
The flood may bear me far 
I hope to see my Pilot face to face 
When I have crost the bar. "" 
The entrancing, lulling rhythms, stoic resignation at human mortality 
and the hypnotic lure of the tide would appear to situate Tennyson's 
poem within Tindall's symbolic mapping of sea-literature. Its elaborate 
gesture of "farewell" is a rhetorical "signing-off": Christopher Ricks 
notes that Tennyson left instructions that the poem be placed "at the 
end of all editions of my poems". " 12ý The poem's "religious attitude" is 
partially subnerged but discernible, and its strategy clearly evokes the 
notion of life as a, voyage, yet any eternal verities that it offers are 
simultaneously undercut. The title recalls Lacan's bar between signif ier 
and signified, a bar that the seeming transparency of the language - its 
straightforward rhyme scheme, consistent rhythmical pattern and clarity 
of statement - attempts to ef f ace. Geof f rey Hartmann's con nt on ' The 
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Lady of Shallott' is also pertinent here: "Tennyson's poetic dream-work 
seems at first no work at all. It is so easy, so unlaboured - 
deceptively "idle". -ý Oscillating between wake and sleep, declaration 
and qualification, overt statement and ambiguous suggestion, the poem 
offers both a plenitude and a lack of meanings, shifting between a 
"personal" meditative tone and a more general focus: its language is at 
once specific and abstract. Not dissimilarly to Frost's 'After Apple- 
Picking', the poem is saturated with hints and allusions, rendering 
meaning ambiguous and elusive. As Alan Sinf ield argues, this strategy 
gives the illusion that the arbitrariness of language is controlled: 
The elaborate diction, the obtrusive syntax and the intense 
effects of sound and rhythm all act in the same direction, 
They offer not an enhanced transparency in the relationship 
between sign and referent, but an unattributed density in 
the sign itselfjennyson creates, as it were, a plenitude 
of the sign, Language cannot be brought closer to the world, 
but it can be made more full and substantial in itself, In 
Tennyson's writing any particular word has, or appears to 
have, many reasons for being appropriate,, "" 
Easthope reads the disjunction in Victorian poetry between 
"explicit assertion and its subtextual implication"'. 1-51 in terms of 
rationalisation and disavowal. Rationalisation is compared to secondary 
revision in the dream-work, in that both processes turn latent ideas and 
images into more plausible, consistent and acceptable forms. Thus there 
is a split in Victorian poetry between "'manifest' and 'latent' levels 
of discourse" (166). Easthope argues that Victorian poetic language 
allows literary text, s to move along a "continuum from one point, that of 
day-dream, towards (though never reaching) another, that of the night- 
dread' (143). The poem's setting at "Twilight" figuratively parallels 
this transition from day- to night-dream. As night approaches, a 
tentative wish modulates into anxiety and indeterminacy; the pleasure of 
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Ilegoistic day-dreams" (AL 141) draws to the threshold of dream-work, 
where pleasure becomes ambivalent and the ego lacks coherence and 
authority. " Twi 11 ght 11 also suggests the blurring or dilution of 
boundaries. The poein is organised by a series of differences that are 
constantly shifting: land and sea, distance and proximity, connection 
and separation, certainty and doubt. As was argued earlier, the 
distinction between "creative" day-dreaming and night-dreams, or 
"nanifest" and "latent" levels, proves sinilarly inexplicit. 
The transition or negotiation between day- and night-dream returns 
to the original sense of metaphor as bearing across. The work of 
metaphor represents an attempt to cross the bar of signification, to 
access a transcendental signified. The language of poetry runs aground 
on that bar or foreshore between signifier and signified, stalled by an 
inability to get "beyond" or to achieve completion. Impelled by the 
ceaseless movements and currents of difference, poetry drifts in endless 
search of a resting point. The language of desire in dreams - the 
mechanisms of condensation and displacement - simultaneously anchors the 
chain of signification and frustrates interpretation: points de capiton 
constitute merely temporary anchorage. The dream reveals the work of 
desire, not desire itself. 'Crossing the Bar' can be read in terms of 
dreams not simply because it expresses desire or resists interpretation, 
but because it is transformed and disfigured by what it articulates. The 
speaker scans the horizon for a transcendental signified, but the sea is 
I 
resolutely extradiscursive, its "unplumb'd" limits beyond articulation: 
what the "boundless deep" contains or promises is uncertain. The 
qualified anticipation that "The flood may bear me far" suggests both 
imnersion in the undifferentiated flux of prematurity (and the 
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joulssance of the death drive) and an anxiety of engulf me r1t. 
Transcendent meaning lies beyond the "bourne of Time and Place"t but 
paradoxically Faith and the immortality of the subject will be affirmed 
or achieved only through its dissolution. 
Although the poem appears to affirm a religious certainty in an 
afterlife, it enacts a hypnopoetics that does not dissolve the bar 
between the human subject and Truth or Eternity, but induces a 
disruptive hesitancy or faltering. The sea nay symbolize eternity or 
origins, but evolutionary theories challenge such a teleology, and in 
their wake the subject is rendered contingent and finite. The text's 
move towards sleep is not easy or assured: its rest is disturbed, its 
destination or goal - quietude and stability - is beset by an unsettling 
drift. The poem is full of conditionals: "may" is repeated three times, 
and "hope" and "seems" imply doubt. The syntactical confusion of "But 
such a tide as moving seems asleep" provokes several questions: what is 
still and what is moving, and what is awake and what is asleep? The 
conditional "seems" merely exacerbates the uncertainty. The text enacts 
a circling pattern, impelled toward a future "at sea", and drawn back to 
land: "when" occurs four timest yet each time the protagonist returns to 
the shoreline. In the expressed hope of meeting "my Pilot" (an echo of 1 
Corinthians xiii, 12) lies a residual memory of primary narcissism, 
irl 
that the subject longs, Jilipossibly, to be brought "face to face" with 
its own plenitude,, a plenitude offered and denied 
by the poem's 
language. <'--; ' This projective meeting anticipates a form of arrival, 
and 
depends upon a call that is returned. The speaker, 
however, is still to 
11 embark", and the only call is that of the "evening 
bell", echoing the 
Warning bell in Keats's 'Ode to a Nightingale' which sounds 
"To toll me 
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back from thee to my sole stalf##, `17: ý This deathly tolling emphasises a 
relationship both of difference and distance between the transcendent 
other and the isolated subject, whose desiring identification with that 
immaterial, immortal other inerely emphasises the inadequation and 
frustrations of desire. 
In Nemoriam (CXXIII) more explicitly links sea and dreams, and in 
doing so, radically reconfigures the "bourne of Time and Place": 
There rolls the deep where grew the tree, 
0 earth, what changes hast thou seen! 
There where the long street roars hath been 
The stillness of the central sea, 
The hills are shadows, and they flow 
From form to form, and nothing stands; 
They melt like mist, the solid lands, 
Like clouds they shape themselves and go, 
But in my spirit will I dwell, 
And dream my dream, and hold it true; 
For though my lips may breathe adieu, 
I cannot think the thing farewell, "" 
Inages of a turbulent and impermanent nature in this section are typical 
of the poem as a whole; the sections on evolution were written before 
the publication of Chambers's Vestiges of Creation (1844), but the 
constant interchanging of land and sea echoes Lyell. Just as objective 
reality is presented as unfixed and subject to violent transformation, 
so the poem' s language struggles to impose any systematic understanding 
on both "external" and "internal" worlds. As Sinfield comments: "The 
structure and language of In Memo riam. are the product of a desperate 
need for order in the absence of any clear and agreed means of 
establishing it". ("Ll-I Here the speaker can dream only in the "spirit", 
for in places the deep of the ocean has reclaimed the land and the land 
has replaced the sea. The hills are mere "shadows, and they flow/ From 
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form to form, and nothing stands". The solid lands melt "like mist", 
transmuted into floating signifiers in a radical sense. Against a vast 
geological timescale, the loss of the tree is partially compensated by 
the replacement of "the central sea" by "the long street". This 
relativism offers little consolation: the section mourns the inability 
to return to that originary "stillness of the central sea". The loss of 
the "tree" (the Cross) and the vanished stability of the "central sea" 
allude to the ebb and flow of Faith charted in Arnold's 'Dover Beach' ; 
the images of "oceanic" blending and merging contrast with a mutable and 
alienating Nature that institutes lack and division. 
For all its attempts to cross over into the realm of the ineffable, 
the poem remains avowedly in the realm of the secular and material. The 
section foregrounds differentiation and isolation: the "solid 
lands. shape themselves and go" while only "spirit" and dreams hold. 
Whilst desiring immersion in private dreams, the subject remains obliged 
to detach itself froin an obliterating, engulfing sea as the only means 
to defend its status and integrity. It cannot "breathe adieu" to, cannot 
think the "thing" - the material world - farewell. The "thing" can also 
be framed by Lacan's rethinking of Freud's das DInE as the primordially 
lost object, an original source of pleasure and plentitude. The poem's 
closing line can thus be read as the inability or unwillingness to 
conceive of the end of desire, to think beyond the pleasure principle. 
Yet, as was seen in I After Apple-Picking' , this "beyond" is the very 
place where "spirit" dwells, a state of quietude and stability beyond 
the partial satisfactions and disruptive drives of the material and 
bodily world. 
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The text ascribes prophetic powers to dreams, foreseeing a future 
moment in which to "dream my dream and hold it true". Dreams appear to 
offer ontological and epistemological certainty; this accords with 
Isobel Armstrong's definition of Tennyson's poetic dreams as "a form of 
non-rational coherence and idealist experience". 120 ý' In this f utural 
poetics, revelation has already taken place: the dream/poem's projective 
orientation transcends or effaces the past and the present of its 
elaboration. Yet this dream cannot foresee truth or anticipate what will 
endure. The repetition of "dream" impossibly attempts to effect closure 
amid this melting, shifting landscape, a doubling that attests to an 
entropic trajectory. The text pulls in contrary directions, flowing from 
"form to form" (desire in the dreanwork is, after all, a question of 
form), desiring to return to origins and onward to an undefined future. 
The subject bids "adieu" to breath in a circuituous return to origins, 
only reaching beyond when no longer "itself". The tidal, self-cancelling 
patterns of the closing lines typify the poem's restless uncertainty. 
The phantasised return to primal origins or an anticipated spiritual 
transfiguration is concomitant with the subject's dissolution and 
dispersal. 
Given this epistemological and ontological ungrounding, it is 
hardly surprising that the ground occupied by the speaker in the text is 
so materially unstable, a lininal dream-space where "nothing stands". 
Both 'Crossing the, Bar' and Section CXXIII of In Memoriam chart 
transforming geographies. In this destabilizing exchange between land 
and sea, the securities of Faith dissolve and Nature, "red in tooth and 
claw", resists interpretive mastery and refuses abiding certainties. The 
subject's misrecognition of the ocean as a stable, unifying force is 
266 
/ 
exposed in this textual dream. The sea does not reflect back a 
narcissistic gaze or sustain this m6connalssance; rather, it diffuses 
the field of vision and blurs distinctions between pleasure and 
unpleasure. In this textual dream, the "I" comes to occupy a contingent 
space between "internal" and "external" reality, with "subjective" 
coherence challenged by bewildering and disruptive forces of change. 
Individual and social are indissociably interwoven: and, as in 'Crossing 
the Bar', even provisional distinctions between manifest and latent 
levels of meaning are difficult to sustain, since both poems destabilize 
the borders of inside and outside, public and private, conscious and 
unconscious. 
The Sea of Faith 
Two of Arnold's poems about oceans and shorelines, 'To Marguerite - 
Continued' and 'Dover Beach"2'", bear out the effects of an estranging 
sea that offers and refuses a complex set of origins, challenging 
epistemological, political and sexual mastery. In these poems, the "Sea 
of Faith" - religious faith, faith in culture and in the masculine 
subject - is in retreat. In its wake, it leaves crumbling certainties, 
just as the sea erodes the geological foundations and symbolic integrity 
of England's coastline. Both poems raise problems of separating pleasure 
and unpleasure, inside and outside, a reminder of the constituent role 
that, according to Freud, prinary narcissism plays in the oceanic 
feeling. The sea does not reflect back an ideal self-image for the 
masculine gaze. The poems fluctuate between representing the sea as 
timeless and as comfortingly dependable as the ebb and flow of the tide, 
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and portraying it as a turbulent, dark, unknown "continent". This 
deliberately echoes Freud's description of femininity as the dark 
continent: the margin ceaselessly crossed in these texts is, at least in 
part, that of sexual difference. 1: 22ý 
As with 'Crossing the Bar' , both poems are night scenes, full Of 
"sounds", both in terms of geographical location and resonances. The 
night-time setting situates the texts in the realm of dream and fantasy, 
suggesting that transition from day-dream to night-dream previously 
marked out in the discussion of Tennyson. Stephen Prickett emphasises 
the distinction drawn in Victorian literature between imagination and 
fantasy. Imagination is the supreme gift of the poet, a reflection of 
the divine. Fantasy, on the other hand, constitutes a gift of dreams, 
"delightful, alluring, compulsive, disturbing" and "akin to madness": 
for Arnold, fantasy represents a vice. "23: 1 The two poems can be read in 
terms of this duality between imagination and fantasy. In 'To Marguerite 
- Continued', the moon-lit "hollows" of the islands are "swept by balms 
of spring" and on "starry nights, / The nightingales divinely sing". 
Their "lovely notes" pour across "the sounds and channels" but this 
divine singing evokes not only Keats's ethereal bird but also the buried 
trace of sexual violence and the silenced female voice that echoes in 
the poem's "farthest caverns". The violence in this instance is that of 
a God that cools desire and severs it from its object. In 'Dover Beach', 
the world "seems/ To lie before us like a land of dreams", but these 
dreams are not beguiling or consolatory. Rather than instances of 
wishfulfillment, they seem duplicitous and illusory, "really" offering 
"neither joy, nor love, nor light, / Nor certitude, -nor peace, nor help 
for pain" . Dover's "sweet night-air" is filled with "the grating roar 
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of pebbles" and the "melancholy, long, withdrawing roar" of the Sea of 
Faith. This tranquil coastline becomes a "darkling plain" where 
"ignorant armies clash by night", and the calm seascape is "Swept with 
confused alarms of struggle and flight". 
In 'To Marguerite - Continued', the "endless bounds" of the islands 
appear to suggest the limitless oneness of the oceanic feeling, but the 
text foregrounds an infinity of divisions and separations. With "we 
mortal millions" scattered across "the shoreless watery wild", there is 
no end of boundaries and demarcations, in contrast to the fluid mobility 
of the ocean. The estranging flow of the sea mirrors the conflicting 
currents of the closing stanza: 
Who order'd, that their longing's fire 
Should be, as soon as kindled, cool'd? 
Who renders vain their deep desire? - 
A God, a God their severance ruled! 
And bade betwixt their shores to be 
The unplumb'd, salt, estranging sea, 
The heavy caesurae and the "cool'd" fires of "vain" desire typify the 
irresolution and tension of these lines. A. Dwight Culler remarks that 
underneath the surface of these disconnected islands, they are connected 
by volcanic fire"", yet the unbounded depths of the salt waters 
nullify any geological unity. Another immutable power renders desire 
"vain", terminating the stanza's questions, but the identity of this 
"God" remains ambiguous. Bernard Richards locates this figure in 
Arnold's work as a form of superego: "Arnold's [God] is a combination of 
I 
his own conscience and a penumbra of social duties and parental 
disapproval. The Father is present, but not God the Father as the 
orthodox might understand him"-`-: "" This God or Father rules the 
"severance" between desire and fulfilment, individual and collective, 
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presiding over alienation, lack and absence. The severing intervention 
of God can be read as provoking an Oedipal anxiety of castration, 
instituting lack and inadequacy (although such a reading once more 
raises problems of pathologizing texts). A phallogocentric presence of 
denial and division punishes desire: in this isolating, "estranging" 
sea, somarges" will never neet again. 
Yet, as Lacan stresses, it is inaccurate to regard the superego 
merely as a punitive or repressive agency, exacting retribution for the 
pleasure-seeking excesses of the ego. Lacan follows Freud in pointing 
out that the hostility of the superego is more systematically directed 
at the ego than the id. Contrary to popular conceptions of the superego 
as an angry, restrictive conscience, it is only through the agency of 
the superego "that it is possible to attain anything at all of the 
subject's relation to desire". The superego can enable, even 
liberate desire, as Lacan argues: "The true function of the Father.. is 
fundamentally to unite (and not to set in opposition) a desire and the 
Law" (E 321). The superego is thus representative of both the Imaginary 
and the Symbolic orders. Although the Symbolic order imposes the law of 
the signifier on narcissistic formations, it "grants access to desire" 
and is itself subject to the possibility of transformations. The 
symbolic suppresses narcissism but does not close off desire. For Lacan, 
" the superego is at one and the same time the law and its 
destruction" - (27: ' So, the God in Arnold's poem, 
far from severing the 
subject from desire, can be seen as granting access to desire. The 
text's "vain" desire - its emptiness and frustration represented by the 
echoing caverns, ethereal birdsong and subjective isolation - founders 
on the lack at the heart of language, not because of the strictures of a 
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repressive Father. This transcendent God actually institutes the lack of 
closure that sustains desire, presiding passively over an irreducible 
severance between desire and satisfaction. The repetition of "God" 
suggests that the absent presence frustrating desire is Desire itself, 
that which figures, through repetition, as lack. 
The littoral or "watery plain" that separates the Imaginary and 
Symbolic orders in the poem can be set alongside a God that is displaced 
as a nexus of authority, order and truth in the Victorian period. A 
range of discourses played out an abyssal trope, whereby God's divine 
plan of Creation was constantly readjusted to incorporate successive 
scientific discoveries about geological and natural history. These 
discoveries configured a God that permitted its own unseating, 
prefiguring the God-shaped hole of Modernism. God functions as a 
defining absence in 'To Marguerite - Continued'. There is a "longing 
like despair" for the sea's enclasping flow; the nostalgia for wholeness 
and the merging of boundaries evokes an originary state when "we were/ 
Parts of a single continent". Thus the sea acts as an index of division 
and unity, of separation and binding, Symbolic and Imaginary orders. 
Ruth Pitman notes that in the poem the sea at once cherishes and 
destroys the land it enclasps: "The sea offers an embrace which may be 
deadly, may define bounds or eliminate them, dissolving the distinction 
between sea and land". 12aý This dissolution of boundaries parallels the 
text's transactions, between enclosure and dispersal, wholeness and 
differentiation. The scattered islands symbolize atomised human 
relations "in the sea cif life enisled, / With echoing straits between us 
thrown". This material estrangement is exemplified by the English 
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Channel, that protective and isolating boundary in 'Dover Beach' 
Iforiginally" Joined to mainland Europe. 
Pitman observes that in 'Dover Beach' the cliffs represent a 
"supremely English place -a stronghold of patriotism, faith and 
tradition" (110). Dover's symbolic authority stands opposed to dark, 
unruly mainland Europe in the wake of the 1848 liberal revolutions. The 
poem's scenario echoes Thomas Arnold's letter in 1837 on Dover's 
symbolic significance and the quelling of pressure for radical political 
change in France and England: "The tide is turned, and will advance no 
higher till the next flood; let us only hope that its ebb will not be 
violent.. " (cited by Pitman, 114). Yet after Lyell's mapping of 
Britain's subsiding and constantly transforming coastline, this familiar 
landmark is not impervious to historical change: Dover offers "visual 
evidence of erosion" (119). Mainland Europe is both assuring and 
threatening: a caln but estranging sea separates its landmass from 
Dover, and its "confused alarms" disturb the "tranquil" bay. In Jb& 
Enchaf'd Flood, W. H. Auden discusses ways in which literature invests 
the sea with ideological significance, presenting it as typifying both 
order and anarchy: 
The sea, in fact, is that state of barbaric vagueness and 
disorder out of which civilization has emerged and into 
which, unless saved by the efforts of god and men, it is 
always liable to relapse, It is so little of a friendly 
symbol that the first thing which the author of the Book 
of Revelation notices in his vision of the new heaven and 
earth at the end of time is that 'there was no more sea'. 1291 
Arnold taps into these codings of the sea as primevally formative but 
also alien. The Channel encloses England, maintaining its cultural 
integrity, but it also produces division and instability. The text 
displays a profound ambivalence towards the continent and more 
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particularly to the estranging sea, drawn to a classical European past 
and the universalizing vision of a Sea of Faith folded around "earth's 
shore" , while simultaneously tending towards introspection and 
"subjective" uncertainty. As Ruth Pitman argues, the speaker is "moved 
by the distant, encircling, guardian sea, and by its other aspect - the 
dangerous, encroaching 'corrosive tides' which threaten England's 
coast". ý3c, -, 
Just as in The Waste Land, fragments of a classical past are used 
to shore up a disintegrating contemporary landscape. The text accesses 
Sophocles as an index of cultural continuity, a figure who understood 
"the turbid ebb and flow/ Of human misery". Yet the "thought" heard in 
the poem - the retreat of Faith - resounds in the present and arises out 
of a Northern sea, not the Aegean over which Sophocles presided 
paternally. As an exemplum of the coherence and permanency of Western 
civilization, Sophocles is figuratively close to Dover, yet also spatio- 
temporally "distant". Thus he represents a Father that is both present 
and absent. This oscillation between "here" and "elsewhere" typifies the 
text's fort1da scenario. As an exemplary space, Dover should reflect 
the subject's authority and confidence in nature. The Sea of Faith 
withdraws precisely as the real tide comes in: the tide of faith 
disconcertingly, and impossibly, does not f low back. Faith's ebb does 
violence to the text, depriving the subject of the illusion of plenitude 
and historical continuity. The text's ebb and f low between containment 
and exclusion, unity and disorder constitutes what Pitman evocatively 
calls "the sea's night-battle with the land". "' Despite stark 
contrasts between light and dark, demarcations between inside and 
outside, land and sea are progressively blurred into a "long line of 
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spray" that lacks "certitude". As the littoral between security and 
instability, familiar and unknown, self and other, the shore can be read 
as constituting the margin between Imaginary and Symbolic, where 
narcissistic identification confronts the realm of language and the Law. 
The register of the Inaginary sustains a bipolar logic of agency and 
passivity, and in the text's night-battle, land and water act and are 
acted upon. The inability to distinguish between whole and partial, 
internal and external might seem to represent a return to the 
uncoordinated matrix of impulses that characterises prematurity, but the 
separations and invasions played out in the poem - thus brought into the 
realm of representation - foreground difference and lack. The phrase 
night-battle also suggests the work of desire in dream-work. Dreams are 
boundary phenomena in which similar crossings to those enacted in 'Dover 
Beach' take place: crossings between body and representation, coherence 
and fragmentation, stability and transformation, language and 
inarticulation. 
Dover's landscape is in process, and in response to a changing 
field of vision, the speaker solicits a confirming look from the lover 
who is called to the window, hoping to find communication beyond 
language, "in a shared gesture, a glance of mutual understanding". 
This shift in perspective is an attempt to institute a form of control 
over the heterogenous field of desire offered by "the land of dreams". 
The sea is scanned ,f or a 
def ining or constituting ref lection, but it 
refuses strategies of visual mastery. The subject's imaginary function 
is dependent upon the proximity, unity and substance of the object, or 
its other; yet here the sea's tireless encroachment and withdrawal is 
destructive, and its "nature" defeats description. In both Tennyson and 
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Arnold, the sea does not function as a neutral reflective plane: rather, 
it refracts or even shatters the subject's gaze. It nakes visible the 
illusory and alienating "virtual" unity of the mirror-image, installing 
difference between the subject and the "outside" world. Scrutinizing the 
ocean, the subject is forced to see not as it would see. Gazing on the 
sea in the search for meaning, the observer resembles the figure evoked 
in Arnold's letter to Clough, "one who looks upon-- water as the mediator 
between the inanimate and man". The sea can be taken to mark the 
vanishing point between animate and inanimate, extradiscursive and 
discursive, instinkt and treib. As in 'Crossing the Bar' , the sea 
remains an ineffable, inexpressible otherness. It excites a yearning in 
the subject but is beyond articulation, synbolizing the "somatic 
substratum" of organic force that exists prior to drive energy entering 
the realm of identification and representation. The endless motion of 
waves - "Begin, and cease, and then again begin" - evokes the subject's 
search for an elusive and frustrating original source of satisfaction. 
Inexhaustibly mobile, extra-human, massively silent, the sea's impact on 
the f our poems discussed is analogous to Lacan's sense of the real, 
which he def i-nes as the "impossible". " 34: ' Above all, in these poems the 
sea is impossibly made to stand, in turn, for self-present meaning, 
eternity and desire. 
Eastbope and Nornan Holland offer distinctive readings of 'Dover 
Beach' in terms of various categories of phantasy. Easthope reads the 
I 
poem in terms of delusional Jealousy and castration anxiety, 
particularly when that anxiety is projected back onto the feminine, 
hence the speaker's urgent demand for fidelity. The cliffs are 
phallically upright against the emasculating fluidity of the sea, but 
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the skirts of the surf are unfurled on the beach. The poen operates 
through a series of dualities and hinges on the littoral between land 
and sea, tide and foreshore: the "difference" at this margin represents 
"sexual difference". 13-': 1 Vhen the (female) sea withdraws its protective 
girdle from the (male) land, masculine authority is exposed, thus re- 
instituting castration. This "novel affirmation of the feminine" ensures 
that sexual relations become "a nightmare to and fro"-"" Holland 
engages with the poem in terms of infantile sexuality within a classic 
Freudian symbology. The cliffs are breasts, and the sea and air stand 
for "nurturing fluids". 137: ' The "clash by night" is a sexual metaphor 
relating to a primal scene fantasy. In this fantasy, the infantile wish 
to "take in" from the nurturing naternal world is countered by the sound 
of the retreating sea, which is associated with the mother's withdrawal 
and her sexual involvement with the father: 
That other, separate adult life has a naked, nighttime, 
rhythmic sound, It does not lie there like a land of 
dreams - rather, it is violent, passionate, brutal; the 
bright girdle is withdrawn and bodies clash by night, (122) 
Holland offers a normative reading of the poem's formal unity and its 
attempt to "give us pleasure and create a satisfying, rounded 
experience" (123), but he links the text's ebb and flow to the "coming 
and going" of something that should be there. He contends that the sense 
of geological decay in the poem corresponds to the child's disillusion 
at the mother's withdrawal. Holland's notion of "coming and going" and 
Easthope's "to andý fro" touch on the dynanic of withdrawal and 
restoration played out in the text. 
Both of these approaches read the poem in terms of pathological 
structures or categories, and Easthope's is a persuasive interpretation. 
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Yet in these poems by Tennyson and Arnold, it is precisely the 
consequence of the land meeting the sea that the subject is radically 
dispersed, and the shifting shorelines render problematic any 
pathological reading of the " I" in the text. This dispersal of the 
subject connects these poetic texts and dream-texts, in that both are 
concerned with crossing and dissolving boundaries. In each poem the 
subj ect Is authority and coherence dwindles: desire insists and 
dissipates in the text, drawing it towards quietude and nullity. The sea 
is both protective and disruptive, comforting and isolating, instigating 
the same tidal rhythms that are articulated in 'To Marguerite - 
Continued', and that are recurrent in the poetic dreams discussed so 
far. The sea grounds and ungrounds the knowable, constitutes the matter 
of the poetry and shapes its mode of articulation, forms both the frame 
and the substance of the poems. The sea represents the "manifest" 
content of these poems, yet in the way it frames each text, it functions 
analogously to the operation of desire in the dreamr-work. (Desire cannot 
be thought of as the content of the dream. ) The sea is inscribed as a 
disruptive textual effect: it is the nodal point where the poems are 
lulled to a disturbed rest. 
Superimpositions 
In proposing that the central component of the oceanic feeling in 
I 
adult life is the restoration of limitless narcissism", Freud 
emphasises that "we have a right to assume the survival of something 
that was originally there, alongside of what was later derived from it" 
(CSR 255). In tracing the residue of a desire to return to or reactivate 
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a previous or originary state, he is drawn to consider the question of 
psychic preservation and survival in terms of classical remains. This 
archaeological ground has already been (un)covered in Delusiona and 
Dreams in Jensen's Gr-adlva, where Freud stresses the ability of dreams 
to preserve and restore; in phantasy, the subject can in effect cross 
time and space. The transformations of dream7-work weave together old and 
new, original and derivative elements. As Jensen's story demonstrates, 
this duality produces uncanny effects: in drawing parallels between ego- 
feeling and the oceanic feeling, the all-embracing tendencies of primary 
ego-feeling persist as a counterpart (an echo of the uncanny double) to 
the demarcating, mature ego-feeling. Freud's return to the past, with 
its ghostly traces and survivals, can be seen to make a connection with 
Arnold's thought on past and present civilization in Culture and 
Freud uses the analogy of Rome's historical development and 
transformation as a city to consider the problem "of preservation in the 
sphere of the mind". The "Jumble of a great metropolis" - its ruins and 
restorations - is likened to a psychical entity 
in which nothing that has once come into existence will 
have passed away and all the earlier phases of development 
continue to exist alongside the latest one, (CSR 257) 
Freud stresses that no memory trace is destroyed; in mental life 
"everything is somehow preserved and that in suitable circumstances.. it 
can once more be brought to light" (CSR 256). Modifications and 
I 
qualifications are proposed, but Freud maintains "that it is the rule 
rather than the exception for the past to be preserved in mental life" 
(CSR 259). The analogy between the history of an ancient city and the 
development of "a mental organism* proves inadequate, but Freud' s 
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digression is narked by a distinct reluctance to sacrifice the 
imaginative possibility of representing "historical sequence in spatial 
terms". Freud truncates the speculation by concluding that "ItIhere is 
clearly no point in spinning our phantasy any further, for it leads to 
things that are unimaginable and even absurd" (CSR 258). Yet this 
"absurd" phantasy appears remarkably reminiscent of Freud's description 
of the process of condensation in dream-work, with its superimposition 
and transformation of elements. The preservation of psychical (and by 
implication cultural) traces through time is a meshing together of the 
"original" and derivative, an act of doubling that disorders space and 
time. Redeploying Freud's example of Rome's development, successive 
images of its urban expansion and architectural alterations and 
demolitions would condense pictorially upon one another, like a film 
sequence of dissolves and fades. Only here the "frame" would not merely 
depict a new mlse-en-sc6ne: the former scenes and images would also be 
traceable, absorbed but not obliterated by these superimpositions, 
enacting a pattern of constant re-framing. Such a sequence would render 
restoration in "original" form impossible, but each trace would be 
preserved and reinscribed in the "new" scene. "01-3 
Rome's changing forms preserved in this spatial phantasy offer a 
clear analogy with the mobile forms of desire that make up the dream- 
work. The mapping of Rome's ruins echoes other classical survivals and 
restorations - Pompeii, the Acropolis - in Freud's work. Ancient remains 
make spectral appearances in the present, surfacing like long-buried 
memories and primal psychic traces. This archaeological phantasy is 
expressed not only in psychosexual terms but also in the guise of a 
cultural "pathology", for which Freud professes his inadequacy in the 
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closing section. The spinner of this phantasy is a visitor "equipped 
with the most complete historical and topographical knowledge" (CSR 
257), who can trace connections beneath an urban "Jumble". Freud's 
speculative venture is implicitly concerned with commemoration and 
maintenance, with imposing order on centuries of change. Both Rome and 
the psyche have "copious" pasts that stand the test of time. 
Freud's conception of historical and psychic preservation can be 
brought into conjunction with Arnold's notions of tradition and cultural 
continuity in Culture and Anarchy, a work that revolves around exemplary 
models drawn from antiquity and a return to origins that manifests 
features reminiscent of the oceanic feeling as outlined by Freud. Arnold 
figuratively excavates classical remains to reclaim an original source 
of authority (and, implicitly, pleasure) and thus projectively renew 
contemporary culture. The reference to Sophocles in 'Dover Beach' 
privileges a pre-Judaeo-Christian cultivated sensibility that sets in 
perspective the "turbid ebb and flow/ Of human misery". Arnold's 
strategy is related to the distinction he draws between Hellenic and 
Hebraic culture in Culture and Anarchy. As a mode of life, Hellenism is 
"invested with a kind of aerial ease, clearness and radiancy": its end 
is "sweetness and light". In the "best art and poetry of the 
Greeks. religion and poetry are one", and since culture is the study of 
perfection, Greek civilization "did not err in having the idea of 
beauty, harmony, cpd complete human perfectiont so present and 
paramount" (67). Sophocles combines art and spirituality, and may be 
taken as an exemplary representative of the Indo-European Hellenic 
culture that constitutes the real roots of Western civilization. The 
idealized radiancy of Hellenism, with its offer of unbounded plenitude 
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and narcissistic unity, represents an oceanic phantasy in that it links 
oforiginary" subjective pleasure with "mature" spirituality. (This 
oceanic feeling - the aspiration to return to a transcendent state of 
oneness, imbricated with a religious attitude exhibiting nostalgia for a 
moment when the Sea of Faith was at the "full" - is registered 
particularly in 'To Marguerite - Continued'. ) 
In contrast, Arnold contends that the predominance of Hebraistic 
tendencies has brought about "the beginnings of our confusion" and at 
the "bottom of our present state" lies "the disbelief in right reason as 
a lawful authority" (137-8). In Arnold's terms, the 1848 liberal 
European revolutions might be construed as manifestations of Hebraisn, 
since they were prompted by material and political dissatisfactions and 
may be classified as a Hebraic striving against sin. The "present 
unsettled state" of England is a result of unrestrained personal 
liberty, "the notion of its being the prime right and happiness, for 
each of us, to affirm himself, and his ordinary self; to be doing, and 
to be doing freely and as he likes" (138). A lack of self-governance 
produces public confusion: anarchy in the private state threatens 
anarchy in the national state. Ironically, for all this unbridled self- 
assertion, Arnold claims that the subject is an "unhappy chained 
captive" under Hebraism. Hebraism valorizes sin as a "positive, active 
entity hostile to man", provoking "the difficulties of knowing oneself 
and conquering oneself which impede man's passage to perfection" (131). 
Under Hebraism the 'subject is divided, the opposite of the noble and 
divine nature of the classical self. The roots of cultural disorder 
derive from the subject's estrangement from itself. Political turmoil 
and fragmented subjectivity, the Hebraic legacy refused in Culture and 
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Anarchy-, cannot be excluded in I To Marguerite - Continued' and 'Dover 
Beach'. Though both poems attempt to sustain the idea of a coherent, 
autonomous and punctual subject, the rejected other returns to disturb 
the text's rest. 
Thus the figure of Sophocles, standing in synecdochic relation to 
Greek culture, paternally presides (at a distance) over attempts to 
restore cultural and individual harmony in 'Dover Beach'. This exemplary 
figure perhaps recalls the child's need for the protective father that 
Freud situates at the root of religion. He argues that the origin of the 
religious attitude can be traced to the feeling of infantile 
helplessness: "ItIhe derivation of religious needs from the infant's 
helplessness and the longing for the father aroused by it seems to me 
incontrovertible" (CSR 260). This paternal presence ousts the oceanic 
feeling as a central psychological component of religious belief. This 
is a highly significant usurpation, because in Lacanian terms the 
oceanic feeling derives from the Imaginary, while the father's 
protection lies in the realm of the Symbolic. This supplanting of 
narcissistic identification by paternal Law reflects back upon the 
oscillation between Imaginary and Symbolic registers in Tennyson's and 
Arnold's poens, particularly on the severing "God" of 'To Marguerite - 
Continued' . It also connects with Arnold's distinction between the 
harmonious Hellenic disposition and the divisive Hebraic Law, in that 
Hellenism manifests the ecstatic oneness of prematurity while Hebraism 
institutes difference within the subject. 
So far the discussion has considered representations of the Eaa in 
a Victorian, Eurocentric setting, yet Arnold's distinctions between 
mature culture and immature anarchy can easily be traced in Imperialist 
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discourses, in the sense of a civilized paternalism watching custodially 
over an Edenic New World. The final section explores the interaction of 
paternal "influence" and narcissistic phantasy figured through images of 
the sea in Derek Walcott's 'A Latin Primer'. 14' Walcott's poetry is 
marked by the superimposed paternal shadows of colonialism and literary 
tradition, echoing the notion of superimposition discerned in 
Civiliz I .. - ents. 'A Latin Primer', like Freud and 
Arnold, is also concerned with classical remains. 
The "swaying words of the sea" 
Joseph Brodsky remarks that an "oceanic infinity" surrounds Derek 
Walcott's poetry, a co=ent typifying a critical orthdoxy responsive to 
the redemptive, celebratory and universalizing aspects of Walcott's 
work. 141: 1 In many of Walcott's poems, seascapes are portrayed as 
consolatory and transformative, a highly traditional humanism 
articulated by Auden in The Enchaf1d Flood: 
On the one hand, the poets long to immerse in the sea of 
Nature, to enjoy its endless mystery and noyelty, on the 
other, they long to come to port in some transcendent 
eternal and unchanging reality from which the unexpected 
is excluded, (42) 
A common feature of Walcott's poetry is to associate the ocean with the 
timeless transcendence of art. In The Schooner Flight the sea symbolizes 
aesthetic, racial and political liberation: "my common language go be 
the wind, / my pageý the sails of the schooner FlIgbt" -C 
43 
-1' Although 
literature strains to imitate the immutability of the ocean, Caribbean 
seascapes are also portrayed as geopolitical reservoirs of historical 
memory: they are reminders of waves of colonial arrivals, slave 
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caravels, and the scattered Caribbean islands. This "watery wild" is 
isolating and estranging, like Arnold's ocean in 'To Marguerite - 
Continued'. (Walcott takes Arnold's closing line as the epitaph to the 
final section of his long autobiographical poem Another Life. Like 
Tennyson and Arnold, there is a discernible drift between blending and 
separation, unity and alienation in Walcott's work, and the sea 
represents complex and divided racial, historical and literary origins. 
'A Latin Primer' deploys an elaborate trope centring on the 
etymology of the frigate bird as a means of reconciling "native 
metaphor" with European languages and cultural heritage. This linguistic 
and cultural superimposition rehearses the ambivalence surrounding the 
"sound colonial education" professed by Shabine in 'The Schooner 
Flight' 1 4ý4 J, a classical education that offers a link with Arnold. The 
imperial legacy bequeathed by "Love's basic Latin" is both refused and 
accepted, mirroring the text's fort1da oscillation between shore and 
sea, past and future. The poem opens with an "I" being born into the 
"shallows" of language, yet this figure uses the "horizon" of "distant 
literatures" to guide "my long walk// home". Immediately there is a 
paradoxical move away from and return to origins. The sea is "home", 
where the protagonist 
, jound my deepest wish in the swaying words of the sea, 
and the skeletal fish 
of that boy is ribbed in me,, 
The "skeletal fish" gestures towards an evolutionary motif of life 
emerging from the ocean that surfaces in many of Walcott's poems. The 
sea fulfils a "deepest wish" for this boy, precisely the residue of 
infantile narcissism offered and refused in Tennyson and Arnold, 
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representatives of "mature" culture. Yet this prelapsarian state cannot 
be reclaimed in the "bronze/ dusk of imperial palms". The "old words" of 
Latin "discipline" childhood pleasure and imaginative freedom; the 
imposition of this educational-, Law suggests the transition from the 
Imaginary to the Symbolic order. As "a master at my college", the "I" 
wavers hypocritically between this imperial discipline and sympathy for 
the schoolboys, whose "lithe black bodies, beached, / would die in 
dialect". This leaves the protagonist "trying to find my voice" through 
"native" and inherited language. 
The frigate bird appears spectrally at midday: for the ancient 
world, this was the hour of ghosts, and recalls Gradiva's noonday 
appearances in Pompeii. The bird raises its "emblem" over "a sea without 
seasons", and it becomes a figurative means of transcending the 
"questions" of an imperial dusk: 
named with the common sense 
of fishermen: sea scissors, 
FrL, gata xagnificLans, 
the patois 
for its cloud-cutting course; 
and that native metaphor 
made by the strokes of oars, 
with one wing beat for scansion 
that slowly levelling V 
made one with my horizon 
as it sailed steadily 
beyond the sheep-nibbled columns 
of fallen marble trees, 
or the roofless pillars once 
sacred to Hercules, 
These closing stanzas enact a metaphorical fusion between the sea, art 
and the sacred to propose a transcendent, ahistorical state or place 
"beyond" racial and cultural differences. The "musing" protagonist's 
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vision triumphantly merges patois with ancient and modern European 
languages. Yet in the context of a colonial history of "fallen marble", 
Caribbean seascapes cannot function purely as "redemptive" sites. The 
frigate bird's flight emblenatises the wake of a ship sailing either 
towards or away from European waters. Seen fron the shore, its "Slowly 
levelling T' converges on a vanishing point on the horizon, implying 
unity and harmony. Observed from the sea, however, it represents only an 
ever-wide-ning wake: this "T', naking "one with my horizon", is both 
narrowing and widening. As in Tennyson and Arnold, originary unity is 
offered and refused. The text drifts between shore and sea, stability 
and movement, blending and separation, a recurrent pattern of motion 
which, as Brodsky points out, noves ashore and back to the horizon. " 
This "swaying" once again alludes to the "oceanic" feeling, its 
contradictory and destabilizing currents. The textual superimposition of 
"native" and cultivated elements is a narcissistic phantasy of wholeness 
and self -identical ity yet, as has been shown throughout, in dreams, 
phantasy and poetry the subject is not "one", not itself. Enthralled by 
the metaphorical possibilities of the sea, the subject is taken 
"beyond" itself, but not beyond the problematic allegiance to different 
and divergent "worlds" that are readable both as public and private. 
The texts discussed in this chapter are concerned with where "we" 
came from and where "well want to go, questions that all too easily lapse 
into hazy liberal sentiments about "self -discovery" These questions 
I 
gather a particular urgency after Darwin's speculations on human 
beginnings and ends, and Freud sees himself as the next participant in 
the process of decentring "man". Psychoanalysis demonstrates that dreams 
are not places of pleasurable or private escape, and the sea is a 
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metaphor for dream in the poetry of Tennyson, Arnold or Walcott only in 
its inability to satisfy "oceanic" desires for unity, plentitude and 
origins# As a cultural or poetic figure, it refuses the subject "the 
pure mirror of an unruffled surface" (E 15). On the contrary, encounters 
with the sea provoke strange dreams. A lack of anchorage and 
navigational certainty for the sUbject constitutes the legacy of sailing 
in the wake of Freud. 
287 
/ 
Footnotes 
1. Thp Post Card. - From jEnc'-rat _P6 to Frei - 
id aIld Beyond, trans. Alan Bass 
(London: University of Chicago Press 1987), p. 261. I have preferred Alan Bass's translation over that of Ian McLeod in 'Speculations - on Freud', since Bass's rendering makes the passage's oceanic associations more 
explicit. The concern with a shore or border returns in 'Living On - Borderlines', where Derrida considers the problems of defining the edge 
or bord of a text that submerges or overruns any notion of a shoreline (Bloon ed. , pp. 81-3). 
2. Freud maps images of water in the dream7work onto a symbolic 
geography of the body; the water-symbol in dreams is either of somatic derivation - pointing to a "urinary stimulus" - or is based upon "phantasies of intra-uterine existence" (TID 322,524). From this 
"classic" position, many branches of psychoanalysis move on to treat the 
symbolism of water and the sea as both an object of analysis -a typical 
motif in dreams - and as a hermeneutic model. Charles Mauron's 
psychocriticism, for example, argues against symbol-fixing in 
psychoanalytic dreamt-theories and proposes three levels on which to interpret the water symbol, this interpretive model paralleling the 
tripartite structure of the psyche. According to Mauron, at the lowest 
level water symbolizes the animal unconscious; the middle level is that 
of creation and destruction, the "open seas" of ambivalence; the 
uppermost level is that of wisdom, the superior unconscious. See Linda 
Hutcheon, Formalis; m and the Freudian Aesthetic: the Example of Charles 
Mauron (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 79. 
In 'Dream, Imagination, Existence', Michel Foucault recounts Ludwig 
Binswanger's analysis of a dream where the patient is "the anguished 
personage, but is also the sea" (p. 59). This night appear to privilege 
the dreamer as protean or transcendent, but Foucault emphasises that the 
subject of this dream is less an individual "I" who dreams - "a stroller 
who follows the endless shores of a beach" - than "the dream itself". As 
Simon During points out, in Foucault's reading "the 'first person' who 
dreams is not a socially constructed individual but (somehow) an 
expression of experience itself before the split into subjectivity and 
objectivity" (Foucault and Literature: Towards a Genealogy of Writing 
[London: Routledge, 19921, p. 30). Foucault's poetic reinscription of 
Binswanger's dream- i nterpretat ion bears out his assertion that "the 
dream, like every imaginary experience, is an anthropological index of 
transcendence" (p. 49). Significantly, universality, wholeness or 
teleology in the dream is invoked at the expense of a punctual, integral 
self: "The three-fold movement of a sea, first agitated, then caught and 
as if fixed in a deathlike iln bility, and finallyt let loose in joyous 
freedom, is the very movement of an existence (Existenz) abandoned first 
to the chaos of subjectivity which knows only itself, a freedom of 
incoherence, fantasy, and disorder; thent of a freedom invested in an 
objectivity which binds it to the point of overcoming it and alienating 
it in the silence of things dead; and finallyl of a freedom rediscovered 
as resurrection and deliverance... 11(p. 59). To a limited extent, the 
coming-to-being of this dream prefigures the currents of the poens under 
examination, at least in terms of disordered subjectivity and the 
(always-deferred) teleology of "resurrection and deliverance". The 
"silence of things dead", brought about by the alienating objectivity of 
"indifferent" nature, denotes the demise of the classical subject: in 
288 
the poems a final ecstatic freedom of full self-awareness remains unavailable and unattainable. 
An oceanic perspective or register is evoked during certain moments in the institutional isation of psychoanalysis. As Malcolm Bowie points 
out, Freud's followers are reported to have compared him to Columbus in his article 'On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement', and "without accepting or rejecting this comparison in his text, he borrows 
from the Parisian coat of arms a defiant seafarer's epigraph: fluctuat 
nec merg1tur ('it is tossed about but does not sink')" (Freud. Proust 
and Lacan, p. 30). Here Freud implicitly aligns himself with another epic 
voyager and empire builder, the discoverer of a New World. 3. Geoffrey Hartmann, Saving the Text, p. 99. 
4. The Literary Symbol (Few York: Columbia University Press, 1955), 
pp. 150-1. 
5. Bodkin, p. 68. 
6. Boothby, p. 201. 
7. 'Early Victorian Science Writers and Tennyson's In Memoriam: A Study 
in Cultural Exchange', Victor-! an Studies 18,3-4 (March & June 1975), 
p303. 
8. From Huxley's Evolution and 'Ethics, pp. 44-50, cited in Tess Cosslett, 
The 'Scientific Movement' and Victorian Literatura (Brighton: Harvester, 
1982), p-58. 
9. Easthope, PAP p. 164. Eliot's comment in Essays Ancient and Modern 
(London: Faber, 1946) about a poet "accidentally" expressing the mood of 
a generation might be appropriate in relation to this representative 
"Darwinian" phantasy, particularly in the case of Tennyson (p. 184). 
10. ibid., p. 166. 
11. The PoeM of Tennyson, ed. Christopher Ricks (London: Longman, 
1969), pp. 1458-9. 
12. ibid., p. 1458n. 
13. 'Psychoanalysis: The French Connection', in Psychoanalysis and the 
Question of the Text, p-111. 
14. Alfred Tennyson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p-86. 
15. Easthope, PAP p. 145. (Further references given in main text. ) 
16. In The Dream and The Underworld (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), 
James Hillmann comments that poetic sleep is a return to primary 
narcissism (p. 119). On the relation between primary narcissism and the 
"sublimating" capacities of art, see Leo Bersani in The Culture of 
Redemptinn (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 
- love is 1990), pp. 29-46. Bersani contends that first narcissistic 
masochistict and "ftjhe first psychic totality would thus be constituted 
by a desire to sbatter totality' (p. 38). This desire to be shattered out 
of all coherence may cast light on the emphasised separations and 
ambivalent currents of each of the poems under discussion in this 
chapter. 1 
17. The Co=lete Pnem- t p. 348. 
18. Tennyson, Poems, p. 973. 
19. The Language of Tennyson's In 1220ria (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1971), p. 39. 
20. Language as Living Form in Nineteenth Century Poetry (Brighton: 
Harvester, 1982), p. 194 , 
21. Arnold, Thp Cnn lete PnpTn--,, eds. Miriam Allott and Robert H. Super 
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp-61,135-6. 
289 
22. W. H. Auden remarks that the sea often functions in literature as a 
place lacking the "ties" of home or sex, thus bringing national and 
sexual difference into play (The Filghafld Flood (London: Faber, 1951), 
p. 65). See John Fletcher, 'Poetry, Gender and Primal Fantasy', in 
Formations of Fantasy, ed. Victor Burgin, James Donald and Cora Kaplan 
(London and New York: Methuen, 1986), pp. 136-40. Fletcher examines the 
11exotic overflow" in Emily Dickinson's 'I started Early - Took my Dog', 
where the dissolving margins between sea and shore enact shifts and 
ruptures in gender positions. 
23. Victorian FantdzýL (Brighton: 
-Harvester, 
1979), p. 6. 
24. Cited in Martin Bidney, '"A Dreaml' as Key to a Reverie Pattern in 
Matthew Arnold: Interactions of Water and Fire', Victorian Poetry, Vol 
26 (Spring/Summer 1988), p. 58n. Bidney offers a phenomenological reading 
of Arnold, via Bachelard's work on the primal elements of reverie, 
concentrating on "the ambivalences and dialectical interplay between 
Arnoldian fire and water images as they function at moments of intense 
experience" (p. 45). In this recurrent pattern of reverie in Arnold's 
poetry, fire is as much home as the sea and "water and f ire 
remain-interacting, duplicitous welcomers" (p. 57). 
25. Richards, p. 123. 
26. Boothby, p. 174. 
27. Boothby, p. 174. 
28. 'On Dover Beach', Essays in Criticism, Vol. XXIII, (April) 1973, 
p. 117. (Further references given in main text. ) 
29. Auden, pp. 18-19. 
30. Pitman, p. 129. Eliott L. Gilbert's 'The Female King: Tennyson's 
Arthurian Apocalypse', in Showlater ed., charts sone of the influences 
exerted on Victorian poetry by political upheavals in Europe, 
particularly the shadow cast by the French Revolution (pp. 168ff). 
31. Pitman, p. 124. The term "night-battle" comes from Newman's January 
1839 sermon, the terms of which anticipate Arnold's critique of the 
turbulent individualism and subjective estrangement of contemporary 
society in Culture and Anarchy: "Controversy, at least in this age, does 
not lie between the hosts of heaven, Michael and his angels on the one 
side, and the powers of evil on the other; but it is a sort of night- 
battle, where each fights for himself, and friend and foe stand 
together" (University Sermons [London, 18431, p. 193). Glossed by Allott 
and Super in Arnold's Complete PnRms, p. 530. 
32. Ian Gregor, 'Eliot and Matthew Arnold' , in Martin ed. , p. 271. 
33. Cited in Norman N. Holland, The D3mamin, ý nf Literary Response (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 123. 
34. Lacan's conception of the real is outlined by Richard Boothby: 
"Neither figured in the imaginary nor represented by the symbolic, the 
real is the always-still-outstanding, the radically excluded, the wholly 
uncognized. . The real is sheer, wholly undif 
f erentiated and unsymbolized 
force or impact.. It inhabits the secret interior as well. The real is 
therefore also to be associated with the active yet ineffable stirrings 
of organic need, the unconsciousness of the body" (p. 19). 
35. Easthope, PAP p. 164. 
36. ibid. , p. 165. It is possible to argue that, since the subject 
is 
radically ungrounded in this textual phantasy, the Law of the Father is 
neither acceded to nor recognised. 
37. Holland, p-120. (Further references given in main text. ) 
290 
/ 
/ 
38. This can be related to Lyotard's remarks on the symptomatic status 
of the work of art: "it is a set of traces referable in principle to a 
primal phantasy; it differs from one in that it bears these traces; 
exhibits them. Trace bearing trace, a representation which is itself 
representative". Lyotard's notion of "disseizure" also bears relevance 
to the work of framing in unconscious phantasy. In art disseizure is a 
space that phantasy encloses and upon which it is "reclosed". Phantasy 
constitutes both the frame and that which is framed, both form and 
content, originary and derivative: "the interior space, that which 
refuses all reception, which grips the primitive figure, escapes from 
it, turns around, returns to invest it and offers a stage for its 
operations". This pattern of return and repetition interweaves the 
inside and outside of phantasy with original and secondary elements and 
forms of phantasy. Lyotard draws an analogy between theatre and dream: 
"Theatre is the dream in that it fascinates and amounts to an 
hallucination giving rise to identification; and it is not the dream, it 
is the dream redoubled, the scene of the dream set on its own 
representation" (Driftworks, p. 37). 
39. Culture and Anarcly and Other Writings, ed. Stefan Collini 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 130. Further references 
given in nain text. ) 
40. Derek Walcott, The Arkansas Testament (London: Faber, 1988), pp-21- 
24. 
41. 'The Sound of the Tide, in Ls-sr, Than One (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1986), p. 166. The tendency to universalize Walcott's use of the sea can 
be gleaned from the title of J. A. Ramsaran's article, 'Derek Walcott: 
New World Mediterranean Poet' (World Literature Vritten In Englisb, 21, 
1 (Spring 1992). In The Government of the Tongue (London: Faber, 1989), 
writing that Walcott's verse sails "well rigged and richly cargoed 
(p. 23)t Seamus Heaney positions him within a European literary 
mainstream: 11-when Walcott lets the sea-breeze freshen in 
his 
imagination, the result is a poetry as spacious and heart-lifting as the 
sea-weather at the opening of Joyce's Ulysaes' (p. 24). 
42. Auden, p. 75. 
43. ' The Schooner Flight' , in Qn1 I ected PQems 
1948-84 (New York: Noonday 
Press, 1986), p. 347. 
44. ibid. , p. 346. 
45. Brodsky, p. 174. 
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CONCLUSION: CROSSINGS 
This study has addressed several recurrent and interlinked 
problems: the question of attributing desire and thinking about the 
unconscious of a text, and the associated difficulty of reading the 
shadowy mobility of desire in poetic texts. Dreamr-texts and poetic texts 
are linked by the ways in which they bring their "subject" into being 
through identification with an other. The subject is not constituted in 
advance of this identification: in both dreams and poems, subjects are 
truly made in an other's image. The discussion has also confronted the 
problematic and inco nsurate relation between the psyche and the 
social. In the texts discussed, figures are situated at the borders 
between mind and matter, body and culture, and their dissolutions are 
both "subjective" and "cultural". The ciphered "secrets", intertextual 
connections and hauntings of these texts bear the marks of an 
"unconscious" that is not decidably individual or social. 
The thesis implicitly advances a certain genealogy of later 
modernity, an historical conjuncture that predates and outlives Freud 
but that in part constitutes, and is constituted by, psychoanalysis. 
Psychoanalysis comes to be institutional ised in a moment of conceptual 
transition, negotiating between a European Romantic tradition that 
exalts the autonomous self and the scientific and systematizing drift of 
the late nineteenth and twentieth century. Freud's theoretical 
elaborations of the subject inevitably bear the marks of this crossing. 
Psychoanalysis seeks the origins of the subject but in its search is 
subject to its origins. At its outset, psychoanalysis bears (and can 
never bury) its debt to a characteristic fin-de-si4cle oscillation 
292 
between "official" branches of knowledge and practices and beliefs that 
hover on the edges of respectable science: telepathy, hypnosis and the 
occult. The Interpretation of Dreams self-consciously formalizes and 
rehabilitates superstition in the name of science. In Freud's work, the 
mechanistic and aesthetic, schematic and speculative, rational and 
mysterious play out a recurrent struggle that is actually a mutual 
contamination and affirmation. 
The complex double movements enacted in the formative stages of 
psychoanalysis have influenced its notions of subjectivity and 
representation for a century. Fluctuating between designation and 
conjecture, observation and hypothesis, Freud both affirms and ungrounds 
the category of the modern subject. Psychoanalysis simultaneously 
articulates what is intimately, singularly human and confronts the 
inpossibility of doing so. Operating at the borders of the knowable, the 
unconscious renders the subject in psychoanalysis (patient and analyst) 
ineluctably "other". When confronted with the question "who comes after 
the subject? ", Xaurice Blanchat considers a "who" that 
does not find its proper site, does not let itself be 
assumed by Me: the 'it' that,, without ceasing to be not 
personal, does not let itself be measured by the impersonal 
either, and keeps us at the edge of the unknown, ") 
A reading of poetry that goes "beyond" the subject need not suggest some 
historical dislocatfon or temporal progression that brings about the end 
of the subject; rather, in its relation to alterity the subject is 
always already beyond itself, since that beyond is the place of the 
unconscious. This recognition is a legacy of Freud, as Borch-Jacobsen 
proposes: "the Freudian subject Is the other, it is the same as the 
other". c2> 
/ 
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This complex identification with alterity does not propose a 
subject devoid of agency, purely under the sway of a machinic psyche or 
the immanent rhythms and force of language. Literary texts, like dreams, 
are boundary phenomena, negotiating between body and society, private 
and public, and their reading provokes a "rivalry of interpretations" 
both within and between subjects. 1dentificatory desire implicates 
the reader/interpreter who, drawn into or induced by that which s/he 
reads, necessarily reads "from", "in" and "through" otherness. The 
reading subject is suspended between waking and sleeping, succumbiDg to 
the lure of the text while trying to make sense of it, reading both 
inside and outside the text. Reading in the wake of Freud is reading 
strangeness; contemporary psychoanalytic criticism demonstrates that 
Freud's own interpretive strategies "are perplexed by a textuality into 
which analyst and analysand, dreamer and interpreter, are 
disconcertingly collapsed". ""' 
By interarticulating poetry and the poetics of psychoanalysis, this 
study traces the "silent" writing and crossings of desire in a range of 
texts that all invite the classification "literary". In reading Freud's 
essays alongside poetic texts, one might propose a form of telepathic 
familiarity, with psychoanalysis at various points anticipating 
literature as its addressee and vice versa. This would bear out Shoshana 
Felman's contention that 
,, psychoanalysis can 
be intraliterary just as much as 
literature is intrapsychoanalytic, The methodological stake 
is no longer that of the appIj'citj'on of psychoanalysis to 
but, rather, of their interMplicitj'on j'n each other, I" 
Thus psychoanalysis and literature cross over inescapably and 
productively. In 'Speculations - on Freud', Derrida outlines his 
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approach to the elaborate "crossings" performed by Freud's speculative 
family venture in Beyond the Pleasure Principle: "I give this word 
$crossing' all its genetic or genealogical chances. A certain writing 
will make its bed there". Bed is a place to sleep and dream, but 
dream is a place of disturbed rest. Writing "in" psychoanalysis or 
literature makes its bed a "chancy", uncertain crossing, where 
genealogies or secure groundings are not constituted in advance. The 
place of poetic texts, and the place of dream-texts, lie at precisely 
such crossing-points. 
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Footnotes 
1. 'Who? ' , trans. Eduardo Cadava, in Who QnMeA After the Subject?, eds. 
E. Cadava, Peter Connor and Jean-Luc Nancy (New York and London: 
Routledge, 1991), p. 59. 
2. 'The Freudian Subject, from Politics to Ethics' trans. Richard 
Miller, in Cadava, Connor and Nancy eds., p. 62. 
3. Vright, p-26. 
4. Elizabeth Freund, The Return of thp Rpad. er: Reader-Response Critini5m 
(London: Methuen, 1987), p. 132. 
5. Jagques Lacan and the Adventure nf TnRight: Psychoanalysis la 
Conte=orary Culture (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University 
Press, 1987), p. 49. Felnan argues that disagreements within Edgar Allan 
Poe's critical "heritage" over the "irresistibility" of his poetry 
exemplify a "poetic" reading effect in which the literary text becomes 
an object of desire, and to an extent produces its readers. ("Object" is 
interpretable as an other place or subject position since desire has 
been read throughout in terms of identification rather than 
acquisition. ) Felman asserts that "poetry is both what most resists a 
psychoanalytical interpretation and what most depends on 
psychoanalytical effects" (p. 51). She proposes that psychoanalysis might 
trace a poetic "unconscious" by conducting a "literary case history": 
this endeavour was attempted to an extent in Chapter Five in relation to 
6. 'Speculations on Freud', p. 86. 
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